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Unlike most of his predecessors and successors, 
Theodore Roosevelt long outlived his Presidential years. 
Because of his unusual physical and mental vigorousness, 
he could not resign himself to the customary secreted 
existence of American ex—Presidents. Instead, he main- 
tained a very active interest in politics and national 
affairs, and his atypical activity in these matters 
assured him a continuing place in the public spotlight 
and of being a perpetual target for journalists, authors, 
and critics. His every utterance concerning domestic 
issues, national preparedness, international morality, 
and Administration ineptitudes was interpreted as indi­
cating selfish personal ambitions* His accusers defined 
him as a man who would not hesitate to stoop to any level 
in order to achieve the fulfillment of his desires, while 
his defenders translated Roosevelt as a great leader, a 
seer, and as the greatest living American.
This thesis was undertaken with the view that 
further study into the last decade of Roosevelt's public 
life would expose a more moderate and realistic position 
between the extreme opinions about him. It is believed 
that the research involved did reveal such a position.
His dogmatic and self-asserting manner provided 
a basis for many types of charges against him. Since his 
political ambitions were not nearly so apparent to him as 
to his antagonists, Roosevelt was unable to attribute any 
credence to these charges. He appears to have been the 
conscious patriot and the unconscious politician, playing 
his unique role to the very hilt.
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PREFACE
As an ex-President, Theodore Roosevelt served his 
country uniquely. Unlike any of the men in American history 
who had formerly served as Chief Executives, Roosevelt re­
mained in the public limelight, active in national politics. 
From 1912, the approximate beginning of this study, he was 
especially vigorous in promoting domestic reform, advocating 
preparedness, preaching international morality, and opposing 
the Wilson Administration. This thesis is an attempt to 
bring out Roosevelt's contributions to his country and his 
influences upon the national character in these last years 
of his life, and at the same time to understand the degree 
to which his machinations were dictated by purely political 
considerations and/or by patriotic ferver.
Research into the questions surrounding Theodore 
Roosevelt's post-presidential life indicates that this 
highly controversial character left few authorities in the 
gap between the extremists, who attempted to label him 
either a saint or a devil. However, there appears to be 
a middle ground; and it is the purpose of this dissertation 
to bring it out.
Roosevelt was often accused of opposing Wilson 
purely for the sake of political opportunism and of break­
ing with various political leaders as well as with the 
Republican Party as a result of self-seeking. While there 
may be some validity to these charges, it seems naive to
iv
suggest that these were his sole motivations. He was con­
vinced of his own high patriotism, and he was self-assured 
that his words and deeds emanated only from it. He seemed 
unable to convince himself that these same actions could 
justifiably be interpreted as resulting from narrow, selfish 
political ambition. Although both politics and patriotism 
were omnipresent characteristics of Roosevelt, politics was 
an influence within him of which he was largely unconscious. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that he fought each struggle 
to its bitter end.
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CHAPTER I
ROOSEVELT: THE CONTROVERSIAL CHARACTER
It seemed he always knew where he was going. Life 
appeared to hold few unanswered questions for the mind of 
Theodore Roosevelt. His existence for over fifty years had 
been one filled with excitement, but it was an experience 
that gave every indication of following a calculated and 
definitive pattern. Even when the politico powers-that- 
were deemed it advisable to channel his accelerating strength 
into the American canyon of political oblivion— the Vice- 
Presidency— his destiny was not to be denied. With only the 
force of one bullet standing between him and the highest of­
fice of the land, providence and the omnipresent Rooseveltian 
luck hastened to provide the motivating munition. His trans­
fer from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other removed 
the hand of Theodore Roosevelt from the innocuous Senate gavel 
and placed it on the pilot wheel of the ship of state— a de­
velopment which brought limitless disquietude to his adversaries.
Twelve years later, as the United States approached 
the problems of almost-total world conflict, Roosevelt found 
himself in an almost helpless state of frustration for the 
first time in his life. He was only in his middle 50's, a 
moderately young age considering that he had already had more 
high positions and high honors than most men usually accumu­
late in a complete lifetime. He was too young to cease to 
care about his reputation or to abandon political ambitions 
even though he had reached the pinnacle of political success
2 the Presidency of the United States. Moreover, the Roosevelt
success was not limited to his abilities and achievements in 
politics. He was a prolific writer, especially on historical 
and botanical subjects; and he sustained a voluminous corre­
spondence with persons throughout the country and the world, 
which, like his conversation, sometimes reached avalanche 
proportions and inundated his subjects.
Though only a colonel, he had emerged from the Spanish- 
American Mar as a hero of wider national acclaim than any of 
his superiors. His flair for the dramatic had brought him to 
resign as Assistant Secretary of the Navy that he might join 
the call to the colors; and his torrid patriotism led him to 
undergo physical endurances of combat which could be expected 
only of younger men. He was truly a "perennial volunteer, 
and this escapade with the Rough Riders in Cuba was to give 
him the keys to the White House and a tenure of seven years
pas President. What then, afterwards, could logically be 
the object of the energies of so young an ex-President, so 
vigorous and bombastic? The perplexity of this problem
1 During his lifetime, Roosevelt had proposed the "harum- 
scarum" riders of his ranch as a cavalry battalion during 
U. S. troubles with Mexico in the 1880's, displayed jimgo 
enthusiasm at the time of American trouble with Britain 
over the Venezuela boundary, shown an enthusiasm for the 
annexation of the Hawaiian Islands despite risks of war 
with Japan, led a voluntary cavalry unit in the Spanish- 
American War, and displayed a determination to lead a 
division of volunteers in the first World War. Richard 
Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York, 1951+)* 
213. Hereafter cited as Hofstadter, Tradition.
 ^Stuart P. Sherman, Americans (New York, 1923), 277* Hereafter 
cited as Sherman, Americans.
3ultimately brought to him a condition of deep frustration
and heartbreak.
As the stormy second decade of the new century be­
gan to unfold, Theodore Roosevelt found it impossible to 
unshackle himself from the binding inhibitions which had 
enveloped him since his political defeat of 1912. Here 
was a natural-born leader of men, a man who had been in 
positions of military and political leadership and who 
seemed to thrive well on their challenge. But in the 
years of the Wilsonian Era, which he did not outlive, he 
seemed relegated to the status of a ''has—been** in these 
two fields of endeavor, fields which contained his primary 
interests. Yet, as the world became embroiled in its most 
terrible holocaust, Theodore Roosevelt was hailed by count­
less of his fellow countrymen, partisan and bipartisan alike, 
as the greatest living American.
After his parricidal attack on his own party during 
the fateful convention period of 1912, this man seemed des­
tined for political oblivion. Such would surely have been 
a certainty for anyone with less physical and mental virility. 
The critical nature of world events should possibly be cred­
ited in sustaining Roosevelt's national stature. It is 
generally believed that he had his sights set for 1916, and 
the Republican nomination— following the certain defeat of 
Taft and a reuniting of the party under his leadership. 
However, this was not to be for the man who was lured into 
the 1912 political imbroglio as the Progressive standard
bearer. In all probability, however, the healing effects of 
time, the nature of rapidly changing events, plus the effi­
cacy of the Roosevelt political technique would have made 
possible the coveted Republican nomination in 1920, had he 
lived to that day.
Having absented himself from the country in 1913 
in favor of an exploration in South America, and thus brought 
into play further the psychopathological analyses of his 
adversaries, the ex-President returned to the United States 
in time to experience and study the European crises of the 
summer of 1911}.. He had publicly stated that it would take 
some time for self-orientation on domestic and international 
affairs before he would be in a position to express his 
studied opinions thereon. And it was at the advent of hos­
tilities in Europe that Roosevelt again began to speak out 
and sought to establish his position once again in the 
national spotlight. The ensuing two years, with their 
interplay of forces, were to determine the political future 
of this unique American figure.
Probably the first big step which Roosevelt took 
toward developing a somewhat new status in American political 
affairs was to resign in June, 1911}-, as Contributing Editor 
of Outlook Magazine. In a letter to Lyman Abbott, Editor of 
the Outlook, he pointed out that developments over the past 
three or four years made it necessary for him to take a more 
active part in promoting throughout the country the principles 
of the Progressive Party.^ He further stated that he felt
3 Hofstadter, Tradition, 211}..
5honor bound to stand in strong opposition to the Administration, 
because it had stood for the "abandonment of the interest and 
honor of America" in international relations.^" He was con­
vinced too that he should strike out at the failure of the
£President's policies in domestic economic matters.-^
One of the greater challenges in any study of the 
Roosevelt life is the analysis of his attitudes on various 
aspects of the World War, and how those attitudes are recon­
ciled with any possible political ambitions which he might 
have had. Such is the purpose of this study. It is signi­
ficant, in the light of future events, that Roosevelt's 
massive correspondence reveals a somewhat delayed formulation 
of opinion on the most important issue at the war's begin­
ning— the German invasion of Belgium. As further development 
of this facet of the conflict will indicate, his initial and 
subsequent reactions to the affair were not the same, and in 
fact seemed somewhat contradictory. Originally, he was silent 
on the invasion issue, believing it to be merely one expected 
aspect of almost any warj then, within a few weeks, he be­
came quite vocal in his demand that the wrong to Belgium be 
righted. Were it not for this change in opinion, his personal
^ This statement without question was aimed primarily at 
Secretary of State Bryan, whose methods and policies were 
anathema to Roosevelt.
^ This letter to Lyman Abbott was acknowledged with the state­
ment that "no man can be both the leader of a great political 
party and an editor of an independent journal.w The Letters 
of Theodore Roosevelt, edited by Elting E. Morison, (8 vols., 
Cambridge, 1951-514-) 7VII, 559. This work hereafter cited
as Roosevelt, Letters.
6campaign for preparedness throughout the ensuing three years 
would not have had its most effective overtone— international 
morality and decency#
This was an era which found Theodore Roosevelt in a 
unique position. Universally, ex-Presidents of the United 
States find themselves of a rare caste. This was especially 
true of "T. R.", who was never quite able to adjust to this 
eccentric status. Probably more than any other Chief Execu­
tive, Roosevelt had been (and still was) a familiar person­
ality in the councils of Europe. And his extroversion had 
resulted in the development of a wide range of acquaintances 
and friendships at home and abroad. Among the prominent 
European personalities with whom he maintained correspondence 
were Dernburg, Von Sturam, Von Mack, Munsterberg, Kipling, 
Edward Grey, Spring-Rice, and Arthur Hamilton Lee#
With Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, Roosevelt had developed 
an intimate friendship following the event of the latter1s 
marriage to Alice Lee in Britain in 1886. At that time the 
distinguished Englishman served as Theodore Roosevelt’s 
"best man”. In 1912, Spring-Rice replaced Janes Bryee as 
British Ambassador to Washington, and at once joined the 
Roosevelt-Lodge circle of Republicans. It was said of him 
that he was "accredited to the White House, but he was
Laccustomed to draw his inspiration from Oyster Bay.”
 ^Frederic L. Paxson, American Democracy and the World War:
The Pre-War Years, 1913-1917 (Boston, 19 3&) > 3^ -* Hereafter 
cited as Paxson, Pre-War Years.
On the other side of the channel, Theodore Roosevelt 
had had much conversation with the Kaiser during his European 
visit in 1910; and these two personalities seemed to find 
great mutual interest in one another. It is evident, there­
fore, that Roosevelt had close associations both among 
leaders of the Central Powers and the Western Allies. This 
fact naturally resulted in suspicions and criticisms of him. 
Though he was an admitted Anglophile, Roosevelt was accused 
of having an affinity for Prussianism. Actually nothing 
deterred him from promoting his relationships on both sides 
of the front, a fact which was to prove invaluable to him 
as the war developed.
Unquestionably, Theodore Roosevelt was a zealous 
patriot. He displayed that characteristic at every turn of 
international events. He was also a master politician. His 
stature as a public personality was nurtured on these two 
traits. Though he had previously expressed opposition to 
the Wilson Administration, the war was only days old when 
he aptly stated that every American citizen should support 
any and all public officials who did all in their power to 
help the United States through the crisis unharmed, who main­
tained the honor of the United States, and who helped in 
securing peace and justice in the world.7 Cast in the light 
of his other statements at that particular time, this must 
be considered a true call for public unity behind the Presi­
dent and his administration. It should be noted that, to
"Mr. Roosevelt on the War," Outlook. CVII (August 15, 1914), 
886.
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this point, Roosevelt had not as yet found it in himself to 
be critical of the Wilson position on Germany's invasion of
Belgium. In fact, he had stated in a letter to Hugo Munster-
berg that he was "not prepared to say that in dire need the
statesmen of a nation are not obliged to disregard any treaty,
if keeping it may mean the most serious Jeopardy to the
Onation," and thus suggested that a treaty is a scrap of 
paper. Whether the Wilson and Roosevelt motives were the 
same, at least they agreed on a policy of inaction regarding 
Belgium. However, from almost this very instance onward, 
these two leaders seldom found themselves on common ground#
A relationship which had begun between them years 
previously and which held promise of developing into a warm 
friendship was very soon shattered beyond recognition and 
rehabilitation. From the days of the Roosevelt-Wilson 
luncheon in 1908 at Princeton University's presidential 
mansion, and their other cordial meetings, the country was 
to observe a transformation which culminated in an intense 
rivalry and a bitterness beyond description. Surely Theo­
dore Roosevelt many times over must have regretted his 
statement to a friend in which he expressed the judgment 
that Woodrow Wilson was an able man who would make an
® Germany had had treaties with both Belgium and Luxembourg 
guaranteeing their neutrality. Roosevelt, Letters. VII,
795. Letter dated August 8, 19111-.
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Q"excellent” president of the United States. Without doubt, 
the development of enmity between them was largely a result 
of their antithetical personalities and views on the responsi­
bilities of the President— a condition which seemed to become 
progressively more aggravated. The journalist Isaac P. 
Marcosson suggested that no two occupants of the White House 
ever expressed such extremes of personality and point of view 
as Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt*"^
In the period between the Spanish-American War and 
his death in 1919, Roosevelt is credited with the production 
of very significant alterations in the national psychology. 
During this era, his personality was accepted by many as 
being near to an incarnation of the national character*
His multitude of interests, exploring, history writing, 
traveling, fighting the Spaniards, swapping views with 
royalty, reforming, stalking grizzlies, swimming Rock Greek 
and the Potomac with ambassadors, and building new canals 
and parties, together with his mental and physical speed 
and a sharp political acumen combined to create a masterful 
force in America. The influence of that force caused the 
"Unimaginative plutocratic psychology" of this country to
9 George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive 
Movement (Madison, 19l|i>), 2^6. This work hereafter 
cited as Mowry, Progressive Movement.
10 Isaac P. Marcosson, Adventures in Interviewing (New York, 
1919), 79.
Sherman, Americans. 26l.
10
be "steadily metamorphosed into the psychology of efficient, 
militant, imperialistic nationalism."
With his vast influence upon the American people, he 
sought to mould the national mind and feelings into his own 
likeness. He sought to make the national mind virile, dar­
ing, imaginative, aggressive, and eager to make for America 
"a place in the sun." He set the example by magnifying the 
office of President, by concentrating power, and by teaching 
the public to look to the Federal Government as the control­
ling, dynamic, and creative center of American life. He was 
positively averse to the spirit of laissez-faire. In domestic 
affairs his policy generally alienated the "big interests" 
but won the support of the "plain people". In foreign af­
fairs, however, the big interests supported Roosevelt, while 
the "plain people" were left somewhat dazzled, astonished, 
and perplexed. Further, it is said that when Roosevelt
crossed swords with "practical" men, he almost always
13strengthened his position with the plain people. Pro­
fessor Sherman of the University of Illinois and a contempo­
rary of Roosevelt’s made an interesting and rather thorough 
study of this ex-President and his relationship with the 
national psychology. His insights into the character and 
personality of the man seem to be among the most objective, 
and they are helpful in understanding the machinations of
1  p Sherman, Americans, 266.
-*-3 Ibid., 278. The term "practical men" was used by Roosevelt
to be synonymous with "politicians".
11
this great American leader, Sherman notes the influence which 
Roosevelt had upon the "man on the street"; but he points out 
that when the Colonel offended them— as by his vindictive and 
ruthless onslaughts upon his successor and upon his great 
rival, and by his conduct of the Panama affair— they "began 
to doubt whether he had the magnanamity, the fairness of 
mind, the love of civil ways requisite to guide them towards 
the fulfillment of their historic destiny," Likewise, his 
habit of speaking scornfully of over-civilization and praise- 
fully of mere breeding and fighting raised the question in 
many minds as to whether he had an adequate "theory of ends" 
and whether he did not become so overwhelmed with his means 
as to sometimes forget his ends altogether,^
Roosevelt expressed a regard for peace. His critics, 
to be sure, would register this as political hash, for to 
them he made it plain that he loved and valued war. Because 
he vilified the pacifists, it is not surprising that many 
peace-desiring people doubted if he had even the slightest 
sympathy for their objectives. And his expressions of ap­
proval for the idea of arbitration always seemed to be condi­
tioned upon the existence of a position of preponderant 
strength for his side,
Roosevelt’s devotion to the art of fighting was such 
as to bring from him constant warnings to his country lest 
its young men become soft, lose their virile fighting virtues, 
and weaken the moral fibre of the nation. "Woe to the nation,"
Sherman, Americans. 283*
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he avowed, "that does not make ready to hold its own in time
of need against all who would harm it I And woe thrice over
to the nation in which the average man loses the fighting 
1<edge....1 In the Outlook, Roosevelt explained his emphasis 
on fighting by pointing out that ancient civilizations be­
came physically, mentally, and morally weak or soft. Each 
then became pacifist in nature, and henceforth was "trodden 
under foot by some ruder people that had kept that virile 
fighting power the lack of which makes all other virtues
, , .T, -1 /useless and sometimes even harmful,"
Sherman, in describing the Rooseveltian influence 
upon the national mind, explains that the highest point of 
such achievement, the point at which his powerful personality 
most nearly succeeded in transforming the national character 
from its original bias, was that in which he made it "half 
in love with military glory" and "half in love with empire- 
building. ...1,17
Convinced that there was a myriad of activities far 
more interesting and rewarding than making money, Roosevelt 
made political eminence a righteous goal. He chose to carve 
his own existence from public life and its glories, rather 
than from opulence and ease. In his opinion, a man who in­
herited a fortune and then spent the remainder of his days
Theodore Roosevelt Cyclopedia, edited by Albert Bushnell 
Hart and Herbert Ronald Perleger, (New York, 19li-l), l80.
Theodore Roosevelt, "The Dawn and Sunrise of History," 
Outlook, CXV (February ll^ , 1917),
-*-7 Sherman, Americans, 281,
in useless idleness was a ’’cootie on the body politic"; a 
pleasure-seeking life was not only undesirable but contempt­
ible. During this period of American life, this concept was
”1almost unique for one of his class.
Roosevelt’s imperialistic nature might have stemmed 
from his persistent desire to impose himself upon others* 
Whatever delighted him, he sought to inculcate upon his 
fellow Americans so that Rooseveltism and Americanism would 
be synonymous. Such a personal motive, when projected into 
public affairs, easily became transformed into the imperial 
impulse.^ Prom the beginning of his public career, he at­
tempted to shape a new and more admirable type of public 
individual, one which was "well bred but strenuous, ambitious 
but public spirited, upright but practical and efficient..." 
The alteration in the national psychology which Sherman 
credits largely to Theodore Roosevelt is viewed by that 
author as one of profound importance. It halted a nation 
for decadence and brought a renaissance to it instead. To 
the contention that the Colonel's greatest contribution and 
achievement was the Panama Canal, Sherman counters that it 
was his creation of an atmosphere for the nation in which 
there was greater valor, a higher seriousness by all the 
people, and an air more nearly free of the poisonous
Sherman, Americans, 271.
•*■9 Hofstadter, Tradition, 211.
20
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Sherman, Americans, 271}-.
emanations of "superior" people. His was a three-fold appeal 
to the more intelligent class of "ordinary” citizens: the
straightforward statement of duty; the craftily constructed 
contemptuous phrase for the dilettante; and the quiet but 
significant reference to the rewards of virtue. It might 
be said that his theme was: "The path of duty is the way
to glory.” And the things he believed a man's duty to be, 
he preached "in season and out of season.” He himself was 
a "powerful animal” who gloried constantly in the fundamental 
animal instincts and activities; and he was highly dedicated 
to the idea of the big family and the big stick, in the 
"full baby carriage," and in "hitting hard and hitting 
first." He expatiated on his patriotic beliefs to the de-
igree that the blase young man of that day became an un-
21fashionable creature.
Roosevelt’s words and deeds evidenced a devotion 
to the noble and virtuous things in life. Yet, being a 
self-styled "practical" man, he could not shy away from 
the necessary associations with the "high-low-brows" of 
politics. He broke bread with political bosses and men of 
great wealth. He had to. It was a necessary evil in his 
profession. But because he, as a public person, was so 
opinionated, so dogmatic and effusive in his views, and 
because his personality was so controversial, he could not 
escape becoming subjected to intense criticism from his 
adversaries. While there were many prominent contemporary
p*l Sherman, Americans, 270.
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authors who condemned him with great facility, probably none 
of the anti-Roosevelt school so ably expressed his convic­
tions and bias as H. L. Mencken.
Mencken,22 a heavy-handed disciplinarian whose hard, 
pointed, forcible, and egotistic style was all he had in 
common with Theodore Roosevelt, wielded his mighty pen 
against the ex-President. He described the similarity be­
tween the Rooseveltian philosophy, as expressed in The 
Strenuous Life, and that of Friedrich Nietzsche--suggesting 
that the borrowings were numerous and inescapable, and he 
suggested that "Theodore had swallowed Friedrich as a farm- 
wife swallows Peruna— bottle, cork, label, and testimonials.”23
Roosevelt also was accused of having philosophical 
kinship to the German Kaiser.2 -^ Both were said to believe 
that all men who opposed them were prompted by the devil and
H. L. Mencken, whose journalistic endeavor had a tremem- 
dous influence on American thinking in the first quarter 
of the 20th century, was of German-born parents and of 
pure German ancestry. He was an individualist, champion 
of heterdoxy, an anarchist, arch-enemy of Puritanism, 
self-styled skeptic, anti-reformer, and crusader against 
Crusades. He is given credit for having a superb gift 
for communication; and, in his prime, he was characterized 
as a ’highly sanative enzyme in the body politic.” He 
was never an economic or political liberal. His career 
as author, journalist, and long-time staff writer for 
the Baltimore Sun gave every indication that he, like 
Roosevelt, enjoyed his prejudices. 20th Century Authors, 
edited by Stanley J. Kunitz and Howard Haycraft, (New 
York, 19^2), 9l]iw
23 H. L. Mencken, A Mencken Chrestomathy (New York, 191^ -9), 231.
2k This accusation came particularly from the British. 
Roosevelt, being quite aware of this, chose to express 
his usual caustic opinion oh such matters by writing 
to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge that "it always amuses 
me to find that the English think that I am under the 
influence of the Kaiser. The heavy-witted creatures
16
would suffer for their actions in hell. The difference be­
tween these two contemporaries was seen as lying in favor 
of Wilhelm II, for he, according to Mencken, was a milder 
and more modest man, who was more accustomed to circumstance 
and authority and hence less intoxicated by the greatness 
of his high estate.2"’ Roosevelt could never be polite to an 
opponent, taking extravagant advantages, habitually hitting 
below the belt, and playing to the "worst idiocies of the 
mob." Definitely not of the formal school of duelists, 
Roosevelt was compared to a "florified bouncer engaged 
eternally in cleaning out bar-rooms— and not too proud to 
gouge when the inspiration came to him, or to bite in the 
clinches, or to oppose the relatively fragile brass knuckles 
of the code with chair-legs, bung-starters, cuspidors,
do not understand that nothing would persuade me to 
follow the lead of or enter into close alliance with 
a man who is so jumpy, so little capable of continuity 
of action, and therefore, so little capable of being 
loyal to his friends or steadfastly hostile to an 
enemy.... I intend to do my best to keep on good terms 
with Germany, as with all other nations...; and I shall 
be friendly to the Kaiser as I am friendly to every one. 
But as for his having any special influence with me, the 
thought is absurd." Theodore Roosevelt Cyclopedia, 6$2. 
Extracted from a letter to Henry Cabot Lodge, May l5,190£.
It is interesting to note that in a letter to Henry White, 
August llj., 1906, Roosevelt expressed an admiration, re­
spect, and like for the Kaiser, despite the fact that he 
found "his personal attitude one of intense egoism." 
Theodore Roosevelt Cyclopedia, 6^2. It is significant 
that this came from a man who was described as having 
"fled from...introspection with a desperate urgency 
that is sometimes pitiable." Hofstadter, Tradition, 210.
25 Mencken facetiously pointed out that the Kaiser also 
wrote much fewer letters.
oC\demijohns, and ice-picks." Though prone to grave over­
statement and exaggeration, Mencken was a keen observer 
of his era. The satire and excellent lexicology used 
in imparting his analysis of the Roosevelt personality 
served to make more delectable the "food for thought 
which he gave to students of those times*
Characteristic of those who viewed Theodore Roose­
velt in a more favorable light, Lyman Abbott of the Outlook 
stated that "the election of 1912 proved that the rank and 
file of that [the Republican] party -understood and believed 
in" the Colonel. Abbott further maintained that the events 
of the five years prior to the opening of World War I in­
creased "our faith in the righteousness and ultimate success 
of the principles of which [Roosevelt is] America's greatest 
interpreter."27 In paying tribute to the memory of Theodore 
Roosevelt, the American Historical Review recalled that he 
conducted the affairs of the Presidency with a "chauvinistic
gusto" that made his voice, despite some false notes, a
28"trumpet-call to his generation."
The Roosevelt character was not one of "delicate 
shadings." Instead, it revealed sharp contrasts which did 
not change with time, and it remained at his death as it 
was in his earliest years. As a legislator, Roosevelt had 
learned the technique of "shouting commonplace virtues with 
heroic emphasis," and "sweeping the other side of argument
26 H. L. Mencken, A Mencken Chrestomathy, 232.
27 "Mr. Roosevelt Resigns from the Editorial Staff of the
Outlook." Outlook, GVII (July 11, 1934), 570*
o f t  . • — ft a * t t i  .  1 _________• _  _ T"y _   ■ V 'V 'T ’tT'
17
18
into the limbo corruption...." And though seemingly un­
professional, he had likewise learned that for him "the 
commission of political suicide was the safest of his 
sports." Roosevelt, one authority insisted, did not change 
his attitudes fundamentally in his later years, and did not
change his virtues for his inconsistencies--all quite con-
29trary to the Roosevelt critics. 7 Ambiguity was seen as 
coming "naturally and honestly" to him, for "the straddle 
was built like functional furniture into his thinking."-*0 
His adversaries more nearly would have agreed with the words 
of Stuart P. Sherman, however, maintaining that "by his 
violent and infallible emphasis he became the greatest con­
coct er of ’weasel1 paragraphs on record. In time his hearers 
learned to distinguish what he said from what he stood for, 
the part of his speech which was official rhetoric from the 
part that quivered with personal force." His impassioned 
messages were interpreted as revealing the whole emphasis 
of his character.
The years following his Presidential terms are un­
doubtedly the most difficult ones of Roosevelt’s life to 
appreciate. He was outside the responsibilities of office 
and was generally on the losing side, though it was often 
the right one. His enemies criticized him as an equivocal
29 Frederic L. Paxson, review of Theodore Roosevelt and 
His Time by Joseph B. Bishop, American Historical 
Review. XXVI (April, 1921), 553.
39 Hofstadter, Tradition. 228.
3^ Sherman, Americans. 285.
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self-seeker whose ambitions brought about his fight with
Taft, his struggle to make something of the Progressive
movement, and his contemptuous opposition to the Wilson
Administration. Paxson, in alleging that the views of
Roosevelt always remained the same, states that only the
times and conditions changed. Substantially, this seemed
to be true. It is obvious that his political friends and
followers of one period became his enemies of another day,
and vice versa. The evolution of events and the political
desires of his contemporaries certainly seemed to determine
their status as friends or enemies. "He was not always
consistent in the application of his views, but the views
were permanent, and he remained the most American leader of
ophis generation.
While one student of the times described the Roose­
velt character as having a "large kernel of compromise at 
its center,"33 another, in a similar vein, declared that 
"men who knew him know that he accepted contradiction and 
correction every day." Roosevelt1s writings however give 
very little corroboration for a statement that he accepted 
correction with any degree of willingness. Instead, his 
judgments were sweeping and inclusive, and he often made 
it sound as if only scoundrels could disagree with him.
His many prominent personal characteristics provided ideal
32 Frederic L. Paxson, review of Theodore Roosevelt and 
His Time by Joseph B. Bishop, American Historical 
Review, XXVI (April, 1921),
33 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 212.
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subjects for the political cartoonists1 busy pens. From 
these caricatures as well as from the many myths which sur­
rounded him, Roosevelt is known to have derived considerable 
pleasure.^ If these favorable insights into his contro­
versial personality be true, they would seem to minimize, 
if not entirely debunk, the criticisms of demagoguery which 
were hurled at him. To one newspaperman of considerable re­
pute who spent much time around the ex-President in his later
years, he was a "tribal chieftain" and "one of the most
,,35versatile statesmen of our day.
The Spanish-American War brought Theodore Roosevelt
to the forefront just as the War of 1812 did Andrew Jackson.
This late century "incident" created a positive effect upon
the American national character; and it is Theodore Roosevelt
36who was largely responsible for that development. It is 
said that he made the deeds of the Rough Riders a "popular 
classic like Lexington and Bunker Hill." And "his little 
war did as much to kindle as Mr. Wilson’s big war did to 
quench the military spirit; for Mr. Wilson went in with the 
grim determination of a chief of police, and Mr. Roosevelt 
with the infinite gusto of a big game hunter."^7 And, "his
3^4- Frederic L. Paxson, a review of Theodore Roosevelt and 
His Time by Joseph B. Bishop. American Historical 
Review, XXVI (April, 1921), 553*
3^ Frederic L. Paxson, a review of Talks With Theodore 
Roosevelt by John J. Leary, Jr., American Historical 
Review, XXVI (October, 1920), 14.9.
3° Sherman, Americans, 275•
37 ibid., 277.
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little war”, as Roosevelt often referred to America’s conflict 
with the Spanish, made him the President of the United States.
Theodore Roosevelt’s characterics seemed to intensify 
with age.-^ Likewise, the Roosevelt trait of absolute self­
trust hardened with the years. Unlike other historical 
figures who in their twilight years chose to reconstruct 
some of their previously-made statements, Roosevelt showed 
a willingness to avoid the opportunities afforded by hind­
sight and let the facts stand, so that posterity might decide 
for itself. ’’Let it stand,” Roosevelt instructed his of­
ficial biographer, "I am willing to have what I said go into 
the record u n c h a n g e d . ...”39 His assent to have his record 
held up for scrutiny appears as something of a rebuttal to 
those who accuse him of having made official decisions and 
of taking public positions on issues in the light of per­
sonal political aggrandizement.
The last epoch of his life, to be sure, was one of 
grave disappointment, and through his griefs he saw the 
drift of national events less truly than was his custom.
The center of the stage had been his by right, and he was 
”too human not to resent being crowded from the stage on 
which he had played a gallant part.”^9
3® Ray Stannard Baker, The Life and Letters of Woodrow 
Wilson (6 vols., Garden City, N.Y., 193^-37)» V, 198.
This work hereafter cited as Baker, Wilson.
39 Frederic L. Paxson, review of Theodore Roosevelt and 
His Time by Joseph B. Bishop, American Historical 
Review. XXVI (April, 1921),
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Stuart P. Sherman reckoned:^
How much more glorious it might have been 
if in his great personality there had been planted a spark of magnanimity. If, after he 
had drunk of personal glory like a Scandinavian 
giant, he had lent his giant strength to a 
cause of the plain people not of his contriving 
nor under his leadership. If in addition to 
helping win the war he had identified himself 
with the attainment of its one grand popular 
object. Prom performing this supreme service 
he was prevented by defects of temper which he 
condemned in Cromwell, a hero whom he admired 
and in some respects strikingly resembled.
The American leader of militant imperial­
istic nationalism fell at the end of his last 
great fight, a fight which, it may be soberly 
said, he had done his utmost both immediately 
and remotely to prepare for and to bring about. 
All his friends and many who were not his 
friends give him credit for the immediate 
preparation. But few of his friends claim or 
admit his profounder part in the preparation 
of the stage for the conflict, the will of the 
combatants, the conditions of the struggle, 
the prizes of victory. The preparation runs 
far back to the days when he began to preach 
the strenuous life in the flush of the Spanish 
War, to the days when he dangled before our 
eyes ’those fair tropic islands,' to the days 
when he boasted that he had taken Panama and 
let Congress debate after the act. In the 
stunning clash of militant imperialistic 
nations, a clash which was the 'inevitable' 
goal of his life-long policy, as it is that 
of every imperialist, he towered above his 
fellow-citizens, constantly and heroically 
calling to arms. His countrymen rose, but 
not for his battle. They fought, but not 
for his victory. Time and events with re­
morseless irony made him the standard-bearer 
and rallying point for an American host dedi­
cated to the destruction of his policy of 
militant imperialistic nationalism abroad 
and at home.
Highly as they valued his instrumental 
services, the principles on which his country­
men waged the war and the objects which they 
sought drew them away from Roosevelt and to­
wards Lincoln and Washington.
U1 Sherman, Americans. 286-8 7.
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This was the character and personality of a man 
horn into an upper middle class family of New York, a 
family which had no political background and had shunned 
any possibilities of being drawn into the public eye 
and public life— attributes expected of the "better" 
families in ante- and post-bellum days. This was the 
character of a man who was described as "second in 
interest only to Niagara Falls among American natural 
phenomena.
Youthful Theodore, though infirm, was dedicated 
to the customary habits of boys; and he revelled in his 
tasks of collecting species of such animals as mice, snakes, 
and birds. Typically, these creatures were found to inhabit 
his dresser drawers and other "safe" depositories, dead or 
alive and regardless of odor. Young "Teedie" showed early 
signs of erudition through his written observations of 
animal life; and his boyish efforts at taxidermy denoted
I O
a devotion to those things which held his interests.
Theodore Roosevelt was the second of four children; 
and in his childhood he indicated to most friends of the 
family only that he was an intelligent child with the 
normally bright future to be expected for most American 
boys. During his minority and prior to his entrance in 
college, Theodore had the opportunity and enlightenment of
k2- Hofstadter, Tradition, 229.
•^3 Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1931), 
3-15. This work hereafter cited as Pringle, Roosevelt.
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European travel. At Harvard, he proved to be a somewhat in­
significant menber of the student body. Academically, he 
did well, but not brilliantly. He fell in love and became 
engaged. He proved to be rather abrupt with many of his 
professors; and his popularity rating with his fellow stu­
dents was only mediocre. Perhaps of greater significance 
among his college experiences was his newly-found dedication 
to physical prowess. This one developed characteristic was 
destined to exert an all-powerful influence upon the character 
of this man henceforth to his end. Though the physical aspect 
of this trait was not translated into the political until a 
number of years later, it eventually came to pervade his 
most important thoughts, actions, and motives— in fact, his 
whole personality.^
Roosevelt’s determination to enter politics was not 
inspired by any concept of positive aims, but instead by a 
vague sense of dedication. ’’One can find little deliberate 
ideology in the early Roosevelt.’’^  Negative impulses seemed 
to lie behind most of his political beliefs.^ It was his 
obsession to ’’save" the masters of capital from their own 
stupid obstinacy.^ Upon being elected to the New York 
State Legislature, another facet of the Rooseveltian
Ml- Pringle, Roosevelt, 16-39.
Hofstadter, Tradition, 216.
Ibid., 230. 
k7 ibid., 2 18.
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individuality was unveiled. Without fanfare and with little 
publicity, Roosevelt "the reformer" was revealed to the 
local political arena. While he was never to belong to the 
wild-haired radical school, his more conservative concepts 
of reform were to permeate his every political campaign and 
position. He considered himself as one who represented a 
golden mean. Reform in his mind did not mean a "thorough­
going purgation". Instead, it was meant to "heal only the 
most conspicuous sores on the body politic."^ His emphasis 
on his philosophy of reform and on the virtues of physical 
battle were to constitute the cornerstone of his guady po­
litical career. Throughout his succeeding public posts— as 
U.S. Civil Service Commissioner, New York Police Commissioner, 
Assistant Navy Secretary, Governor of New York, as President 
of the United States, and as ex-President, Theodore Roosevelt 
used these two attributes as leavening qualities. As he 
fought and struggled through the political battles of these 
various high offices, he became more strongly imbued with 
these dominant characteristics. With him they were omni­
present, internally and unconsciously as well as outwardly, 
consciously, and public.
Theodore Roosevelt had a certain breadth and culti­
vation that are usually considered rare among early 20th 
century politicians. During his presidency, he displayed 
a superb technique for drawing popular excitement and irri­
tation into channels of moderate action. His exuberance
^  Hofstadter, Tradition, 225.
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and versatility while in that high office brought at least 
a partial restoration of consciousness that other ends 
exist which make life worth living besides power and wealth. 
Roosevelt considered himself a moralist, one who was fighting 
for the real need in American public life— morality. He 
spoke the views of the middle classes of all parts of the 
country, and he was considered to be the "master therapist" 
of those peoples.^ It is characteristic, however, that many 
people, even some of his best friends, refused to take him 
altogether seriously as a person. Elihu Root is quoted as 
saying: "I have no doubt he thinks he believes what he
says, but he doesn't."-^ Theodore Roosevelt was hardened 
and trained by a long fight with his own insecurity. Prom 
this came his egoism, his little-known facets of intro­
spection and despondency, and his attacks of anxiety.
^  Hofstadter, Tradition, 231* 
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CHAPTER II
UP THE RIVER OF DOUBT
While there undoubtedly are many theories as to the 
origin of the Progressive Party, there can be little doubt 
that it had as a birthplace the political split between 
President William Howard Taft and ex-President Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1910. Chagrined because Roosevelt would not 
give his administration a public endorsement, Taft cooled 
toward his kingmaker. Roosevelt, showing obvious disap­
pointment at various shortcomings of his successor, refused 
to endorse Taft because he felt it would be gross insin­
cerity. This stand on the part of the returned big game 
hunter was interpreted as unfriendliness, and it gave the 
President just cause for suspicion of Roosevelt’s designs. 
Taft could reach no other conclusion than that his former 
friend had joined the Administration’s political enemies 
--those enemies consisting largely of members of the pro­
gressive wing of the Republican Party who had been finding 
themselves at odds with the conservatives, especially since 
1908.
To 1912, the struggle between progressive and con­
servative Republicanism was very real, and Taft and Roosevelt 
represented the opposite poles of opinion. The Progressives 
in the House and Senate of the 62nd Congress established 
themselves as a separate minority within the Republican 
Party, and they succeeded in maintaining a balance of 
power in both houses. Senator Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin
28
led a group of progressives to form the National Progressive 
Republican League. The ostensible purpose of this organi­
zation was to advocate progressive principles; however, its 
fundamental purpose for existence was to insure the defeat 
of Taft for renomination in 1912.^
The National Progressive Republican League was soon 
recognized as a very potent nominating machine, and it was 
not too surprising that it quickly became the instrument 
which promoted the candidacy of Senator LaPollette. There 
was one serious defect from which the League suffered, how­
ever. Despite all its worthy attributes, it did not have 
the support of Theodore Roosevelt. Mowry believes that 
this non-support stemmed from Roosevelt's hope that Taft 
would receive the 1912 nomination. With an obvious schism 
in the party, and a certain Taft defeat at the polls^ Roose­
velt saw that it could be he who would be called upon to 
reorganize and reunite the party. Hence, to endorse the
League would destroy his bipartisan position in the intra- 
2party feud. On the other hand, Roosevelt did not openly 
repudiate the League and he remained cordial to it and came 
to support some of its principles.
Upon the occasion of Roosevelt's sixteen-state tour 
of the country in 1910, the old public enthusiasm for the 
Colonel revived. He expressed his views on the more im­
portant questions of the day and expounded his somewhat
Mowry, Progressive Movement, 171*
2 Ibid., 17lj..
3 Ibid., 177.
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new economic theories. His utterances revealed to M s  fol­
lowers a growing radicalism, causing observers to refer to 
him as the John Brown of the Republican insurgents. Try 
as he did in the ensuing months, he could not entirely re­
move himself from this position.^- Roosevelt’s climactic 
speech came at Osawatomie, Kansas, and it was hailed with 
great rejoicing by all progressives in the trans-Mississippi 
West. Such overwhelming support came to him spontaneously
for his stand on various issues that the ’’Theodore Roosevelt
9for 1912” boom was born.
At first, the ex-President maintained silence on 
the subject of 1912. But the response to his cross-country 
tour, and to articles which he had written for the Outlook, 
persuaded him to permit his friends to send up trial bal­
loons to determine the potency of his political radiation.
It was not long before he no longer asked his colleagues 
to cease political activity in his behalf, as he had done 
all along, Instead, he invited them to Oyster Bay. Soon 
his eagerness to enter the forthcoming presidential race 
became a matter of public recognition. The decision was 
made; and the battle was on.
The question is often presented as to why Roosevelt 
chose to jump into the uncertainty of 1912 when, with a de­
feated Taft, he could surely capture the Republican nomina­
tion in 1916 with relative ease. The answer to this seems
^ Roosevelt, Letters, VII, 108n.
5 Mowry, Progressive Movement, lI|-7.
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to lie in his complete irritation with Taft, his recently- 
regained self-confidence, his sincere desire to see his 
reforms implemented, his view of a Democratic victory as 
a minor national tragedy, and his inability to refuse the 
call of his friends who needed his name to add strength to 
local Republican tickets*
By convention time, despite the aid he received 
from a few individuals of big business such as George W. 
Perkins, Roosevelt had lost the support of the nation’s 
monied interests, because of his adverse stand on issues 
which affected them* Likewise, he had drawn the dislike 
of the supporters of LaFollette, who accused him of 
treachery toward the Senator. These, plus the all-important 
fact that Taft controlled the Republican National Committee 
and hence the machinery of the convention, proved an in­
surmountable roadblock to the Rough Rider in his asperations 
for the Republican nomination. That thirteen state primaries 
showed Roosevelt to have had a strength greater than Taft
and LaFollette combined was to mean little in the conven-
7tion’s political manipulations.1
The "most momentous struggle since the close of 
the Civil War" came to a climax on June 18, 1912.® The 
Republican National Convention which convened on that date 
opened what was possibly the greatest political imbroglio
® Mowry, Progressive Movement, 195*
7 Ibid., 236.
n Roosevelt’s term for his fight against Taft.
In American history. It was a fight, said Roosevelt, of 
"honesty against dishonesty," charging that President Taft 
had surrendered to "the machine" and that Taft delegates 
had been dishonestly seated by the National Committee, al­
though the Roosevelt forces had "a large majority of the 
legally elected members of the convention."^ Despite the 
inevitable defeat which faced his forces there in Chicago, 
Roosevelt rose to the occasion with a dramatic statement 
that "the victory shall be ours...by clean and honest fight­
ing for the loftiest of causes...; with unflinching hearts 
and undimmed eyes, we stand at Armageddon, and we battle 
for the Lord."I®
The Colonel had come to the convention city con­
vinced that he was the choice of the majority of Republi­
cans and with the decision made that he would lead a bolt­
ing faction out of the party if the Taft forces overwhelmed 
him.11 Prom the vote for temporary chairman, which his 
forces lost by $$8 to 5>02, to the first roll call vote for 
nominations, which gave Taft 5>6l and Roosevelt 107, every­
thing indicated the impossibility of the Colonel's nomina­
tion. The final straw, the action xfhich was to result in 
the election of Woodrow Wilson, came on the second day of 
the convention when the Credentials Committee affirmed the 
preconvention decision of the National Committee to seat 
the contested Taft delegates. Though there was a slim
9 Pringle, Roosevelt, 563*
10 ^id.. 561j..
11 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 2J4.8.
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possibility that these decisions could be reversed on the
convention floor, Roosevelt told his excited followers
that 1 so far as I am concerned I am through. If you are
voted down jin the convention] the real and lawful majority
will organize as such.*•• I went before the people and I
won.... Let us find out whether the Republican Party is
the party of the plain people...or the party of the bosses
12...acting in the interests of special privilege.”
The inevitable did happen. The Roosevelt forces 
lost their fight on the floor, and some delegates made
their exit from the convention. But this departure did 
not occur without the proper adieus. In what journalist 
William Allen White described as a "masterpiece of amiable 
sarcasm,” Henry J. Allen of Kansas stood before the barbed 
wire protected1  ^chairman, Elihu Root, and in "ironic 
diatribe” bade a "tearless farewell" to the Taft majority. 
Thereupon the Roosevelt delegates, said White, marched 
out of the building with "as much dignity as men of wrath 
can assume in defeat."^
The ensuing gathering of the disgruntled at Orches­
tra Hall pledged their enthusiastic support to the Colonel
12 Pringle, Roosevelt, 565*
13 After the Republican convention had adjourned, it was 
discovered that the bunting surrounding the platform 
had served the duel purpose also of camouflaging 
interwoven strands of barbed wire.
1^ William Allen White, Autobiography (New York, 19J+6), 
li.72, I4.83. This work hereafter cited as White, 
Autobiography.
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in whatever way was considered best to right the wrong which 
had been done them. And in his characteristic manner, Roose­
velt replied: "If you wish me to make the fight, I will
make it, even if only one State should support me.” This 
enthusiasm was translated into action on August 5» 1912, 
when the Bull Moose Convention of the new-born Progressive 
Party got under way. It was described as a "novel political 
gathering,” opening with boundless human spirit. The initial 
oratory by Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana and the 
20,000-word "Confession of Faith" address by Theodore Roose­
velt succeeded in working the throng of delegates into a 
state of near delirium. And to the accompaniment of such 
hymns as "Onward Christian Soldiers" and "Praise God From 
Whom All Blessings Flow," the colorful Colonel was duly 
nominated as the party's presidential nominee.^
xsThe convention of "rather more than mildly mad" 
delegates was adjourned; and a bitter three-sided campaign 
was about to begin— the results of which were to haunt 
Roosevelt for the remainder of his days. The exponent of 
the "New Nationalism" launched his crusade, and while he 
never seemed to entertain much hope of victory, he felt 
that he was adhering to his moral duty.1  ^ His journeys
15 Pringle, Roosevelt, 565.
16 Ibid., £66.
-1-7 White, Autobiography, Lj.81}..
18 Ibid.
George E. Mowry views the New Nationalism as having
doctrines pointed in a different direction from that
314.
through the country were described as "triumphal as a Roman 
warrior’s," for he still had the power to attract the multi­
tudes. He gained many followers because they admired his 
apparent abandonment of opportunism and his complete de­
votion to his cause.20 While his critics, on the other hand, 
wrongly accused Roosevelt of opportunistic actions, almost 
without exception where there is evidence to support such 
an accusation, it can be countered with proof that he dis­
regarded his own political welfare and stature in order to
PIfight for what he considered right. This ignominious 
campaign as carried on by all sides saw the Colonel pull 
out all the stops, even turning an attempted assassination 
into political capital.
The day of decision in November, 1912, revealed 
that the old Rough Rider had aided a man defeat President
of traditional American progressivism. , Pro-
gressive Movement, ll|_7. The New Nationalism was 
described as combining Hamiltonian means with Jef­
fersonian ends, and as being only a step away from 
the more recent New Deal. Ibid., lLf.5* In following 
the theories of his new program, Roosevelt had 
given the Progressive Convention a speech recommend­
ing unprecedented changes, which was described 
editorially as a "manifesto of revolution," a pro­
gram of wild and dangerous changes. Ibid., 265.
20 Ibid., 275. Be his program New Nationalism or pro­
gressive, he was most dedicated to its principles. 
Otherwise, questions Mowry, how could he have^so 
boldly advocated reforms in big business in his 
Columbus speech prior to the conventions which he 
knew would alienate a considerable segment of the 
Republican Party and hence greatly reduce his 
chances for that party’s nomination. Mowry, Pro­
gressive Movement, 255.
2  ^e.g. his stand on rearmament and hyphenated Ameri­
canism, both vote-losing propositions.
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Taft who would thereafter be a nemesis to him at every turn.
Although expecting defeat, Roosevelt dejectedly asserted:
"The American people will cheer for me but they will not 
22vote for me." It was said that "Armageddon had been 
fought, but the Lord had forgotten." Nevertheless, in 
his happier moments he was gratified at his showing in 
the election— as a third party candidate he had run second 
in the field of three and had proved a definite superi­
ority to Taft.^3 »it was a phenomenal thing," he exclaimed, 
"to be able to bring the new party into second place and 
to beat out the Republicans. The Democrats nominated their 
strongest man and yet we reduced his vote to less than that 
of Bryan four years ago." In his letter to Henry J. White, 
Roosevelt’s further observation is significant in that he 
expressed belief that if Wilson "behaved himself," the 
Democrats would continue in power for some tirne,2 -^
The outcome of the 1912 presidential election was 
indeed a personal achievement for Colonel Roosevelt, It 
was more than creditable that he could have drawn such 
wide support without the aid of either major party’s organi­
zation, and the results constituted an "enduring testament" 
to his personal popularity.2^ Roosevelt's "moral" victory,
22 Isaac P. Marcosson, Adventures in Interviewing, 89.
2  ^Mowry, Progressive Movement, 28l.
2k Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 639. Roosevelt to Henry 
J. White, November 12, 1912.
25 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 28l.
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however, did not carry down through the lesser offices. Pew 
of the minor Progressive candidates had won offices. Recog­
nizing the importance of having a working group of state and 
county level officeholders, Roosevelt saw a bleak future 
for his new party. Hence, it was apparent to him that the 
Progressives could not fail to lose further ground in the 
mid-term elections of 191^* Though the picture was dis­
couraging, he saw that it was vital to the whole progressive 
movement to continue the Progressive Party and build its 
strength. Inasmuch as he had lured so many of the new 
party’s leaders out of the Republican ranks just at a time 
when they had threatened to control it, leading these men
into a blind alley would cause any future possibility of
26Republican progressivism to perish.
From the vantage point of 1912, the future of the 
Progressive Party was definitely clouded. At that stage 
of its development, its fate is said to have lain "in the 
lap of time and in the strong but nervous hands of Theo­
dore Roosevelt. And this man with "nervous hands" was
having antipodal thoughts. While on the one hand he was 
convinced of the need to continue the work of the progres­
sives; yet, on the other, he came to be leery of the "divine
28mission" of the Progressive Party. But whatever thoughts 
he might have entertained of leaving his new party for
p/L Mowry, Progressive Movement, 282.
27 Ibid.. 283.
White, Autobiography, 503.
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greener pastures, he saw that he could not afford so quickly
to dash the hopes of millions of his followers who had left
the Republican Party at his call. He was the one who had
led them into the struggle; now it was his obligation to
29lead them further--at least for a little while.
Though struggling with these opposing emotions, 
the ex-President recognized that the Democrats might elimi­
nate the necessity of his making a decision. It was true 
that if the Democrats, now going into power in Washington 
under Wilson, made good on their progressive promises, the 
Progressive Party per se was through. The only factor that 
could prevent this obliteration was the possibility that 
the heterogeneous Democratic Party would split wide open, 
thus leaving the now rather ineffectual Progressives as a 
group to be reckoned with. Especially if President Wilson 
should happen to align himself with the reactionary elements 
of his party, the Democrats, in the eyes of the populace, 
could be put in the same fold as the Republicans; thence 
the Progressives would be the organization to speak the 
strong voice of progressivism.-^ Of the other two powerful 
voices of progressive principles, LaFollette and Wilson,
Roosevelt saw that he was in most direct competition with 
11the latter;-' and the question was: Would Wilson steal
the Roosevelt progressive thunder? He did; and President
29 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 281|.
3° Ibid., 286.
3^ Pringle, Roosevelt, 51|5.
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Wilson's remarkable record of reform without question had a 
strong bearing upon the bitter enmity which was to develop 
between these two political leaders.
Severe disappointment fell upon Colonel Roosevelt 
in the two years following the 1912 political struggle.
It was enough that many of the prominent insurgent progres­
sive Republicans had failed to desert the old party when it 
became clear that the Progressive Party was to be a perma­
nent organization.32 But to climax this political timidity, 
Roosevelt lost most of his principal followers who had 
joined the ranks of the Progressives in 1912--including 
six of the seven governors and most of the progressive 
Republican nucleus of the Senate. These were the men 
largely responsible for persuading the Colonel to lead the 
bolt, and their actions made the Bull Moose furious. He 
credited them with nothing but ’’mere sound and fury.”33 
As could thus be expected, from 1912 to 191ip there was an 
evident departure from the Progressive columns of great 
numbers of its lesser lights. What was described as a 
’’retreat at full gallop from Armageddon’’ continued until 
the autumn of 1911]-. And many of those who did not desert, 
preached amalgamation with the Republicans. In terms of 
his continuing to be the leader of the party, such a union 
was contrary to the purposes of Theodore Roosevelt. As
32 e.g. Hadley of Missouri, Borah of Idaho, and Norris 
of Oregon.
33 Mowry, Progressive Movement. 2j?7.
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early as these pre-war months, well over two years before 
the next presidential election, he was pondering his po­
tential bargaining power at the next Republican convention. 
The asking price at that conclave might range quite high, 
if only he and other prominent Progressive leaders such as
Hiram Johnson, Miles Poindexter, Albert J. Beveridge, and
o iGifford Pinchot could command even three million votes. ^
The several months following the election of 1912 
undoubtedly brought significant influences upon Theodore 
Roosevelt which were to sway him in his thoughts and actions 
regarding future affairs. He had had time to think, and 
such thinking could at times lead him into deep despondency 
if he were not provided with an outlet. But there was no 
outlet at hand adequate for his furious energies. He seemed 
to view himself as being "over the hill" with his day as a 
great leader past. He declined to make speeches on political 
subjects or to accept any leadership in party matters be­
cause he believed that to do so would be only "mischievous 
and not useful."^5
It was little wonder then that in late 1913 the 
hero of San Juan Hill chose to take an expedition— an 
expedition into the interior of South America and up the 
Duvida, The River of Doubt.
3^4- Mowry, Progressive Movement, 291.
35 Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time 
(2 vols., New York^ 1920), II, 355. This work 
hereafter cited as Bishop, Roosevelt.
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Upon Roosevelt's return to the United States in May 
of the following year, it was not unexpected that he should 
succumb, after an appropriate period of temptation, to an 
unconditional surrender to politics, 3^ But the man who re­
turned from the jungles and the alligators had assumed the 
role of practical politician. The emotional idealist of 
1912 had vanished, and surprisingly he was remaining mute 
on such subjects as the Progressive Party, a third party 
candidacy in 1916, and his unknown movement toward closer 
association with "regular11 Republican thinking, 3?
Despite his long absence and lack of home contact, 
Roosevelt was still the hero of the Progressives. They were 
convinced that he, morally and orally, was committed to lead 
them in 1911)- and 1916.3® He was soon being urgently re­
quested to get into the fall campaigns. Physically tired 
as a result of his rigorous experiences in South America, 
he undoubtedly was somewhat lacking in political spirit.
But great pressure was brought to bear upon him to help 
out at least in certain key races. Two of the most im­
portant contests to the Progressives were those involving
3^ Pringle, Roosevelt. 57i)-.
3? ibid.. 5 7 5.
3® Harold L. Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party?" 
American Historical Review, XLVI (January, 19kl), 308. 
Hereafter cited as Ickes, "Progressive Party. A 
statement which Roosevelt made at a New York dinner 
before leaving for Brazil was the primary basis for 
this Progressive assumption. On this occasion, the 
Colonel pledged to fight to the end for the Progres­
sives.
Gifford Pinchot in Pennsylvania and Raymond Robins in Illinois, 
both running for the United States Senate. Though he appeared 
quite reluctant to actively engage in the political campaign, 
he nevertheless committed himself to speech-making, parti­
cularly in behalf of Pinchot and Robins. Once enticed into 
the political arena, his enthusiasm grew and his old vigor 
seemed to return. The results, however, were not encouraging. 
Despite Roosevelt's great popularity in both Pennsylvania 
and Illinois, and notwithstanding the very forceful cam­
paigning done by both Pinchot and Robins, these two very 
able Progressives were defeated. It was as evident in 1911| 
as it had been two years earlier that the celebrated Theo­
dore Roosevelt could not translate his popularity into votes 
39for other men.
The pressure which the Progressives brought to bear
in getting the Colonel back into political action had been 
typically effective in stirring him to respond to a call to 
arms. Though having been back in the country only five 
weeks, Roosevelt in late June announced that he was resign­
ing from the Outlook staff for political reasons. The de­
velopments over the past three or four years made it neces­
sary, he asserted, to take a more active part in promoting 
throughout the country the principles of the Progressive 
Party. He was especially concerned over certain social 
and industrial evils, the abatement of which the Wilson
39 Ickes, "Progressive Party," 310.
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Administration seemed to have abandoned. Further, he was 
honor bound, he said, to stand in strong opposition to the 
Administration because it had stood for the "abandonment 
of the interest and honor of America" in international re­
lations. Wilson’s failure in matters of domestic economics 
likewise was a point on which he intended to launch an at­
tack.^
Although such matters as Progressive principles, 
international relations, and the domestic economy were 
ostensibly of high importance to the Roosevelt mind, as a 
composite it is doubtful if they were nearly as responsi­
ble in bringing his Outlook resignation and his re-entry 
into politics as the treaty with Colombia. Secretary of 
State Bryan, the Colonel's old adversary, had negotiated 
a treaty with this South American country which was tanta­
mount to an apology on the part of the United States for 
her part in the Panama revolution. The treaty provided 
for the payment of an indemnity of twenty-five million dol­
lars. Of all things that enraged Theodore Roosevelt against 
Woodrow Wilson, surely there was none that created greater 
vehemence on the part of the ex-President than this. To 
charge that his actions in Panama had not been honorable 
threw him into a white heat. This one factor, according to 
Mowry, became the major ingredient in Roosevelt's hate for 
Wilson, and it became a major influence in motivating him
ko Roosevelt, Letters, VII, 768. Roosevelt to Lyman 
Abbott, June 29, 1911+.
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to take some of his future stands against the Administration. 
In fact, the chagrin and self-righteousness which he felt 
over this Colombia affair is believed to be largely responsi­
ble for Roosevelt’s actions in 1916, when he hesitates at 
nothing in trying to defeat Wilson.^-1 This Bryan treaty was 
certainly timed well, as far as the Progressives were con­
cerned. Such an act on the part of the Administration was 
sure to bring a sulphurous attack from the Colonel, and it 
would not only spur him into more vigorous political activity 
but would also give him an important campaign topic for the 
fall battles.^2
If the Administration seemed to be playing into the 
hands of the Progressives, certainly the aid must have been 
appreciated, for all was not well within the Progressive 
camp. In Congress they had lost whatever effectiveness and 
power their small group had been able to exercise. Instead 
of remaining united against their adversaries, the Progres­
sives on Capitol Hill had become a group tom by internal 
dissention and had been divided against itself on most every 
piece of major legislation.^ Within their party organiza­
tion as well, all had not gone smoothly. Controversy had 
arisen between the Progressive Party leader, George W. 
Perkins, and Amos Pinchot, brother of Gifford. The latter 
had implied that Roosevelt had given his complete approval
Mowry, Progressive Movement, 308.
Ibid.
Ibid., 287.
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to the questionable machinations of Perkins and hence was 
directly responsible for the pitiable condition of the 
party. So bitter did the Colonel become at his old friend 
Amos Pinchot that he broke off their friendship by writing 
him that "when I spoke of the Progressive party as having 
a lunatic fringe, I specifically had you in mind."^ These 
internal squabbles caused a loss of trust by many Progres­
sives in their leaders, including Theodore Roosevelt. As­
suredly, this public airing of the party's dirty linen could 
have nothing but an adverse effect on its chances in Nov­
ember.^
So distraught was the Colonel over the problems of 
the steadily declining Progressive Party that he left for 
a rather brief trip to Spain in June, 191i|-, without even 
so much as leaving a message of cheer to his fellow party 
leaders. This seemed a bit unusual in view of the critical 
problems which they faced to the November elections. This 
act by Roosevelt was surely an indication of his thinking 
regarding the future prospects of the Progressives.^ Upon 
his return, he confided to his intimate friends that "we 
must... amalgamate or fuse with some body of men. Perma­
nently there is only room for two national parties in this 
country. This opinion was not to be expressed, however,
^  Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 1122. 
iiS^ Mowry, Progressive Movement. 299.
Ibid.
^  Roosevelt, Letters. VII, 796. Roosevelt to Raymond
Robins, Aug. 12, 19114-.
US
to his Progressive followers until after the election. Until 
then he expounded on his wholehearted allegiance to the party, 
even predicting victory in November for Progressive candi­
dates.^®
In his summer and fall campaign speeches, Theodore 
Roosevelt's expressions took on a new tone. This was in 
contradiction with other Progressives who expected to pick 
up where they had left off in the 1912 crusade. Instead of 
the loud call for reform, Roosevelt, especially at Pitts­
burgh, spoke of prosperity and protection, and it was 
obvious that he leveled his criticism only at the Democrats, 
seldom mentioning the Republicans or his New Nationalism.
The New York Times editorially stated that Roosevelt, with­
out specifically recommending such, was cleverly moving the 
Progressives and himself toward a reunion with the Republican 
Party in 1916.^ His developing sympathies for "regular** 
Republicanism, which had previously been concealed, were now 
coming to light. Through his speeches he was moving back 
into the good graces of the business interests. This could 
only be interpreted as a move in the right direction for the
Colonel insofar as his 1916 Republican nomination aspirations 
<0were concerned. It is superfluous to say that such staunch 
Progressive leaders as Hiram Johnson, William Allen White,
Mowry, Progressive Movementt 300.
^  Prom the New York Times of July 1, 19114-, as reported by Mowry, Progressive Movement. 300.
Ibid.
John Parker, and Albert J. Beveridge, who wished to see the 
party continue as a permanent and separate organization, 
were dismayed. They saw in Roosevelt’s contrivings a re­
treat from the party's doctrines and an indication that their
leader who had led them to Armageddon might now be preparing 
<1to desert them*
The new war in Europe played a relatively minor role 
in the 191i|- Congressional campaigns. While Roosevelt struck 
at the Democrats, especially on domestic issues, the Demo­
crats harnessed their efforts to give the President a Demo­
te?cratic Congress in view of the worsening European situation. 
The "desultory, half-hearted" campaign waged by the Progres­
sives failed of its purpose— the re-election of the success­
ful Progressive representatives of 1912, and the addition of 
a sizeable bloc in the House in order to give their party 
greater prestige and a more prominent position in 1916.-^
The end of the 1911+ campaign found Theodore Roosevelt 
extremely tired (which was primarily a result of his jungle 
exploits) and very disgusted with the ranklings of the 
elements of the Progressive Party. He had spoken almost 
daily from August to November to rather small crowds. He 
had seen the handwriting on the wall, and confidentially 
expressed his relief at "finishing a hopeless campaign."
In the closing hours of his efforts, he declared to a
Prom the New York Times of July 1, 191q-, as reported 
by Mowry, Progressive Movement. 301.
^  Baker, Wilson. V, 9i+*
Ickes, "Progressive Party," 310.
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friend that he had paid all his political debts and would 
soon be out of politics for good. "I have done everything 
this fall that everybody has wanted,” he asserted. "This 
election makes me an absolutely free man. Thereafter I am 
going to say and do just what I damned please.”^  To an 
editorial which remarked that Roosevelt’s party had "relapsed 
into innocuous desuetude," the old Colonel concurred by 
asserting that he was now "a private citizen of the privatest 
sort."55
True, the Roosevelt revolt seemed to be over. The 
Progressives had staged a listless campaign, their ablest 
candidates had fallen to defeat, and, to rub salt into the 
wounds of Roosevelt, most of the G.O.P. Old Guard whom he 
had been responsible for defeating in 1912 were returned 
victoriously to Congress. Furthermore, instead of drawing 
up to four million votes, as was hoped, the Progressives 
received less than two million; fewer Progressives were re­
turned to the Senate, and only one would return to the House.
What more proof was needed to show that the Progressive Party
96had disintegrated.
Though the November "cataclysm" was about what Roose­
velt had expected, this knowledge did little to soften the 
reality of defeat when it came. In the gloom of total
^  Mowry, Progressive Movement, 302. Quoted from a Roose­
velt letter to 0. K. Davis.
Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 832n.
^  Mowry, Progressive Movement, 303*
defeat, the Colonel momentarily lost his political touch.
Always capable of analyzing his political stature, he saw
that he should retire once and for all from politics. He
suggested in a letter to his son Archie that the Progressive
57Party Mnow would probably disband.” Ex-President Taft, 
feeling in a vindictive mood, wrote his former Secretary of 
State, Philander C. Knox, "I hope the late election satisfied 
your desires. I am able to endure it with Christian resig­
nation.
Theodore Roosevelt saw that the reform movement
which had spread throughout the country in the previous
twelve years was now subsiding through pressure from a
conservative reaction. The people, he felt, were tired of
reform, and no longer cared for political "fair play and
decency."^ Furthermore, the Bull Moose party, which was
founded upon a "demand for distributive justice, using the
government as an agency of human welfare," had lost its
cause. Prosperity from war contracts and profits was cheer-
£>0ing up the farmers and the workers.
It was obvious to Roosevelt what was happening; and 
for the party faithful to continue to push the Progressive 
Party cause seemed to him like "spurring a dead horse."
His views on national trends and party policies as well as
^7 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 30i|..
Ibid.. 303.
Ibid.. 305.
White, Autobiography, $12,
Ibid., 513.
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his general attitude sorely disheartened his followers who
now felt uncertain and unhappy. Many more continued to
desert the party, but those who remained were as dedicated
as ever to the cause and were doggedly determined to struggle 
6?to the end.
Strange as it may seem, a short time after the elec­
tion, when Roosevelt's dejection had eased somewhat, he came 
to the conclusion that the party must be held together.
The opinions which he formulated in this immediate post­
election period were to color and partially explain his 
political course for the future, especially to 1916. He 
hoped that the Progressive organization could be perpetuated 
at least until the next presidential election, at which time 
the ability to deliver even two million votes could demand 
a high price in the case of a close race. As for progres- 
sivism itself, Roosevelt, who had often been accused of 
having only a perfunctory interest in it, now had even less 
concern for the principles of reform. It was rather sud­
denly noted that he no longer had a burning interest in 
social and industrial justice.^
Here was the turn of Theodore Roosevelt's emphasis 
from progressivism to war.^ The conflagration in Europe
62 ickes, "Progressive Party," 311.
63 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 305*
^  White, Autobiography, 5>13.
65 Ickes, "Progressive Party," 3H»
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had come to engage his talents. For the duration there 
would be no more ringing declarations or call to arms over
L «■?progressive principles. ' And many Progressives “heard
68Roosevelt's war drums with distaste and uneasiness...." 
Within short order the man whom Ray Stannard Baker de­
scribed in August as making speeches with more balance
zqthan ever and who seemed more "retiring" y was soon to do 
a sharp reversal. As the Colonel’s attentions were diverted 
from domestic justice to international barbarity, he focused 
his attacks on President Wilson and his administration’s 
policies toward the war. On the subjects of neutrality, 
preparedness, and international morality and decency, he 
began to rant and preach. The more he raged, the more he 
forgot about the Bull Moosers— now "orphans in a storm."
In his tirades at the President, Roosevelt alienated many 
of his Progressive Party supporters— people who agreed with 
the Wilson policy.^®
Though Roosevelt at first did not advocate American 
participation in the war, he clamored for preparedness, 
criticizing the President for not adopting a policy of re­
armament and for his attitude on foreign policy. During
66 White, Autobiography, 5l3«
^7 Ickes, "Progressive Party," 311.
6® White, Autobiography, 5>13.
69 Baker, Wilson, V, 198. Baker visited Sagamore Hill, 
August li|, i911j-.
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the entire year of 19l£j the Colonel led the agitation
against the Administration, hammering away on the need to
train and arm men against the time when we should inevi-
71tably enter the war. While he felt that eventually 
America would become a participant, throughout the course 
of his preparedness campaign he preached on the theme of 
arming to prevent war.
As the months passed between the political wars of 
1911}. and 1916, Theodore Roosevelt drifted farther from the 
heart of his party. Little by little, he was leaving the 
organization which he had been responsible for founding.
If those Progressives who in 1916 expressed such bitter­
ness at the Colonel for not accepting their nomination had 
only followed the trend of his speeches and his articles, 
as well as any of his correspondence which might have been 
available to the public, they would have recognized that his 
refusal for the most part had been indelibly determined long 
before convention time.
There were many factors involved in the parting of 
the man and the party, the multiplicity of which perhaps 
was not seen by the ex-President1s contemporaries. As one 
whose interest had shifted from domestic to international 
issues and as one who was taking a positive stand on the 
issues of rearmament and preparedness, he was certain to 
come in conflict with the great body of Progressives. It 
is traditional that people who are dedicated to working
^  White, Autobiography, 507.
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for social reform are not at the same time inclined to find 
much interest in international issues— especially war. They 
tend to be pacifist in nature. Therefore, it is not sur­
prising that from the ranks of Roosevelt’s Progressives came 
some of the most militant opposition to American involvement 
in European affairs and to the Colonel's views thereon. 
"Humanitarianism and war's barbarism are at antipodal poles
of social action," states Mowry, because a spirit of mili-
72tarism within a country will retard its social progress.
Because Americans of German blood, who were concerned 
with Germany's fate, saw there was little possibility of our 
becoming allied with the Fatherland, it was only natural 
that large elements of these people became associated with 
the Progressive Party— a party whose purpose it was to keep 
the country out of the war. They, of course, preferred to 
see the United States remain neutral rather than align it­
self with the Allies. Theodore Roosevelt held nothing but 
contempt for these German-Americans. These "hyphenated 
Americans," as he called them, were people who did not 
feel sufficiently assimilated and rededicated to drop the 
"German" and the hyphen before their "American" title. It 
was impossible to expect the Colonel to have any affinity 
for an organization so heavily populated with "hyphenates" 
as was the Progressives ! Even the old cliche concerning 
political bed-fellows was not broad enough to cover both 
the German-Americans and one so vitriolic toward them as 
Roosevelt.
72 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 320.
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Inasmuch as he and his party developed conflicting 
positions on matters of war, which led to Roosevelt's gradual 
withdrawal from the inner circle of the reformers, it was 
only natural that a person of such political energies would 
assume a new channel as an outlet. Slowly and no doubt 
deliberately, the ex-President moved toward his mother 
party. Because of his enthusiasm for preparedness, it was 
to be expected that he would lean toward that segment of 
the population which endorsed such a policy. This segment 
happened to be the conservatives, Republicans for the most 
part. They were the force which was promoting the various 
patriotic organizations throughout the United States, organi­
zations which the Colonel so heartily endorsed. The people 
who made up the conservative and patriotic forces happened 
to include, among others, industrialists, financiers, and 
businessmen in general. Roosevelt's growing association 
with these organizations and individuals seemed only to 
intensify his disgust with the Progressives. Adding to his 
chagrin was his awareness of the growing strength of the 
anti-war element in the Progressive Party and the knowledge
that two of the leading Progressive newspapers on the West
7kCoast had come out against preparedness. The influence 
of Senator Lodge also had its usual positive effect in 
guiding the Colonel. Lodge had written Roosevelt that "the 
worst crowd we have to deal with are the so-called Progres­
sive Senators. Almost all of them are for the embargo— I
73 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 321.
7^ Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1013.
think all. They are not the supporters of preparedness? and
*7we can hardly count on them for anything."
That large sections of what remained of the Progres­
sive Party were deserting him because of his stand on war 
issues, and that he was drawing closer to his onetime po­
litical foes as his enthusiasm for his reformer friends 
waned— all aspects of this curious turn of fate— seemed to 
concern the Colonel but very little.. He began to resume 
his correspondence with many of his former friends; through­
out 19l5> the men of great wealth whom he had so severly 
chastized in his role as Progressive leader were "slowly 
changing their spots, were being transfigured from male­
factors to benefactors;" and the 1912 charges of thievery 
against the Republican directorate were becoming "percepti­
bly blurred.
Certainly no small detail in the Roosevelt disin­
terest in progressivism was the record of the Wilson Admini­
stration during that first term. Such elements of legisla­
tion as the tariff-reducing Underwood Bill, the Federal 
Reserve Act, the Clayton Amendment to the Sherman Anti- 
Trust Act, the LaFollette’s Seamen’s Bill, a child labor 
enactment, and the founding of the Federal Trade Commission 
provided an excellent record of reform enactments. It was 
a program sufficiently good to take the wind out of the 
sails of the reform-preaching Progressives. Virtually all
7^ Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1013. Quoted by editor 
Morison (Roosevelt, Letters) from a Lodge letter to 
Roosevelt.
7k Mtwry, Progressive Movement, 322.
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justification for the existence of the Progressive Party, 
therefore, had been eliminated. Wilson had stolen Roose­
velt's platform and the Colonel was quite aware of the
77larceny which had so successfully been carried out.
As the time approached for party leaders to think 
in terms of 1916 conventions, a rather strange political 
phenomena was working within the Progressive Party. That 
was the person of George W. Perkins, who was proving himself 
to be anathema to the other Progressive chieftains."^® After 
the 1912 convention, Perkins had become the "receiver”, the 
chief lieutenant, of the party. When his good friend Theo­
dore went off to Brazil in 1913* the affairs of the party 
were left in his hands. And thus began the period of his 
absolute control, which he held "in the palm of his hand” 
until 1916.^ Because of the autonomous nature of his 
rule over the Progressives, a severe split developed within
77 Mowry, Progressive Movement. 28 7.
7® The most influential men of the Progressive Party in 
the 1911i-19l6 period included:
Gifford Pinchot of Pennsylvania Raymond Robins of Illinois 
Matthew Hale of Massachusetts Hiram Johnson of California 
Chester Rowell of California John Parker of Louisiana
William Allen White of Kansas Victor Murdock of Kansas
William R. Stubbs of Kansas Bainbridge Colby of New York
Everett Colby of New Jersey Frank Knox of Michigan
- Ickes, "Progressive Party," 312.
79 Perkins, an associate of J. P. Morgan and Company, had 
a background shaded by his arrest in 1906 on a warrant 
charging him with grand larceny of almost fi|.9 ,000 from 
the New York Life Insurance Company. This amount repre­
sented campaign funds donated to the Republican National 
Committee in 190i|. Ickes, "Progressive Party," 307*
*
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their ranks. Though most all the leaders found themselves 
lined up opposite the dictatorial Perkins, the J. P. Morgan 
associates had the support and confidence of Colonel Roose­
velt— who had delegated to Perkins the top position in
Op.
determining party policy. Perkins made the decisions 
and spoke for the party. The fact that the Progressive 
National Committee was not called into session between 1912 
and January 10, 1916, is an indication of the personal con­
trol and the one-man manipulation which he exercised over
O-i
the organization. x Perhaps most significant of all was 
the fact that he sat closest to the Colonel and had easiest 
and most frequent access to his ear. It was through the 
Roosevelt-Perkins discussions (called collusions by some) 
that the idea of a mutual Progressive-Republican candidate 
for 1916 became strongly developed.8 "^
For several months prior to the 1916 conventions, 
Roosevelt appeared to waver as he deliberated and discussed 
potential actions for the forthcoming political phase. With 
Perkins, he discussed the mutual candidate idea; with others, 
he hashed over the names of various individuals as potential 
Progressive presidential candidates. 83 To most everyone he
Mowry, Progressive Movement. 291,O-1
Ickes, "Progressive Party," 3~l)|t
82 Ibid.. 313.O q
It is known that Roosevelt also discussed the possi­
bility of a mutual candidate with other Progressive 
leadersj however, the approach seemed different from 
that used in his conversations with Perkins. To the 
Progressive leaders, he seemed to favor working with 
the Republicans from a position of strength; while
57
seemed sincere in his determination not to be a candidate 
himself. He never spoke of wanting or expecting to run for 
office again. He was wary of the limitations of his health, 
and Ickes and others were convinced that he wouldn't consent 
to make another race unless supported so enthusiastically 
and unanimously that he would be unable to refuse. Roosevelt 
confided to William Allen White that he felt he should not 
be asked to ’'sacrifice” himself a g a i n . " I  have come to 
the conclusion,” he told Ickes, "that I ought never to be a 
candidate for public office again. I will always be inter­
ested in public affairs, but my role, it seems to me, will 
be to raise the black flag and strike out at wrong wheneverOH
I see it.” ^ Thus his desires for 1916 were not only im­
plied but expressed. They were physical as well as oral. 
Though his adversaries contended that his rapprochement 
with the Republicans was an indication that he was laying 
groundwork for his candidacy, the very nature of his re­
newal of cordial relations with the G.O.P. was sufficient 
to refute such contentions. He was moving back into the 
Republican fold, and he was doing it through two approaches?
(1) his frequent discussions regarding a possible Progressive- 
Republican candidate for 1916 (in which he never mentioned
to Perkins, there is reason to believe that he expressed 
approval of most any arrangement so long as it assured 
a Republican victory over Wilson. Ickes, "Progressive Party," 311+.
White, Autobiography. 312. To this, White retorted 
later: No one entered Roosevelt in the 1912 campaign.He jumped into the furnace with Meshach and Abednego 
with a prophet's zeal. Wild horses could not have kept him out."
85 ^id.. 3 1 3.
his own name); and (2) his expoundings on the conservatives* 
preparedness theories. Neither of these approaches indi­
cated any burning desire on the ex-President»s part to try 
again for the Presidency, especially in view of the fact 
that both alienated from him large voting blocs in the 
country.
The closer the Colonel moved in the direction of the 
Republicans, the more suspicious became his Progressive 
associates who feared that he would work some kind of deal 
with the G.O.P. regardless of the cost to the Progressives.88 
Their suspicions may very well have been with good foundation, 
for there is reason to believe that in 1915 he had favored 
the idea of no Progressive national ticket the following year. 
The means seemed to be of little import to him so long as 
the end was accomplished--the defeat of Wilson. This might 
connote a uniting behind a mutual candidate with the Republi­
cans; or, if necessary, it could involve a return of all 
Progressives to the Republican camp with no strings attached. 
So strong were his convictions that Wilson should be de­
feated (hence, that there should be a Republican victory) 
that he appeared willing to vote for almost any Republican 
nominee except Taft.®7 In correspondence with Lodge, Roose­
velt admitted that the Republicans could win in 1916 without 
the Progressives, and they could possibly lose with them. 
However, in the interest of uniting all anti-Wilson forces, 
the Colonel hoped the Republicans would take the necessary
O /
Howry, Progressive Movement. 32if. As cited from the New York Times. October 10, 1915.
87 Ihid.
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action to make it possible for the Progressives to join with
them. He stated that he did not expect to separate himself
from his Progressive supporters and would do anything possi-
88ble to get them to act wisely.
During the time that Roosevelt was showing an in­
creasing affection for Republican causes and for Old Guard 
personalities, they likewise were drawing closer to him. 
Mowry notes that various articles in the October, 19l5> 
issue of the Republican National Magazine approached the 
subject of Theodore Roosevelt "with a gentleness of spirit"
that "did not go unnoticed by either the Progressives or
89the Republicans." But other Progressive leaders were also 
entertaining some pretty definite opinions. And they for 
the most part were not in harmony with the Colonel’s. Vic­
tory in 1916 was not necessarily their aim. Many actually 
hoped for another Republican defeat, believing that one more 
setback would end the Republican Party as a reactionary 
organization. In such an event, they believed the Progres­
sive Party would emerge as one of the two major political 
organizations in the c o u n t r y . This Progressive desire 
for a "moral" victory, albeit an extermination of the Re­
publicans, prevented any harmonious feeling between the 
rank and file of the two parties. Furthermore, this an­
tipathy carried over into the Republican convention in 1916
Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 991. Letter dated Nov­
ember 2?» 1 9 1 5.
89 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 323.
Ickes, "Progressive Party," 312.
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and was partially responsible for the hate shown by the 
Republican bosses toward Roosevelt and the Progressives— a 
hate not only nurtured since 1912 but engendered for those 
who would destroy their party. Like Roosevelt, most Pro­
gressives were not averse to the idea of a mutual candi­
date j but unlike him and Perkins, they considered them­
selves as the choosers, not the beggars. And unlike the 
Republicans, the Progressives saw in Roosevelt the only 
man capable of victory over Wilson.^1
As the conventions drew closer, Roosevelt seemed to 
be consorting with two paramours. He gave his support to 
a meeting of the Progressive National Committee in January, 
and they in turn drew up a statement of party purpose which 
was consonant in all respects with the Colonel’s desires.
He pledged to the committeemen at this meeting to make an 
effort to join the Progressives with the Republicans under 
a "common leadership.” This, he said, would be possible 
if the Republican convention were "responsive to the patri­
otic spirit that brought the Republican Party into being."92 
Later that same month, Roosevelt devoted his pen to a lengthy 
letter to the Old Guard’s Henry Cabot Lodge. Herein he ex­
tended advice to this Republican leader regarding the nature 
of the Republican^ campaign plans, and extolled the virtues 
of his own personal positions regarding preparedness and
9^ Ickes, "Progressive Party," 313.
92 Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, lOOOn.
hyphenated Americanism.9^ If it is true that Roosevelt dur­
ing the past three years had sincerely discounted any possi­
bility that he would ever again be a presidential candidate, 
his pre-convention utterances were indicating a rather ra­
pidly changing position. This perhaps was first shown in 
another letter he wrote to Lodge a few days later. To the 
Senator he appeared to be outlining reasons why he "could 
not" be a 1916 presidential candidate but refusing, at the 
same time, to close the door on such a possibility. The 
door, in fact, seemed to have been left very much ajar. 
Roosevelt pointed out that, in total disregard to his own 
interests, he had attacked the German-American and pacifist 
vote, hence rendering himself impossible as a candidate.
But, he intimated his willingness to accept the call, if 
the popular feeling in the country and the "Republican"
Party indicated that such was strictly for the good of the 
country. Further, he cautioned that it would be idle to 
nominate him if the country were in a mood of timidity re­
garding international relations.9**- Significantly, this 
lengthy bit of correspondence fails to reveal any Roosevelt 
thought of or reference to the Progressive Party, his re­
lationship with the Progressives, or a possible Progressive 
nomination for himself.
In these pre-convention months, Roosevelt indicated 
that his was an untenable position, that he was seeking the
93 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1005. Roosevelt to Lodge,January 26,1916.
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proper solution which would be to the satisfaction of all 
those groups who looked to him for leadership. Though he 
apparently sought long and hard for just the right answer, 
his resultant position seemed to please few of his adherents. 
He appeared to be sincerely devoted to his crusade for pre­
paredness, and therefore he seemed to look upon the purely 
political machinations which were going on only as bother­
some, but necessary, interruptions to his vital work. To 
George L, Meyer, promoter of the Roosevelt Republican 
League, he wrote: "I am not in the least interested in the
political fortunes either of myself or any other man..,. I 
am interested in awakening ray fellow countrymen to the need 
of facing unpleasant facts.... I am interested in the triumph 
of great principles.... I will not enter into any fight for 
the nomination...." But, the omnipolitical Roosevelt, still 
suggestively left the nomination door open, asserting that 
"it would be a mistake to nominate me unless the country 
has in its mood something of the heroic....
To interpret the ever-so-complex Roosevelt must 
certainly have been a challenging task for his contempo­
raries. They surely wondered how a person could decry, as 
did he, any suggestion that he was striving for the
QCj Letter dated March 9> 1916. This pronouncement os­
tensibly was for the purpose of preventing damage to 
the policies he championed, which might come from 
overenthusiastic supporters or from local candidates 
attempting to ride his coattails. Roosevelt, Letters,VIII, 102Lj.n. -------
qAnomination,7 and yet, without expecting to he accused of 
hypocrisy, make the following declaration: ”Jf a cut is
to he healed, it must be healed to the hone. If I am 
nominated and accept the nomination, it will be with the 
determination to treat the past as completely past and to 
give absolutely fair play to all my supporters."^7 This 
quotation from a Roosevelt letter to one prominent Republi­
can clearly indicates that he was thinking and planning 
even into the post-convention future regarding the problems 
he would face as a once-recalcitrant Republican. Justifi­
cation or reconciliation of his contrasting statement can 
be accomplished only if the Colonel*s critic will view him 
in this frame of reference: As a true patriot who is ever-
willing to heed his country's call to duty, i.e. in this 
instance, run for political office. Perhaps this further 
quotation from the above-cited letter reveals such a Roose­
velt ian characteristic: "I regard this as a very great
crisis in the nation's history.... My feeling is that all 
men who stand for Americanism, Preparedness and for Inter­
national duty in this crisis should join, and whoever they 
are about to unite upon as leader should treat all of them 
with absolute fairness and justice, with reference only to 
their attitude in the present and without regard to past 
differences.
96 Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, lOllj.. Roosevelt to Lodge, February l\.t 1916.
^  » 1038. Letter to Foster Vincent Brown, Republi­can Congressman from Tennessee, May 10, 1916.
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Since its early phases, neither the Republican nor 
the Progressive parties had wholly supported the Roosevelt 
position in regard to America and the European war. In 
fact, some of the most outspoken opposition to Roosevelt 
had come from Progressive voices. The Colonel was most 
aware of these factors, and on the eve of the convention 
came to realize more and more that there was little room 
for expectation that he would be the 1916 choice of the 
Republicans. He wrote his friend Arthur Hamilton Lee that 
he did not believe the Republicans had any intention of 
nominating him, although he believed himself to have a 
"considerable following." He did not feel, however, that 
he had a majority of the people in his support, and defi­
nitely not enough to be reflected among the politicians at 
the convention. Recognizing that Charles Evans Hughes would 
probably be the G.O.P. nominee, Roosevelt asserted that the 
only chance Hughes had for victory lay in "my aggressive 
campaign of the last year and three quarters."99
Despite Roosevelt's words to Lee, there remained one 
last thought in the Colonel's mind that he by chance would 
be selected at the Republican convention. Many suggestions 
have been proffered as reasons for his optimism. However, 
in all likelihood, it was the encouragement which came from 
his very closest friends, friends who had made great sacri­
fices for him in the past, that caused him to entertain such
99 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1052. Letter dated June 7,1916. *
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speculation. At least from the vantage point of hindsight, 
there was unmistakable evidence that the Republican leader­
ship were determined to do one thing at the Chicago conven­
tion above all else— to stop Roosevelt.100
Prom throughout the country, delegations arrived 
with instructions to support a loyal or true Republican, and 
the conservative element of the party had the strength to 
insure this through the manipulation of offices and com­
mittees. The Old Guard, however, could not be too careful 
in the choice of a candidate. They remembered well the de­
feat of 1912, and they realized that it would take Progres­
sive votes to elect a Republican as President, unless some 
unforeseen development arose to weaken the Wilson position. 
Hence, there was much concern over nominating a man who would 
likewise please the Progressive delegates, who were meeting 
in convention simultaneously in that same city.101 Hover­
ing over both conventions was the tenseness resulting from 
ever-closening American involvement in the war. These were 
not ordinary times, times for the full pleasures of politics, 
and the political leaders concerned saw that they were going 
to have to present for the country's consideration in Nov­
ember men who had the stature and ability to lead the nation 
through the ultimate crisis. Thus the Republican objective
100 Mowry, Progressive Movement. 3ip5.
10  ^Both conventions, held in Chicago, were in session 
June 7-12. The Progressive National Convention of 
that year was described by Harold L. Ickes, a dele­
gate, as one of the strangest affairs in the history 
of American politics.” Ickes, "Progressive Party,"
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was three-fold: (1) to nominate a man of stature and ability;
(2) to nominate a man with at least a liberal tinge so as to 
have progressive appeal; and (3) to nominate someone besides 
Roosevelt. It was these three major conditions which caused 
most Republican eyes to turn to Charles Evans Hughes of the 
United States Supreme Court and former rather-liberal gover­
nor of New York.
The machinations between some of the leaders of the 
two conventions (especially by George W. Perkins) in an at­
tempt to create a common candidate provided a unique ex­
perience in American politics. Both sides gave appearances 
of being willing to compromise. It became obvious however
that the mass of the Progressives wanted to nominate Roose-
102velt, do it quickly, and go home. The Old Guard leaders,
Boise Penrose, Murray Chrane, Reed Smoot, and Elihu Root, 
remembering 1912, chose to go down to defeat at the hands 
of Wilson rather than agree to nominate Roosevelt— who
1 0^admittedly was the only man who could defeat the President.  ^
Distrust of their leadership was rampant among Pro­
gressive ranks. For quite some time, there had been a con­
siderable lack of faith in the Progressive prince-regent, 
Perkins. It appeared that most Progressives were dedicated 
to the idea of nominating Roosevelt and going down to defeat 
with him if necessary rather than supporting the Republican
102 ickes, "Progressive Party," 322.
103 Ibid.. 313.
nominee (unless that nominee happened to be Roosevelt also). 
And their rank and file were fearful lest they be misled# 
Certainly, the secret sessions between the Republican and 
Progressive leaders as well as Perkins' insistence that the 
Republicans be permitted to nominate first gave most Pro­
gressives adequate reason for unrest and distrust. It was 
not understandable to the delegates why it was important for 
the Republicans to be the first to nominate, since they be­
lieved the only sure way of getting Republican agreement on 
Roosevelt was for the Progressives to nominate first. In­
asmuch as Perkins was solely responsible for this maneuver 
among the Progressives, his silence on the subject has left 
this big question unanswered. The opinion has been expressed, 
however, that Roosevelt so desired to see Wilson defeated 
that he was willing to have the Progressives go along with 
most any Republican candidate and have a united front, rather 
than to nominate him again, split the vote, and hence insure 
a Wilson victory. Because such a plan could best be achieved 
by letting the Republicans nominate first, there is every 
possibility that the Colonel had instructed Perkins to ma­
neuver as he did.10^ Mowry believes that Roosevelt re­
solved in advance not to run on a third party ticket again 
unless the character of the Republican nominee forced him 
to in order to maintain his self-respect. Furthermore, if 
the Republican candidate happened to be Hughes, the Colonel 
had definitely decided not to run against him.10^
Mowry, Progressive Movement. 32ij..
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Perhaps the Progressive delegates were ignorant of 
the extent to which Roosevelt was dedicated to a Wilson de­
feat and of the lengths to which he would go in bringing
that about— even at the expense of his own political for­
tunes. It is not believed, however, that the Progressive 
convention was conducted as he would have desired; Exactly 
what Roosevelt's wishes were regarding the work of the con­
vention are not known, but there is evidence to indicate 
that had he either been present or in better contact some
matters would have been handled differently.
After two Republican convention ballots, which 
showed that Roosevelt had no real strength there, Nicholas
Basis for this belief lies in Ickes1 revelations con­
cerning contact, or lack thereof, between Roosevelt 
and the Progressive leadership at the convention.
Ickes points out that even though there was a direct 
wire providing phone communication between Sagamore 
Hill and Chicago, unfortunately it led into George 
W. Perkins' private suite in the headquarters hotel. 
Phone contact with the Colonel was limited by Perkins, 
therefore, to "his chosen few.” This, of course, 
caused Roosevelt to see the Progressive convention 
only through the eyes of Perkins, and not as the 
great body of Progressives would have wanted him to 
see it. After adjournment, William Allen White 
finally got to talk with Roosevelt.-::- The Colonel 
expressed his displeasure at learning that Perkins 
had restricted the use of the direct phone; and 
White learned that Roosevelt had little, if any, 
knowledge of the National Convention. Ickes, 
"Progressive Party," 327.
-^ -William Allen White, an ardent Progressive and long­
time editor of the Emporia Gazette does not reveal 
this incident in his autobiography. Not only was 
White a close friend of Roosevelt's but their fami­
lies were also friends. The two men saw each other 
often and corresponded regularly. Though White was 
a staunch support of the Colonel, he many times 
disagreed with him, e.g. over Wilson's foreign 
policy and rearmament.
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Murray Butler, of the Republican National Committee and 
friend of the Colonel, called Oyster Bay and assured him 
that he could not be nominated. Roosevelt in turn recom­
mended that the Republicans nominate either Henry Cabot 
Lodge or Leonard Wood, believing that either would stand 
a gOod possibility of also getting the Progressive nomina­
tion. He then wired the Progressives his recommendation 
that they nominate Cabot Lodge. This recommendation, along 
with others* suggestions that Hughes be nominated, was booed 
down by the mass of Progressive delegates.10  ^ The Republi­
cans, on their third ballot, proceeded to choose Hughes, 
and the Progressives almost simultaneously nominated Roose­
velt by acclamation. Before the Progressive convention 
closed, however, Colonel Roosevelt sent a message to that 
body, rejecting the nomination, saying:'*'®®
I cannot accept it at this time. I do 
not know the attitude of the candidate of the 
Republican Party toward the vital questions 
of the day. Therefore, if you desire an 
immediate decision, I must decline the nomina­
tion. But if you prefer it, I suggest that 
my conditional refusal to run be placed in 
the hands of the Progressive National Com­mittee. ...
Roosevelt explained that the purpose of this condi­
tional refusal was to leave the way open for future Pro­
gressive action. Should the Republican candidate not 
make satisfying statements regarding national policy, the
Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 1060n.
Ibid^, 1062. Message undated.
Progressive National Committee and Roosevelt could then
determine some action which they considered appropriate.
Thousands of Progressives who formerly looked to
Theodore Roosevelt as their idol became an embittered group.
They accused him of betraying the Progressive Party and of
selling it out to the Republicans.^"^ Why had Roosevelt
let all this happen, this mass of disorganization and
confusion? Why had he even permitted a convention to be
held in the first place if he had known he was going to
slap it in the face? Why did he want to destroy the faith
and hope of thousands of his adherents?
Ickes places much of the blame on Perkins. Before
the convention, Roosevelt had talked only to the not-too-
honorable Morgan associate, and not to the rank and file
of the altruistic Progressives who were to be affected by 
111his decision. Perkins, said Ickes, must be given the
"discredit for the ignominious and ignoble death of the 
Progressive Party." Because he wanted to be a kingmaker, 
he saw that he could be so only through the uniting of 
the Progressive and Republican parties. If such a union 
could be brought about under Roosevelt's leadership, that 
would be well and good with Perkinsj but if this could not 
be accomplished, then he was ready to scuttle the too- 
trusting Roosevelt. By arranging to unite the parties,
Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1062.
H O  ickes, "Progressive Party," 328.
111 Ibid., 330.
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Perkins would be in a position to accept laurels for pre­
venting a third party movement and subsequently be rewarded 
for a Republican victory (presumably)«
Such a skilled and experienced politician as Roose­
velt, according to Ickes, could not however be exonerated 
for not understanding Perkins’ pre-convention maneuvers# 
Roosevelt owed it to himself and to his Progressive fol­
lowers to determine what the plans of the '’slippery”
Perkins were. 112 Thus in the final analysis, Roosevelt 
must be held largely responsible for the destruction of 
progressivism in the Republican Party, for after the 1916 
Progressive debacle, the truly liberal elements in Congress 
were without a party and could be effective only to a mini­
mum degree if they returned to the Republican side of the 
aisle.11^
What did Roosevelt think of the rough treatment he 
had received at the hands of the Old Guard leaders at the 
Republican convention? He had very little to say on the 
subject. However, to Isaac Russell of the New York Evening 
Mal1 he wrote: "They were more intent upon disciplining me
and teaching a lesson in party regularity and party su­
premacy than anything else."11 "^
Because of the many facets of character and person­
ality which Charles Evans Hughes and Woodrow Wilson had in
11  ^Ickes, "Progressive Party," 331.
113 Mowry, Progressive Movement. 208.
1]iJ- Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, IO6 3. Roosevelt to Russell dated June 16, 1916,
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common, it has been a question as to the degree of acceptance 
which Roosevelt showed for the 1916 Republican nominee. The 
Colonel had fairly clearly exposed his feelings late the 
previous year when he said of the Justice: "I thoroughly
dislike him.” He questioned Hughes’ thinking on such mat­
ters as preparedness, defense, and foreign policy. Further­
more, he said that Hughes "never forgives a man who renders 
him effective support; and when he is in office he loathes 
the politicians who have elected him to office."11^ Cer­
tainly no love between the two men had ever been lost, be-
1x6cause they were miles apart personally.
Regardless of this feeling of animosity toward 
Justice Hughes, Roosevelt undertook a rather active cam­
paign in his behalf. It might be noted, however, that 
Roosevelt in his campaigning laid much more stress on 
Hughes' positions regarding foreign affairs and prepared­
ness than upon the potentials of the candidate himself. 11,7 
During the campaign, the ex-President commented privately 
that Wilson had been afraid of him and had never dared 
answer his charges, but that "if Hughes lets him, he will 
proceed to take the offensive against Hughes." "I shall 
do everything I can for him," the Colonel remarked, "but 
don't forget that the efficiency of what I do must largely
1:L£ Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 995. Roosevelt to Lodge. 
December 7 » 1915.
116 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 357.
117 Russell Buchanan, "Theodore Roosevelt and American 
Neutrality," American Historical Review, XLIII (July, 
1938), 78I4.. Hereafter cited as Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality."
depend upon Hughes." Obviously, Roosevelt was insinu­
ating that if Hughes adopted a policy of me-tooism toward 
Wilson, it would make the Colonel appear as being in contra­
diction with his own candidate.
The former President's activity in the Hughes cam­
paign was not altogether in the category of assets for the 
Republicans. Arthur S. Link asserts that Roosevelt was a 
"virtual millstone" around Hughes', neck. The "hapless" 
candidate, he says, was drawn into approving Roosevelt's 
declarations on preparedness and foreign policy, which en­
abled the Democrats to charge that the Republican candidate, 
like Roosevelt, harbored warlike designs. Comment was fre­
quently made that "if Hughes is defeated, he has Roosevelt 
to thank for it."^^
Ex-President Roosevelt's remarks about Charles 
Evans Hughes showed his ever-present abilities as a coiner 
of phrases, as well as his coolness toward the man. During 
one of the more depressing moments of the 1916 campaign,
the Colonel is quoted as having called Hughes the "bearded 
120lady." He is also said to have frequently and sneer- 
ingly referred to Hughes as "another Woodrow Wilson with 
whiskers. "^2-*-
118 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 10614.. To William Roscoe Thayer, June 16, 1916.
119 Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive 
Era (New York, 1934), ZLtfT. -------
120 Frederic L. Paxson, review of Talks with Theodore 
Roosevelt by John J. Leary, Jr., American Historical 
Review, XXVI (October, 1920), 149.
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CHAPTER III
THE BEGINNING OP THE EUROPEAN WAR
What was Theodore Roosevelt's immediate reaction to 
the German invasion of tiny neighboring Belgium? And how 
did he parlay this issue into a stimulus for a national 
crusade for preparedness? These questions are paramount in 
a study of the ex-President in the first months of the 
European war.
"I am not prepared to say that in dire need the 
statesmen of a nation are not obliged to disregard any 
treaty, if keeping it may mean the most serious jeopardy 
to the nation." These words, reflecting upon the German 
violation of her treaty with Belgium, which guaranteed 
the latter's neutrality, were among the first written by 
ex-President Roosevelt upon the occasion of the subjuga­
tion of the Belgians by the Kaiser's troops. And they were 
written August 8, 19U|., to his German friend, Professor 
Hugo Munsterberg, at Harvard. If this letter was to indi­
cate any Rooseveltian position, besides an apparent justi­
fication of the German action, it was his belief in the 
futility of arbitration treaties. He saw these treaties, 
which had been negotiated under the Taft Administration and 
which were being promoted by President Wilson (and his "paci­
fist supporters"), as being utter folly. The invasion of 
Belgium was "proof of the pudding. " 1
1 Roosevelt, Letters. VII, 795.
The concern of Theodore Roosevelt over the injustice 
done to Belgium, which he preached upon so many times in 
later months, was not to be detected during the first two 
months of the war. He had issued his statement of support 
for the President and his administration during this time 
of crisis; and in late August in the Outlook he reiterated 
this pledge and further stated? "I am not now taking sides 
one way or the other as concerns the violation or disregard 
of these treaties. When giants are engaged in a death 
wrestle, as they reel to and fro they are certain to trample 
on whomever gets in the way. . . . ”2 But the war was very 
young and the Belgium Commission had not arrived as yet to 
stir up American sympathies, and other developments were yet 
to take shape which would serve to prejudice the minds of 
the American neutrals.
As the month of August, 191l|., progressed, Roosevelt’s 
opinions gradually took on a more positive aspect, and they 
were moving in the direction of sympathy for the British 
cause. He wrote to his friend Arthur Hamilton Lee on August 
22nd that while Americans felt that the course taken by 
Germany on her Western frontier was a menace to civilization, 
the issue between the Slav and the German was still in doubt. 
Roosevelt suggested to Lee that if he had been President he 
would have registered the strongest kind of protest, a pro­
test that would have meant something, over the German levy 
of huge war contributions on Belgium. Furthermore, he
Theodore Roosevelt, "The Foreign Policy of the U.S " Outlook, CVII (August 22, 1914), 1012.
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viewed the activities of Germany over the past forty-three 
years as having menaced every nation where she thought it 
was to her advantage to do so. As for American relations 
with England, as compared with relations with Germany, Roose­
velt observed that the former had been improving for several 
decades, while American attitudes toward Germany had under­
gone a considerable change throughout the previous fifteen 
to twenty years because of that nation*s hostile attitude.
He insisted that surely the directors of German policy by 
this time must have realized the damage they had done.^
Thus it is observed that Roosevelt was nudging closer to 
the Allied position in the European war but still writing 
in a fairly neutral and objective vein.
By September !}.th, Roosevelt was taking more emphatic 
views toward the belligerents, pacifists, and arbitration 
treaties. In another letter to Lee, on this date, he praised 
the heroic part being played by the British, and assured Lee 
that England was as certain to win this time as she was 
against Napoleon a century before. He condemned his fellow- 
countrymen who thought that universal arbitration treaties 
with raraguay and similar world powers" were sufficient 
force to supercede military strength. Likewise, he con­
demned the pacifists, those "peace-at-any-price men" who 
tended to support the "apostles of brutal violence" in 
time of crisis, and hence who "now have a sneaking admira­
tion for Germany." He acknowledged that he had a very real
3 Roosevelt, Letters. VII, 809.
and sincere liking and respect for the Germans individually, 
but, when it came to their treatment of Belgium, there just 
wasn't even room for argument. The Germans had trampled, to 
suit their own purposes, their solemn obligations to Belgium 
and on that country's rights. In a previous letter to Lee, 
Roosevelt had accused Wilson of being almost as much of a 
prize jackass" as Bryan, and he now observed that there was 
no opportunity on this side of the Atlantic to display heroic 
qualities and no indication of a desire to do so even if the 
need arose. These were trying and difficult times he recog- 
nized.1*- Herein, Roosevelt not only revealed his newly 
partisan views but also discarded any pretense of support, 
or even neutrality, toward the President. His vitriolic 
words indicated that he had assumed the role of arch-critic 
of the Administration, a role he was to play relentlessly 
for the next four and one-half years.
Whereas Roosevelt had once stated (September 2 3, I91I4.) 
that the United States did not have the "smallest responsi­
bility for what has befallen" Belgium, and that only urgent 
national duty would justify our departing from our tradi­
tional neutrality and policy of non-interference, by late 
September of this first war year he was no longer intimating 
that he would act as President Wilson did in this crisis.^
In an article in the Outlook, September 23, 191ip, Roosevelt 
seemed to officially break his silence and/or neutralism re­
garding the prospects for peace, in the light of the wrongs
U VI11’ 8l7, RoosSTClt *•. Sept-
£ Baker, Wilson. V, 162.
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visited upon Belgium. He insisted that he was not anti- 
German, but was emphatic in stating: "I am anti-brutalityJ"
And he assured his readers that had Britain or Prance been 
as guilty of brutal actions in Belgium as was Germany, he 
would be just as critical,^
During August, the Belgian mission had been to the 
United States. The unmeasurable sympathy which they created 
in this country for their cause was having its telling ef­
fects upon Theodore Roosevelt. He could still see some 
justification for the cause of either side in the war, but 
he was becoming more and more impressed with the fact that 
small, innocent Belgium had been "clobbered" in her neutral 
role while relying the sanctity of her treaty with Germany. 
To Count Albert Apponyi of Hungary, Roosevelt wrote: "If
treaties are ever to amount to anything... then some effi­
cient way must be designed for preventing the recurrence 
of the kind of thing that has happened to Belgium.
In the month of September (191ij.) the ex-President 
adopted two specific personal policies which were to guide 
him in his thinking for the remainder of his life. Be­
cause he had seen through Belgium’s experience that treaties 
can be inviolate only when backed up by force, he translated 
this as meaning that the United States should immediately 
strengthen its defenses. At this same time he insisted, for
6 Theodore Roosevelt, "The World War: Its Tragedies and
Its Lessons," Outlook. CVIII (September 2 3, 191k), 169.
Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 819. Letter dated September
the first time since 19 10, that another of our responsi­
bilities was to work for a world league of nations which
Owould be backed by force.
Theodore Roosevelt’s initial neutrality can be said 
to have been definitely terminated as of October 3, 191i|.,
i
when he wrote to his friend Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice that 
the United States should have accepted the Hague treaties 
as a "serious” obligation. Had he been President, he as­
serted, he would have called on all neutral nations to aid 
the United States in enforcing these treaties. 0 This was 
obviously an important supplement to, if not an abject 
contradiction and rejection of, his previous policy as indi­
cated only ten days earlier— when he wrote in the Outlook 
strictly as a neutralist and in academic platitudes con­
cerning our defenses and a world league. 10 Thus within a 
span of ten days, the former President moved the whole dis­
tance which differentiates the isolationist from the inter­
ventionist. Furthermore, from this point, his attitude re­
garding Germany’s guilt hardened, and his attitude toward 
the Wilson-Bryan policy of neutrality became more wrathful.
As to the reason for the very apparent Roosevelt 
reversal of attitude toward America's position in the 
European war, there are as many opinions as there are
8 Theodore Roosevelt, "The World War: Its Tragedies and
Its Lessons," Outlook. CVIII (September 23, 191*1.), 169.
0 Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 821.
10 Theodore Roosevelt, "The World War: Its Tragedies and
Its Lessons,” Outlook. CVIII (September 23, I91J4.),
authorities. It is suggested that the old Rough Rider could 
not bear the thought of finding himself on the same side of 
an issue as his two arch-antagonists, Wilson and Bryan. 11 
Another view is that the Colonel was merely emerging from 
a condition of confusion and was just now beginning to see 
and to state his position clearly. Pringle contends that 
Roosevelt's were the inevitable first reactions of a man 
who was a militarist at heart, who would not have hesitated 
to violate a treaty for righteousness, and who worshiped 
military efficiency, the sufferings and cruelties being the 
necessary evils. 12 But with the opportunity of two months 
of meditation on the subject, his long-established attitude 
of suspicion of both the Kaiser and the British had under­
gone a change. His preference for the British had become 
obvious; initial reactions had faded. He found himself in 
sympathy for the Belgians, for like most Americans he began 
to tag the Germans as aggressors. Furthermore, he was in­
fluenced to support the British position of maintaining the 
status quo in international affairs.
The rather sudden change of the Roosevelt position 
was indeed unique. Probably never before had any public 
figure shifted so decisively and so suddenly. Mowry reasons 
that a multiplicity of factors was involved, inasmuch as 
Roosevelt himself was a compound character. Like others, 
Mowry recognizes the power of the warrior strain in the
11 Mowry, Progressive Movement. 312.
12 Pringle, Roosevelt. 578.
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former President. Action was more natural for him than re­
flection, hence reflection resulted only after time had 
made it possible.^
A second factor in his reversal of position was the 
ex-President's basic nature of taking sides on every ques­
tion, he being a very partisan individual. Politics as­
suredly played another part in the formulation of the new 
Rooseveltian position. The Colonel had run into a blind 
alley in 1911). under the banner of progressivism, and it 
was interpreted that his new attitude toward the European 
conflict was an attempt to mend his political fences and 
fortunes on the issues of preparedness and war,1^ Thus, 
if he could win the support of large numbers of non-partisans 
and Republicans on these issues, he would be able to work for 
a rapprochement with his mother party from a position of 
strength instead of a position of weakness, which would have 
been the situation had he sought a reunion of his Progres­
sives with the Republicans.
Mowry's final point in explaining this action taken 
by Roosevelt is the ex-President's antagonism for Woodrow 
Wilson. These two men were contrasted as Democrat and 
Republican, as introvert and extrovert, as scholar and 
activist, and as idealist and pragmatist. Obviously, they 
had little in common. Both were certain they spoke the
-*-3 Mowry, Progressive Movement. 3 1 3.
^  Ibid* * Reference is made by Mowry to an article which 
appeared in the Mew York Times of November 10, 19lJ|.
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voice of the people on certain subjects and that they spoke 
with divine authority. Wilson in 1912 had beaten Roosevelt 
at his own game of progressivism and reform, and further­
more had translated his campaign promises into reality. 
Wilson's New Freedom" had virtually exterminated any hope 
of future Progressive Party virility. To be sure, the 
Colonel scorched under these thoughts, but his hatred for 
Wilson was climaxed by memories of the "insulting" treaty 
which the Chief Executive and Secretary of State Bryan had 
negotiated with Colombia over the Panama affair.^ Roose­
velt's reaction to this affront by Wilson and Bryan un­
doubtedly prompted his remark that "I really believe that I 
would rather have Murphy, Penrose or Barnes [his bitterest 
enemies within the Republican Party] as the standard bearer 
of this nation [than Wilson],
It may be reasonably concluded that Roosevelt's 
emotional intensity in hurrying America into the war can be 
attributed chiefly to his patriotism and his bias for the 
Allies, but no small factor was the former President's burn­
ing aversion for Woodrow Wilson. While the Colonel un­
doubtedly would have been on the side of the Allies regard­
less of what man and what party controlled the White House, 
If? Mowry, Progressive Movement, 313« This treaty, which 
was not passed until after Wilson left office and re­
visions had been made, originally provided for an 
apology to the Colombian Government for the actions 
of the Roosevelt Administration in the Panama incident plus an indemnity payment of twenty-five million dol­lars. Baker, Wilson. IV, i+27-28.
16 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 861. Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, December 8, 1911)..
his hatred of the Princeton professor unquestionably caused him 
to be more positively biased for the Allied cause— a stand which 
placed him normally, naturally, and somewhat happily in opposi­
tion to Wilson and the Administration's policy of neutrality.
H. L« Mencken, the reformer against reformers, was 
much more critical of the new Roosevelt position on the 
Belgian issue than were others. He suggested that the 
Colonel's was a calculated reaction to a series of factors 
and events. These included the deluge of German atrocity 
stories which were spread throughout the United States and 
the subsequent campaign to enlist American sympathies. In 
addition, by the middle of August, the British propaganda 
was in full swing and soon thereafter this country was 
flooded with "inflammatory stuff," which, six weeks after 
the opening of the war, had created a situation whereby 
it was hazardous for a German in America to state his 
country's case. The Wilson Administration, in supporting 
a policy of neutrality, provided an opportunity for Roose­
velt, said Mencken, and he leaped to it with sure instinct.
Here was a ready-made issue, full of emotional possibilities, 
stupendously pumped up by extremely clever propaganda, which 
had not been embraced so far by any "rabble-rouser of the 
first magnitude." Here was the Rough Rider's golden op­
portunity to deal a mortal blow to the Administration which 
he so detested, and thereby enhance greatly his possibilities 
of regaining his old leadership of the G.O.P. and occupancy 
of the White House. "Is it any wonder," Mencken asked, "that 
he gave a whoop, jumped upon his cayuse, and began scream­
ing for war? In war lay the confusion of Wilson, and the
melodramatic renaissance of the Rough Rider, the professional 
hero, the national Barbarossa."1^
Mencken reasoned further that had it not been for 
the astuteness of the British press agents and tear squeezers, 
if the indignation over the invasion of Belgium had failed 
to materialize, and if the President had been "whooping for 
war with the populace firmly against him,” then assuredly 
the moral horror of Roosevelt would have stopped short at 
a very low amperage, and...he would have refrained from 
making it the center of his policy."1® "My guess is," said 
the perspicacious Mencken, "that Roosevelt, like the great 
majority of other Americans, was not instantly and auto­
matically outraged by the invasion of Belgium." Instead, 
he probably viewed it as "a fine piece of virtuosity, pleas­
ing to a military connoisseur."1*^
William Allen White attributed the reversal in the 
Colonel’s policy to the wave of rage in the United States 
over Belgium1s fate at the hands of Germany. This wave, 
said White, carried Roosevelt along with it, and by winter 
"he was well established as a Man of Wrath, raging at Wilson
for his neutrality.
That the Colonel was greatly influenced by many fac­
tors and from many quarters cannot be minimized. At the 
beginning of the war, his apparent political ambitions would
1 '^ H. L. Mencken, A Mencken Chrestomathy, 23I4..
18 Ibid*. 236.
19 Ibid.. 23li.
20 White, Autobiography. 5>07.
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not have permitted him to overlook a statement by so impor­
tant a Republican personage as Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge 
urged that America had the duty of observing ’’strict neu­
trality as between the belligerents, with all of whom we 
are at peace.” It appears somewhat natural that the Sena­
tor’s statement should have been followed by Roosevelt’s 
advocacy of strict neutrality, contending that ”we should 
remain entirely neutral, and nothing but urgent need would 
warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or 
the other; and by his article in the Outlook in which he 
congratulated the country on its separation from European 
quarrels which made possible the preservation of our peace.^ 
Roosevelt’s two-months’ silence on the issue of 
Belgium is attributed by Russell Buchanan to the former 
President’s desire to avoid public expression of his opinion 
so as not to embarrass the Administration in any steps which 
it might take. Lyman Abbott, editor of the Outlook and 
apologist for Roosevelt, set up the doctrine, according to 
Mencken, that the invasion of Belgium threw the Colonel into 
an instantaneous and tremendous rage of moral indignation, 
and that the delay in the letter’s public exhibition thereof 
was due to his (Abbott's) fatuous interference. 2 -^
21 Baker, Wilson, V, 19.
^  Theodore Roosevelt, "The World War: Its Tragedies and
Its Lessons,” Outlook, CVIII (September 23, 1911|.), 169.
23 Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality,” 775.
^  H. L. Mencken, A Mencken Chrestomathy. 233.
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The Roosevelt motives and developments during the 
August-September period of 1911+ seem to shape themselves 
into a picture-forming pattern, and the partisans on the 
issues of this period have not seemed reluctant to state 
whether this was an unconscious development on the Colonel's 
part or if it was the result of the machinations of one of 
America's greatest and most astute political minds.
As the European war developed and its scope was 
understood by Americans, there was a largely-unconscious 
move to determine and choose sides between Germany and the 
Allies. Opposing opinions and opposing camps evolved rather 
rapidly and there came to be a hot rivalry between them.
One element advocated a steady and vigorous pressure for 
peace, this being the surest way out of our international 
troubles. These were the pacifists, and their idol was 
Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. On the other 
extreme were those who demanded military preparation. They 
probably were best represented by ex-President Roosevelt.
In the beginning, the strength of the pacifists was centered 
in the agricultural Midwest and the West, while the advo­
cates of preparedness were confined largely to the East, 
their doctrine being based upon industrial and financial 
interests rather than upon agricultural. As for President 
Wilson, in the early months of the war he regarded both of 
these movements as unnecessary and extreme. He felt that 
they were "rocking the boat" in our international relations
and were creating a divided front at home. However, between 
the two groups, the President found himself most opposed to 
the preparationists, whose lack of numbers was said to have 
been made up in economic power.2^
While the pacifists vociferously preached their 
theory— almost a creed--the men of preparedness warned of 
international dangers and our need to prepare to meet them. 
Bryan made the statement that "if this country needed a ' 
million men...the call would go out at sunrise and the sun 
would go down on a million men in arms. " 26 Thus, he saw no 
validity to the preparedness argument. For the other side, 
Owen Wister, author and personal friend of Theodore Roose­
velt, was writing that the case of Germany "is a hospital 
case, a case for the alienist; the mania of grandeur, 
complemented by the mania of persecution."2? Theirs was 
a "diseased mental state," he asserted, as he struck at 
the influence of Prussianism on Germany— Prussianism which 
had put its uniform on Germany's brains as well as its 
body and which had established the new trinity of German
worship; the super-man, the super-race, and the super- 
28state. China, Wister said, had built a stone wall against
2^ Baker, Wilson, VI, 2.
26 This statement was first reported in the New York 
Times of December 1 1, 191i{., at which time that 
publication castigated Bryan for such an utter­
ance. It went on to support another cabinet mem­
ber, Secretary of War Garrison, who was in favor 
of at least a mild form of preparedness. Baker.Wilson, VI, 2. *
27 1 9 1 5 73s1** Pentecost Calamity (New York,
28 Ibid.. 86.
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the world, and Germany was building a wall of the mind.29 
Furthermore, "if the Fourth of July and the Declaration it 
celebrates still mean anything to us," he warned, "let our 
arm be strong."3®
Wister was an early student of the Rooseveltian pre­
paredness theory and he became one of its most ardent ex­
ponents. In the darkening days of fall, 191i|, there were 
few, however, who cared to support the newly enunciated 
doctrines of the ex-President, either from a patriotic or a 
political standpoint. The Colonel's campaign for prepared­
ness was truly begun under great handicaps. He had little 
following of any kind. Most of his conservative supporters 
had evaporated after his 1912 endorsements of radicalism, 
and much of his Progressive following had drifted to Wilson, 
in view of their approval of his domestic policies. 31
The war in Europe was an event which to Roosevelt 
appeared as an argument for his life-long policy of a strong 
army and navy. By the most powerful technique of which he 
was capable, including the use of irony, warnings, appeals, 
and invective, the Colonel pursued his campaign for prepared­
ness from late I9II4. to the date of our entry into the war 
almost three years later. Eventually, this campaign became 
merged with his advocacy of American participation in the
29 ?Q?^Wioter* ^2. Pentecost of Calamity (New York,-L 7 9 uy #
30 Ibid.. UK).
31 Mark Sullivan, Our Times: Over Here 19lit-1918 (New 
York, 1933), 203. This work hereafter cited as Sullivan, Over Here.
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war on the side of the Allies. It was a double cause, a 
two-headed crusade.
On August 18, 191ij-, President Wilson had given his 
message to the people. Almost universally well-received, 
his program called for steadiness and a determined attitude 
of peace. He urged Americans to conduct themselves in a 
manner which would best safeguard the nation; and he called 
for neutrality in fact as well as in name, and for impar­
tiality in thought as well as in action. The President 
emphasized the need for and the duty of "one great nation" 
to remain neutral so as to play the important role of 
impartial mediator,^3
As several weeks passed, many persons in high places 
throughout the country were becoming somewhat concerned with 
the nature and condition of the nation's military. Repre­
sentative A. P. Gardner-^- demanded (in October) that a 
National Security Commission be created to report on de­
fense conditions in the United States. But he got no reply 
from the President. Colonel House was also having qualms 
regarding our security. He had been conferring with General 
Wood, and, as a result, had concluded that we should build
Sullivan, Over Here, 202.
33 This speech by the President must be viewed in the 
light of the recent events which had left deep scars 
on his personal life. On this date, Wilson had re­
turned from Georgia and the funeral of his long- 
suffering wife, Mrs. Ellen Axson Wilson* Baker,
Wilson, V, 19. It has been questioned if the Presi­dent's address was influenced by his tragedy.
3^ - Gardner was Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs.
up the armed forces so as to prevent any nation from think­
ing of attacking us. House submitted this conclusion to 
the President in the form of a recommendation, but the re­
sult was not the same as in Gardner’s case. This time, the 
Chief Executive did reply— in a rebuff. He said that he 
"did not believe there was any necessity for immediate 
action," fearing that to do so would shock the country.3^ 
Thus, while those who favored an increase in the country’s 
armaments worked in behalf of such a program, the President 
on the other hand maintained from the outset a calmness and 
a disinterest which alarmed and infuriated his adversaries.
To Roosevelt, who had become the voice of preparedness and 
the conscience of national honor and morality, the Presi­
dential attitude was intolerable and detestable.
The German invasion of neutral Belgium had now be­
come a symbol to Roosevelt— a symbol which was to remain 
with him for the duration. This greatest of all wars was 
summoning up in him a shining spirit of sacrifice and 
patriotism. But at the same time, it was stripping him of 
his sense of proportion and fairness. 37 He lashed out at 
Woodrow Wilson with a wrathful vengeance that would excite 
the admiration of Beelzebub. In the course of his attacks, 
the Colonel accused the President of inconsistency, hypocrisy,
, Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (2 vols«, Boston, 1926), I, 29^7^
Mowry, Progressive Movement, 319.
37 ibid.
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despicableness, timidity, ridiculousness, and of represent­
ing the "nadir" of American misconduct. He found the Admin­
istration’s international policy to be one of "milk and 
water," fantastic, "diluted-mush", and one encouraging a 
Chinafication of the country. Despite his recent attacks 
oh the Administration’s policies, he never fooled himself 
into believing, especially in these early months of the war, 
that he had the support of the American masses. On October 
3, 1911]-, he wrote his friend Spring-Rice that he was "certain 
that the majority are now following Wilson."38 Recognizing 
and admitting that the Administration "only too well repre­
sents the American people,"39 he seemed most aware of his 
impotence. His was a very lonely voice in the woods, and 
effectiveness was yet to be realized.^"0
What did the President think of the thundering at­
tacks which were made upon him and his administration during 
the period of American neutrality? The answer is largely a 
secret which only Wilson himself knew. Seldom did he ever 
publicly recognize Roosevelt, and records of his private 
correspondence and conversation reveal very little of his 
attitude toward his bitter antagonist. In 191lj. and 1915, 
he recognized that the public for the most part looked at
88 Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 821. Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice.
39 Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 776.
Up to November, I91I4., no responsible American critic, 
except Roosevelt, had raised a protest over the Wilson 
foreign policy. It was then that the American Ambas­
sador to France, somewhat belatedly perhaps, charged 
that his country had not done its duty in"regard to Belgium. Baker, Wilson. V, I6I4.*
Theodore Roosevelt as a scold with but little support. Wil­
son, therefore, felt safe and ignored him. He was as subtle 
with his silence as he was with his words, for he pretended 
that he did not know that the man or the attacks existed.
He is quoted as having said: "The way to treat an adversary
like Roosevelt is to gaze at the stars over his head.
Wilson would not permit his supporters nor members of his 
administration to answer his critics, especially Roosevelt. 
"Please don't give yourself any distress or concern about 
what Mr. Roosevelt is saying," Wilson wrote Dudley Field 
Malone on December 9, 191i+. "The very extravagance and 
unrestrained ill feeling of what he is now writing serve 
to nullify any influence that his utterances could have.
He cannot possibly in his present situation or temper cause 
any embarrassment which need give us a second thought. I 
am sincerely sorry that he should have so forgotten the 
dignity and responsibility of a man placed as he is who 
might exercise so great an influence for good if he only 
saw and chose the way.
The Wilson Administration gained a slight breath­
ing spell from the sulphurous attacks of the Colonel, who 
had seemed to lurk at every turn. This came at the re­
quest of the persons for whom Roosevelt was campaigning in 
the fall elections of I9H4-. His candidates asserted that 
Wilson's policies in foreign affairs, which Roosevelt had 
consistently attacked, were popular with the people. Thus,
Sullivan, Over Here, 203.
^  Baker, Wilson, V, 165.
the Colonel conceded to wait until after the elections be­
fore hitting at the President on this subject. He waited; 
but once the ballots were in the boxes, he wasted little 
time in coming back to his point. The attack was resumed 
in an article he wrote for the New York Times on December 
6th. ^ 3
A curious feature at the beginning of the European 
war was the fact that important figures from both sides of 
the barbed wire sought Roosevelt's ear— at the same time 
that Wilson was minimizing the Colonel's worth to anyone 
or to any cause. Both the Germans and the Allies placed 
a high value on securing his sympathy. Through personal 
visits and by correspondence, the cause of the Central 
Powers was placed before him for his consideration by such 
men as German Ambassador Johann von Bernstorff; Harvard 
professor Hugo Munsterberg; Bradford Academy professor 
Edmund Otto von Mach; Baron Ladislaus Hengelmuller, former 
Austrian Ambassador to the United States; Count Apponyi of 
Hungary; and Professor Kuno Meyer of the University of 
Berlin.^ Important British leaders who sought the Roose­
velt understanding included his long-time friend and Mem­
ber of Parliament, Arthur Hamilton Lee; Cecil Arthur 
Spring-Rice; Lord James Bryce; Rudyard Kipling, who wrote 
Roosevelt regarding U. S. inaction regarding Belgium; and 
Sir Edx-rard Grey, British Foreign Secretary, who expressed
b-3 Moitfry, Progressive Movement. 308.
^  Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 779.
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to Roosevelt his convictions regarding British innocence 
ll1?in the war. And always, the Colonel was in close touch 
with his old friend Jean Jules Jusserand, a man of letters 
and the French Ambassador to the United States.^ 6
Although Roosevelt took a strong anti-German posi­
tion and became a bitter opponent of German policy quite 
soon after the beginning of the war, he remained friendly 
to his pro-German acquaintances, and he purported to have 
an open mind in their relations. The Colonel consulted 
them early in the war to learn their side of the story be­
fore he drew his own conclusions. Both he and his German 
correspondents were vigorous in their attempts to convince 
each other of the validity of their positions. Roosevelt 
never hesitated to be most emphatic with them in pointing 
out his charges against Germany. There could be no serious 
question of fact, he told them, regarding the truthfulness 
of the stories of the subjugation of Belgium and of the 
killing of Americans on the high seas by submarine war- 
fare. -^7 Sometimes the correspondence became a little 
heated, each side was playing for high stakes. But Roose­
velt continued to attempt to prove that his policies were 
dictated by his concern for his country's best interests, 
and not by any prejudice he had for or against any foreign 
nation. This he pointed out to Hugo Munsterberg in a 
letter of December 23, 191^. "It is possible," said the
^  Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality, 11 779.
^  Paxson, Pre-War Years. 3I4..
Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 786.
9^
Colonel, "you may be interested in seeing for your private 
information (and von Mach's), a letter I wrote in answer 
to a friend who desired me to support an Anglo-American 
alliance movement. At any rate, I try to play fairl"^ 8 
In the letter referred to, Roosevelt had refused to join 
such an alliance because he did not believe that it was 
the proper thing for Americans to do. "I do not believe 
m  hyphenated Americans," he asserted in his r e p l y . T o  
others as well as his German friends, therefore, the former 
President emphasized Americanism and the need to do what he 
considered as right for America. The first time that Roose­
velt openly criticized Germany, however, he immediately 
lost favor with the German press. The Cologne Gazette 
attacked him editorially as one who was "never gifted 
with modesty," who lacked "a full insight into European 
affairs." The publication pointed out that "when anybody 
is m  office, other people have respect for the fact, and 
foreigners are treated in accordance with the prestige which 
they enjoy at home. That was why Roosevelt was formerly 
treated with special respect in Germany. At the last Presi­
dential election he lost all his prestige.»^° This news­
paper article was a reaction to the Colonel's recent wrlt- 
ings, all of which cast a heavy shadow over Germany. ^ 1
Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 868.
k9 5 iF f? , 22f7i 9l 4 ° OSeTelt t0  MrS‘ Salph Saneer’ De° -
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Attacks upon him by the foreign press were dismissed 
by the ex-President without serious regard. He sincerely 
believed himself to be scrupulously fair toward Germany, and 
he asserted that he held no bitterness toward that country. 
His sole ambition, he contended, was to make his position 
"as clear as a bell."^
This was the nature of the Roosevelt position as 
America sought to adjust itself to the existence of the 
European conflict. Ensuing events and developments, the 
sinkings of tne Lus1tania and the Arabic, and the gain­
ing momentum of the Plattsburg idea, were to mold further 
the former President's ideas. They seemed to corroborate 
his already-expressed views and to make more definite the 
course which he had chosen.
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(New York, 1920). This little volume, which is intro­
duced by a prayer for peace, contains twelve chapters, 
all concerned^with the European conflict as it af­
fected the United States. Among these were chapters 
on: The Duty of Self-Defense and of Good Conduct
Toward Others;" "The Belgian Tragedy;" "The Causes 
of the War; "Preparedness Against War;" and "Utopia or Hell."
^  Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 821. Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, October 3, I91I4..
CHAPTER IV
STIMULANTS TO PREPAREDNESS: LUSITANIA AND PLATTSBURG
I
On May 7» 19l5» a German submarine sank the British 
liner Lusitania, at a great loss of life. Admittedly this 
was a terrible disaster. However, for the United States it 
had a far greater significance than the loss of human life. 
Americans pondered the meaning of this catastrophe not only 
because a large number of Americans were aboard the liner 
but also because the country had just been introduced to 
the brutality of a new type of warfare, and they were 
shocked. America seemed to indulge in a period of soul- 
searching, for the apparent purpose of determining where 
we should stand on this matter of ruthless submarine de­
struction.
The Germans, who even at this point in the war were 
hoping for American moral if not material support, appeared 
somewhat concerned over the reaction in the United States 
to the Lusitania affair. They attempted to justify their 
actions by pointing to an advertisement which the German 
Ambassador had placed in a New York newspaper prior to the 
ship’s sailing, warning its passengers of impending danger. 1 
The German Government stated that the United States Govern­
ment had not warned its civilians of the war zone and
1 This insertion by the German Ambassador has been re­
ferred to as the most famous newspaper advertisement in the world. Owen Mister, Roosevelt, The Story of 
£ Friendship (New York, 1930), 3^2. This work is 
hereafter cited as Mister, Friendship.
reminded that its expressed position had been that American 
citizens should either stay on U. S. ships or remain at 
home. Furthermore, the Germans said, the Lusitania carried 
over $200 ,0 00 worth of ammunition in its cargo. 2
The controversy arising from the sinking of this 
ship finally convinced the Administration that there was 
serious danger lurking in the immediate future for this 
country. The Wilson reaction had not only international 
but domestic overtones. Over a period of two and one-half 
months, the President sent three notes to the German Govern­
ment concerning the Lusitania. The first was his "strict 
accountability" note. While this communication was cloaked 
in sufficiently strong language, Secretary of State Bryan, 
with the approval of the President, confided to the Austrian 
Ambassador (Dumba) that "this note was not to be taken 
seriously." This note, therefore, could be registered as 
nothing more than an obvious attempt to placate American 
public opinion. In addition, it was speculated that this 
"side statement" to the Austrian Ambassador was another 
effort by the President to gain German acceptance of his 
good offices for peace negotiations.^' The second of the 
three Lusitania notes was so much milder in tone than the 
first that Elihu Root was prompted to say: "You shouldn't 
shake your fist at a man and then shake your finger at
2 ,,Tlie Lusitania Torpedoed." Literary Digest, L (May
15, 1915), H3h«
3 Wister, Friendship, 3lp6.
^ Ibid.. 39-8.
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him.”- Wilson’s recognition of growing international danger 
prompted him on July 21st, 1915, the date of the third 
Lusitania note to Germany, to order his Army and Navy Secre­
taries to consider and report "far-reaching" programs of 
national defense.^*
Serious-thinking people throughout the United States, 
and even in Europe, became concerned over the spiritual void 
which America was displaying in her actions and policies 
toward the war. The London Punch ran this poem in its columns
following the disastrous loss of life on the sea: 7
In silence you have looked on felon blows,
On butchers' work of which the waste lands reek;
Now, in God's name, from Whom your greatness flows.Sister, will you not speak?
America, however, did not need her sister Europeans 
to remind her of her moral deficiencies, for we had our own 
built-in morality meter— a most energetic, effusive, and 
patriotic ex-President. Theodore Roosevelt had maintained 
a "comparative quiet" throughout the preceding nine months, 
giving the Administration some opportunity to develop and 
shape its war policies without undue criticism. But the 
Colonel, who had already become the recognized voice of 
preparedness, cried out at the neutrality displayed by the 
President in this time of crisis. He could no longer re­
press the urge to vent his frankest opinions publicly, 
opinions which he had made known for the most part only
£ Wister, P;riendship. 3I4J4..
^reaerie L. Paxson, "American War Government,"
American Historical Review. XXVI (October, 1920), 55.
7 Wister, The Pentecost of Calamity.
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privately to this point. He charged that the sinking of
the Lusitania was "piracy on a vaster scale of murder than
any old time pirate ever practised." He called it "cold-
8blooded murder."
In the mind of Roosevelt, the Lusitania affair left 
no room for a feeling of neutrality in America. "For many 
months," he asserted, "our Government has preserved between 
right and wrong a 'neutrality* which would have excited the 
emulous admiration of Pontius Pilate— the arch-typical 
neutral of all time. " 0 On June 1, 1915, he wrote a progres­
sive Republican friend that he wished to call his attention 
to the New York Times of that day "which gives a statement 
of Wilson that literally passes belief, for it closes with 
this remark: 'This is perhaps the very time when I would 
not care to arouse the sentiment of patriotism.' I think 
this should be framed with 'Remember the Maine' on the op­
posite column and underneath it the President's previous 
statement 'We are too proud to fight. ' " 10 Roosevelt was 
vehement in his hate for the President as well as in his 
conviction that there was a direct correlation between 
Germany and immorality, atrocities, and treachery. It 
seemed that he had the ability to believe without bounds 
anything concerning either Wilson or Germany. 11 It was
Q
Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 782.
g
"America's Response to Germany's Challenge," Liter- 
ary Digest. L (May 22, 1915), 1197-99.
10 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 925. To John G. Borglum, 
famous sculptor.
11 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 315.
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inconceivable to him that the United States should refrain 
from taking action in regard to the Lusitania matter, as­
serting that we owed it to humanity and to our own national
*1 p
self-respect to do something. He demanded, among other 
things, that we immediately prohibit all commerce with Ger­
many. As for hyphenated Americans, the Mew York Herald re­
ported him as saying: ’’The hyphen was submarined with the
Lusitania, and henceforth there can be no divided al­
legiance.”^^
Roosevelt was thoroughly angered by the President’s 
speech (subsequent to the Lusitania sinking) in which he 
suggested that "there is such a thing as a nation being too 
proud to f i g h t . A n d  he railed in his antipathy for Secre­
tary Bryan, who contended that the war in Europe was caused 
by preparedness. But, said Roosevelt, it was Wilson, not 
Bryan, who was the real enemy of the country's best inter­
ests. Even the German Ambassador became victim of one of 
the Colonel's blasts. In view of the threatening advertise­
ment which he had placed in the newspaper regarding the 
sailing of the Lusitania. Roosevelt asserted that if he 
had been President, he would have put Ambassador Bernstorff 
aboard the Lusitania— to share its fate.16
► 12 tir^ Lusitania Torpedoed." Literary Digest L (Mav 1 9.
1915)7 T 1 ' 3 3 -------
^  "America's Response to Germany's Challenge," Liter­
ary Digest, L (May 22, 1915), 1198. ------
Wister, Friendship, 3^3. This statement appeared in 
the President's address to some 15,000 naturalized 
citizens in Philadelphia.
Ibid., 3I4.7 p 
16 Ibid.. 31+2.
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After these outbursts, there could be little doubt
as to where the ex-President stood in regard to Germany,
German-Americans, and the Wilson Administration. Whatever
element of equivocation Roosevelt had shown previously in
his attitude toward the war had completely evaporated.
The summer of 1915 found his position toward the European
17was to be well jelled. In the eyes of many of the na­
tion’s leaders, he had sounded the death knell of "watch­
ful waiting."^
This period was described by a Roosevelt friend 
as one characterized by the emergence of the ex-President
and the eclipse of President Wilson in matters of influ-
19encing public opinion.
II
Other than the Regular Army, which trained a rela­
tively small number of men for military service, the only 
other sources of American military instruction during the 
half century prior to the war were the nation’s Land 
Grant Colleges and the high schools. The Government, 
however, exercised no effective control over the programs 
being given at these schools and the training was generally
^7 Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 78 3.
^  "America’s Response to Germany’s Challenge," Liter- ary Digest, L (May 22, 1915), 1198.
Wister, Friendship,
102
defective and unsatisfactory. Furthermore, only college 
students of agricultural and mechanical schools and mili­
tary academies were exposed to this military training, there
being no such programs in the greater part of the old Eastern
20colleges, state universities, and private colleges.
To the university and college presidents of the country 
on May 10, 1913» Major General Leonard Wood, Army Chief of 
Staff, addressed a circular letter which announced that the 
Secretary of War had decided to hold two experimental sum­
mer military camps for the instruction of students. Their 
stated purpose was to increase the country's trained re­
serve with a class of men from whom, in time of national 
emergency, a large proportion of the commissioned officers
would be drawn. Depending on their success, it was expected
21that these camps would be held annually.
The "student camp" idea was basically Wood's. He
saw it as being the only feasible means of giving officer
reserve training in the absence of financial support from
an uninterested Congress. Because the students were to
finance all details in regard to their training, no legis-
22lation would be required.
These camps, which were inaugurated a year before 
the beginning of the European war and two years before
20 Ralph Barton Perry, The Plattsburg Movement (Hew 
York, 1921), 11. This work is hereafter cited as 
Perry, Plattsburg.
21 Ibid.. 2.
22 Ibid.. 3.
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preparedness became a popular national issue, served to 
furnish a model and precedent for the more famous Platts- 
burg, New York, camps of 1915 and 1916. It was the latter 
which then provided the name and impetus for numerous other
such camps in the succeeding two years.
At the advent of the war, General Wood began agita­
ting with his characteristic blunt vigor for a sound, na­
tional military policy— calling our preparedness situation 
"thoroughly unsatisfactory. " 23 Due in large part to Wood's 
warnings, Theodore Roosevelt's utterances, and the public 
information program of the National Security League, the 
preparedness movement soon began to spread throughout the 
country. The Congress, to the contrary, was pacifically- 
minded, seeming to base its attitude to some degree on the 
protection offered by the arbitration treaties recently 
negotiated.2^ The advocates of preparedness did not share 
the security felt by those who chose to hide behind such 
treaties. General Wood, in his book Our Military History, 
pointed out the futility of arbitration unless it was ap­
proached from a position of strength.2^ Because of their 
stand on increasing the nation's military strength while 
de-emphasizing arbitration treaties, the adherents of
23 Baker, Wilson, VI, 2.
2^ Charles Seymour, Woodrow Wilson and the World War 
(New Haven, 1921), 82. This work hereafter cited 
as Seymour, Wilson and the War.
2^ Leonard 'Wood, Our Military History (Chicago, 1916),
9-7. This work hereafter cited as Wood, Military 
History.
preparedness seemed to be in conflict with Administration 
sympathies, if not its policies.
In his official report for the year 191ip, Secretary 
of War Garrison said: "The students' camps were very suc­
cessful and bid fair to be more so and undoubtedly can and 
should be developed into a most valuable assistance." And 
President Wilson in his address to Congress on December 8,
19Uj., alluded to the camps and seemed to give them his tacit 
approval. "We must depend in every time of national peril," 
he stated, upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to 
arms.... It will be right...to provide a system by which 
every citizen who will volunteer for the training may be 
made familiar with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of
brill and maneuverj and the maintenance and sanitation of 
26camps. The words of the President and the Secretary, how­
ever, carried only a limited meaning. The camps were con­
tinued, but had only luke-xtfarm support from these two.
The sinking of the Lusitania. May 7, 1915, touched 
the humanity and pride of a great mass of Americans. Their 
reaction to this act of brutality was a deep resentment a— 
gainst the Germans and a desire to take some form of action. 
The Plattsburg Movement was just such an action. It, like 
other activities which were undertaken, offered its parti­
cipants an opportunity to engage in a form of patriotic ef­
fort.
The Plattsburg Movement, while an outgrowth of the 
student training camps, was different from these previous
io5
26 Perry, Plattsburg, 19.
training efforts inasmuch as it was originated by a group
of young business and professional men (largely from New
York) and was created for them and for others of similar
interests. The charter members of this movement included
such prominent young men as Elihu Root, Jr., Cornelius W.
Wiekersham, Hamilton Pish, Jr., and Theodore Roosevelt,
2?Jr. These names as well as their social and economic 
backgrounds would indicate the developing organization to 
have been one with a strong Republican flavor. This being 
true, there is little wonder, therefore, that these men 
emitted patriotism and preparedness of the variety which ex- 
President Roosevelt had been expounding for the previous 
seven months.
Plattsburg came to have a national character because 
of the men from all parts of the country who had asked to 
participate. To the young men who promoted the establish­
ment of the camp, General Leonard Wood, Commanding General 
of the important Department of the East, promised his 
"hearty cooperation." Plattsburg, therefore, in some mea­
sure had the assured assistance and supervision of the War 
Department, and from its early beginnings, it was a move­
ment which demanded immediate action and personal effort on 
the part of the trainees. The men involved publicly expressed 
their alarm that they and their country were almost entirely 
without military experience at this time of international 
crisis— a crisis in which the United States assuredly was
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27 Perry, Plattsburg, 26.
becoming more deeply involved. 20 At the camp, the men were 
told by General Wood and other officers of the defenseless­
ness of America. It was revealed to them that the United 
States Army at that time possessed only nine more field 
pieces than x^ rere used by General Longstreet and General Hill 
at the battle of Gettysburg half a century before.^
Plattsburg, like the other military training camps, 
served a profound purpose. It helped to create a moral force 
within the country— a force represented by a rather powerful 
and effective military organization of civilians that was 
ready to meet an emergency for which no machinery of the 
government was available. Plattsburg did much to prepare 
the public mind for the Draft Act of 1917, and it secured
publicity for and promoted generally the whole idea of 
30preparedness. It is of little surprise therefore that the 
apostle of American preparedness, Theodore Roosevelt, was 
invited to make an early appearance at Plattsburg.
The majority of the men in training there looked to 
the ex-President and to General Wood for leadership rather 
than to President Wilson and his administration. This was 
unfortunate, to be sure, but under the circumstances of the 
times, it was inevitable. These two men were the acknowledged 
prophets of the very thing which the trainees were so dedi­
cated to— military preparation. Therefore, on the occasion
2® Perry, Plattsburg, 27.
29 Ib id ., 14.3.
3° Ibid., 21+2.
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of the arrival of Theodore Roosevelt at Plattsburg, August 
25, 19l5> the sentiment of the camp was overwhelmingly 
favorable to hira.^
Besides the Colonel, there were numerous other dis­
tinguished personages who visited Plattsburg during the 
encampment. But the most important two who were invited felt 
compelled to decline their invitations. They were the Presi­
dent and the Secretary of Mar. Secretary Garrison, though 
refusing to appear at the camp, had strongly endorsed the 
work being accomplished there. President Wilson, likewise, 
in a letter to General Wood on August 16, 19l5> expressed 
his approval. "I have followed as well as I could at a
distance," he said, Hwhat has been done at Plattsburg and
have followed it with the greatest interest. I think all 
concerned ought to be congratulated upon the success of the 
experiment."
Despite these encouraging words, it was only a few 
days later that the Commander-in-Chief refused an invitation 
to speak at the camp. He insisted that anything he had to 
say on preparedness should be made to Congress and expressed
the view that harm only could come to those indulging in the
practice of making partisan use of the camp. This last ex­
pression was undoubtedly intended by him to serve as a warn­
ing to his adversary, Theodore Roosevelt, who was to speak 
within a few days at the training area. ^ 2 It is somewhat
31 perry, Plattsburg. lj.6.
^2 Baker, Wilson. VI, 13.
curious, therefore, that the United States Commander-in- 
Chief and his Secretary of War should refuse to express ap­
proval of '’Plattsburgn by a personal visit when the camp 
and the movement represented had the tacit endorsement of 
the national administration.
On the evening of August 25, ex-President Roosevelt 
spoke to some twelve hundred trainees at Plattsburg. The 
greater part of his speech was devoted to an attack on 
hyphenated and "Chinafled" Americanism. But it was his 
reference to foreign affairs that "threw the fat into the 
fire." "In international matters," he charged, "rules of 
morality should apply as well as in personal matters." As 
he was being applauded for this statement, he demanded of 
his listeners: ’Don't ' I do not want the applause of any
man for that statement on international morality unless 
that man has a burning sense of shame that the United States 
has not stood up for Belgium." The reaction was a redoubled 
applause, enthusiasm which was heard in the nation's capital. 
By the Administration, this speech was considered to be 
highly political, but if the address itself was not enough 
to stir the President, another incident which immediately 
followed most certainly did. In an interview with the 
press as he awaited his train for New York City, and while 
enroute, Roosevelt made reference to Wilson's "too proud 
to fight" speech of May 10, 1915 (three months earlier fol­
lowing the Lusitania disaster). At the same time, he made 
sarcastic reference to the President's "elocutionary cor­
respondence" in his three Lusitania notes to Germany. The
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ex-President concluded the interview by making reference to 
the often-repeated statement that everyone should stand be­
hind the President in times like these. "I heartily sub­
scribe to this on condition, and only on condition,” he 
asserted, "that it is followed by the statement 'so long as 
the President stands by the country. ' 1,33
The strange quirk of events surrounding the develop­
ment of this whole episode was unfortunate. General Wood 
had carefully edited the Roosevelt speech, but the Colonel's 
secretary gave the newspapermen an unedited copy inad­
vertently.^ These unedited, and unspoken, remarks were 
then amalgamated in the following day's press with the state­
ments Roosevelt made directly to reporters (but not to the 
trainees) following his departure from Plattsburg. Thus it 
appeared in journalistic accounts that the ex-President was
guilty of having incited American soldiers against their
35Commander-in-Chief. This series of events created the 
explosive situation which caused one of America's greatest 
military leaders to receive a public reprimand. On the day 
following the Roosevelt appearance at the camp, Secretary 
of War Garrison sent the following telegram to General 
Wood:3^
33 Baker, Wilson, VI, I4I)..
3 -^ Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 965n.
35 Perry, Plattsburg. Ijlj..
3 6  I b i d . ,  1+ 5 .
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I have just seen the reports in the news­
papers of the speech made by ex-President Roose­
velt at the Plattsburg camp. It is difficult 
to conceive of anything which could have a more 
detrimental effect upon the real value of the 
experiment than such an incident. This camp, 
held under government auspices, was success­
fully demonstrating many things of great 
moment. Its virtue consisted in the fact that 
it conveyed its own impressive lesson in its 
practical and successful operation and results.
No opportunity should have been furnished to 
any one to present to the men any matter ex­
cepting that which was essential to the neces­
sary training which they were to receive. Any­
thing else could only have the effect of dis­
tracting attention from the real nature of the 
experiment, diverting consideration to issues 
which excite controversy, antagonism and ill- 
feeling, and thereby impairing, if not destroy­
ing what otherwise would have"been so effective. 
There must not be any opportunity given at 
Plattsburg or any other similar camp for any 
such unfortunate consequences.
The Secretary apparently did not check the validity 
of the press releases on which he chose to base his disci­
plinary action. The above rebuke therefore was founded on 
the assumption that the ex—President!s address to the 
trainees had been an attack on the Wilson Administration.
General Wood accepted this unusual discipline with 
soldierly obedience and forbearance. Seeing that the Gener­
al would not give an explanation, Roosevelt took it upon 
nimself to reply sharply to the Secretary's telegram through 
a statement in the New York Times, August 27, 1915. He 
referred to Garrison's actions as ’’buffoonery",37 anci ^e 
reminded the Secretary that he had not mentioned either the 
President or the national administration while at the camp. 
He further suggested that it was a confession of guilt on
37 Mowry, Progressive Movement. 317.
the part of the Administration if it regarded his calling 
attention to thirteen months of inaction on national pre­
paredness as an attack upon itself.3® The ex-President 
admitted, however, that "to support the great immediate 
need of national preparedness is...by implication to con­
demn, the Administration to whose supine action we owe our 
present utter unpreparedness.
Roosevelt felt indignant that his friend, General 
Wood, should be made to suffer for what he considered his 
own responsibility, and which was beyond the control of 
the General. "I am, of course, solely responsible for 
the whole speech," he reminded. "When, after three weeks' 
notice, the War Department made no objection to my visit 
to the camp, they were disqualified from criticizing Gener­
al Wood because I went, and because he did not submit my 
speech to the Administration for approval."^
Secretary of War Garrison, who only six months later 
was to resign from the Cabinet because of disillusionment 
and difference with Wilson on preparedness issues, has been 
credited by Ralph Barton Perry with a genuine desire to pro­
mote the cause of preparedness— despite his involvement in 
the Roosevelt-Plattsburg-Wood matter. Although it might ap­
pear that Garrison acted hastily in his rebuke of the General,
Bishop, Roosevelt. 39lp,
39 This statement was contained in Roosevelt's letter 
to Dr. Henry S. Drinker, President of Lehigh Uni­
versity, on September 1, 1915. Ibid.. 396.
^  Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 965n.
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CHAPTER V
THE LONELY VOICE
By 1911+, conditions in Europe, a continent armed to 
the teeth, had made war inevitable. Whatever the reasons, 
war did come, as did the somewhat academic argument over its 
causes. On this side of the Atlantic, there were two definite 
schools of thought on this issue. The pacifists, as charac­
terized by Secretary of State Bryan, contended that it was 
logical to believe we could stay out of war if we were un­
prepared— inasmuch as preparation for war is an incentive 
to war. 1 The counter opinion to that of the pacifists was 
held by those who could be considered as the disciples of 
preparedness. America’s two foremost advocates of this 
theory were General Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt. 
General Wood spoke well the thoughts of the proponents of 
a militarily prepared nation when, in his book Our Military 
History, he asserted: "We have no right to jeopardize all
we have and hold most dear by failing to organize and pre­
pare our strength because of the fear that if strong, organ­
ized and ready, our nation may become an international high- 
wayman." "If no serious resistance is possible on the part 
of one party to a dispute," he pointed out, "the temptation 
of the stronger and better prepared to use force is great; 
if the reverse is the case, consideration and a disposition
1 Paxson, Pre-War Years, 131.
2 Wood, Military History, 52.
Perry suggests this might well have been due to the Secre­
tary's desire to prevent inflammatory utterances that could 
have brought the country into war before it was ready. He 
also may have desired to avoid popular agitation, hoping 
that the Administration, if left alone, would work out a
satisfactory plan of its own without popular excitement 
and partisan censure.^
xhis incident at Plattsburg, without doubt, offered 
great opportunity and potential for a long-running political 
battle. However, despite Roosevelt's characteristic vitri­
olic attack upon the Secretary of War, the affair was soon
closed after the latter had made a rejoinder to the Colonel's 
attack upon him.
Plattsburg had received and continued to receive 
much attention in the nation's press. This, combined with 
the personal influence exerted by the camp personnel, re­
sulted in the Plattsburg Movement becoming "a megaphone
through which...words of military wisdom penetrated to the 
uttermost ends of the land.
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^‘1 Perry, Plattsburg. ip7.
fbid^, J4.3.
to arbitrate may be counted on.’1^  Wood cautioned that it 
isn‘t enough to be filled with the spirit of sacrifice and 
to have lofty ideals, for the strength of right must be 
organized against the day when it may be necessary to meet 
the force of wrong.^1 He reminded that a war prepared for 
is often a war avoided,^ paraphrasing Washington's statement 
that "to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual
Lmeans of preserving peace.”
At their adversaries, the supporters of preparedness
charged that it was an insult to us as a people to have it
assumed that we could not be strong and prepared to fight
for the right without becoming likely to use our power for 
7wrong. Furthermore, the professional pacifist, the advo­
cate of unpreparedness and nonresistance, was seen as the 
most ciangerous of our citizens. While being generally 
eminently respectable, the pacifist was charged with advo­
cating a policy which would surely end in great and unneces­
sary loss of life, if not in the final loss of our national 
liberty. The adoption of the pacifist policy was viewed as 
the establishment of a condition which would prevent the 
country from effectively defending that which was right. 
Hence, it would assure the subordination of good to evil. 8
3 Wood, Military History, lj.8.
^ Evan J._David, Leonard Wood on National Issues (Garden 
City, 1920), 1 2 5 1 This work hereafter cited as David.Wood., .
^ Ibid.. 130.
 ^Wood, Military History. I4.8.
7 Ibid.* 51.,
8 Ibid.. I8li_.
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As a result of the warnings of the highly respected 
General Wood that our army was sorely inadequate in this time 
of crisis, and because of the subsequent alarm by many highly 
placed individuals especially in the East, the preparedness 
movement was born. It is said to have been crystallized by 
the National Security League— founded in December, 1911}., by 
some 150 public leaders in New York City. This league was 
opposed by the pro-German element in the country, and, if 
not actually opposed by President Wilson, it found no co­
operation or encouragement from his Administration.^ Need­
less to say, Theodore Roosevelt was the League’s unabashed 
exponent, for almost simultaneously with its founding, the 
Colonel assumed the leadership of the movement for national 
preparedness.^
For those who remembered the pre-Cuban Roosevelt in 
his post as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, his obsession 
for positive action and military preparation in time of 
turmoil was not surprising.11 On one occasion in 1898, 
while momentarily serving as Acting Navy Secretary, Roose­
velt, considerably concerned over accumulating interna­
tional storm clouds, used his authority to mobilize all 
units at Mare Island, California, buy thousands of tons
9 Seymour, Wilson and the War, 8l.
Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive 
Era, 177.
McKinley, knowing of the closeness of the Roosevelt- 
Wood relationship and their strong views on preparedness, 
remarked facetiously to the General on one of his calls 
at the White House: "Well, have you and Theodore de­
clared war yet?" David, Wood. 132.
of coal in the Far East for the fleet, and direct a con­
centration of U. S. ships in Asiatic waters under Admiral 
12Dewey.
Throughout 1915 and 1916, Roosevelt hammered on the 
subject of an adequate military preparedness program for 
the country. He bitterly opposed pacifists and others who 
believed our people could rely on treaties to preserve the 
peace. Furthermore, he saw preparedness as a means of in­
suring the continuance of our valued institutions, the 
protection of our liberty, and as the preventive for un­
necessary loss of life in time of war.
As the former President engaged in his lonely cam­
paign to get the country to rearm, he found himself te­
naciously attacking the President, his Administration, the 
pacifists, pro-Germans, hyphenated groups which maintained 
a strong mother-country allegiance, and in fact most any 
group or person who opposed him or his program.
While the old Colonel was accused of using patri­
otism for selfish political reasons, there can be little 
doubt as to his emphatic views on preparedness. As a 
super-nationalist, he saw that his country could not hold 
its place in the world unless it stood ready to "guard its 
rights with an armed hand.1 Xn a letter to an acquaintance 
he quoted from statements he had made 19 years earlier when
12 These actions by Roosevelt were lauded by Wood as wise 
and far-seeing, they being largely responsible for 
American control of the seas in the Far East and the 
subsequent Philippine victory in the Spanish-American War. David, Wood. 135.
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in the Navy Department which indicated his long-continuing
convictions on this subject. "Preparedness against war,"
he had asserted, "is the surest guarantee for peace...and
a willful failure to prepare for danger may in its effects
be as bad as cowardice." Reflecting on the then-current
situation, Roosevelt adjudged it a crime against the nation
and mankind that there had not been any vigorous preparation,
militarily, socially, or industrially, in that hour of 
1 ^need. J
Roosevelt's campaign for preparedness involved four 
aspects. Besides (1 ) rearmament, he demanded (2) obligatory 
military service. He preached (3 ) Americanism, with a 
specific assault upon the "German-American Alliance." And 
he maintained (I}.) a steady assault upon the Administration 
for its policy of lethargy, especially regarding Belgium.1^ 
The former President was accused by his adversaries 
of entertaining an unusual affinity for war. This lust for 
combat, they suggested, was the contributing factor toward 
his violent anti-pacifist position. But whether he was a 
warmonger or a peace-loving individual who sincerely be­
lieved in the sanctity of preparedness, Roosevelt xras a 
rabid nationalist and a patriot— a patriot of the fire- 
eating variety. And he cared not to shield himself or his
13 Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 10lj.0. To Guy Emerson, Secre­
tary of the Roosevelt Non-Partisan League, May 1 1, 1916.
^  » 109 2. Contained in letter to John St. LoeStrachey, July 22, 1916.
family from their responsibilities to their country. Never 
did he want his own sons to be guilty of avoiding war ser-
15vice. As for himself, his experiences in Cuba and his 
tireless and persistent efforts to become a combat leader 
in the World War indicate his ready willingness to serve 
his country.
As the events of 1915 unfolded, the Roosevelt voice 
in the wilderness was no longer without its hearers, though 
the numbers were relatively few. Economics had come to 
have its effect upon American sympathies. After the Battle 
of the Marne that year, the Allies placed tremendous orders 
for war material with United States companies. Because of 
the superiority of the British fleet, the Germans had little 
success with trans-oceanic shipping, and hence the Allies 
became our best customers— our best friends. The swing by 
the mass of American opinion was away from a position of 
neutralism, or even pro-Germanism in many cases.
Inasmuch as the powerful Roosevelt was already in 
the pro-Allied camp as an energetic participant, the newly 
developing sway in national sentiment was manna from heaven. 
And he took advantage of his opportunities. Old charges 
against Wilson, his administration, the pacifists, and the 
pro-Germans were reiterated, and new charges were formulated. 
Privately, Roosevelt had come to doubt the personal and
Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality,” 78 1, Roose­
velt's correspondence with General Pershing would 
seem to prove this point.
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public honesty of the Administration’s leaders, characteri­
zing their policy as "dishonorable."1  ^ They were guilty 
of timidity and folly, he said, and they had failed in their 
duty to their country. Furthermore, the Administration 
policy of neutrality was seen as a blind behind which it 
was attempting to aid the Central Powers. "With great 
dexterity and adroitness," Wilson and his crowd had done 
all possible, asserted the former President, "to influence 
American public opinion against the Allies and in favor of 
Germany.n1^
A letter which Roosevelt wrote to his very good 
friend Owen Mister was ample proof that his anger toward 
the President was as great, if not greater, than it was 
toward the Germans. He might have reasoned that the Kaiser 
was acting in behalf of his country's highest self-interest 
and hence could be condemned only as any much-respected 
opponent in war. Hox^ ever, the President of the United States 
was viewed in a different light. To Roosevelt, Wilson was 
not acting in the best interests of his country, and hence 
could not be respected either as an adversary or an ally.
The Mister letter showed the contempt entertained for the 
Wilson policy by the Colonel, and it displayed his reason­
ing regarding the Administration policy pursued to that
date, and his evaluation of the President's position as a
19leader of the American people:
Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 1013. Letter to SenatorLodge, February Ij., 1916.
Mowry, Progressive.Movement, 319.
19 Wister, Friendship. 330-£l. Letter dated July 7, 1913.
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You say that it would have been an act of "unprecedented folly" if we had not been politi­
cally neutral. On the contrary, in ray view, the 
really unprecedented folly was in exercising our 
loose tongues in a way thoroughly to irritate 
Germany and yet to do nothing whatever to back 
these aforesaid tongues by governmental action.
If it was our duty to remain neutral politically, 
it was emphatically our duty to remain morally 
neutral. Any political neutrality not based on 
moral reasons is no more and no less admirable 
than the neutrality of Pontius Pilate or of the 
backitfoodsman who saw his wife fighting the bear. 
Either The Hague Conventions meant something or 
they did not mean something.... If they meant 
nothing, then it was idiocy for us to have gone in­
to them. If they meant anything, Wilson and Bryan 
are not to be excused for failure to try to make 
them good by whatever action was necessary; and 
political neutrality when they were violated was 
a crime against the world and a thoroughly base 
and dishonourable thing on our part.... Of course, 
our people are now all confused and weakened and 
incapable of giving any coherent support to our 
own rights or the rights of others in the teeth 
of Germany's ruthless and cruel efficiency.
This is directly due to the action of Wilson....
The Colonel continued his letter to Wister by drawing this
interesting contrast between Wilson's actions and those of
r • i 20Lincoln:
[What] if, after the firing on Sumter, Lincoln had made a speech in which he said that the 
North was "too proud to fight," and if he had 
then spent sixty days in writing polished 
epistles to Jefferson Davis, and if Seward 
had resigned because these utterly futile 
epistles were not even more futile, why, by 
July the whole heart would have been out of 
the Union Party and most people in the North 
would have been following Horace Greeley in 
saying that the erring sisters should be per­
mitted to depart in peace! I have a perfect 
horror of denunciation that ends in froth....
If Wilson is not wrong in his action or rather 
inaction, about the Lusitania and Belgium, 
then the wise and proper thing for our people 
is to keep their mouths shut about both deeds.
Wister, Friendship. 350-51. Letter dated July 7, 1915.20
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The loose tongue and the unready hand make a 
poor combination.... I don’t think that the 
American people believe that he jWilsoi^ has 
misrepresented us I I think they are behind 
him. I think they are behind him largely 
because their leaders have felt that in this 
crisis the easy thing to do was to minister 
to our angered souls by words of frothy 
denunciation and minister to our soft bodies 
by taking precious good care that there was 
no chance of our having to turn these words into deeds.
Prom this letter it is clear that the old fighter was 
roundly scolding the President of the United States, and 
he was scolding his fellow Americans.
Words which had to be uttered at this time, accord­
ing to the Outlook, were spoken by Roosevelt in a care­
fully prepared "non-political'’ address in San Francisco, 
August I4., 1915. The skillful coiner of phrases again did 
not disappoint his audience. He charged that the United 
States was being "Chinafied”— it was permitting its sover­
eignty to be encroached upon as had the Chinese down through 
the centuries. 21 This speech, coming in the aftermath of 
the Lusitania sinking, hit upon the people's consciousness 
that the Administration had played an equivocal game in 
dealing with the German Government in the matter of the 
rights of our citizens on the high seas. We had not stood 
up to the Kaiser in a positive manner, as we would have 
had Roosevelt been in the White House. We were compromis­
ing our stature as a free nation. To his California 
listeners Roosevelt was reproachful. He cited the belief 
of the pacifists that the country’s honor could be main-
21 "Chinafying This Country," Outlook, CX (August ii.
1915), Ilk*
talned only by being unarmed; and he labelled it as false.
He admitted that preparedness did not guarantee peace, but 
he contended it was the right position for a leading nation 
of the world to take. Preparedness would make a would-be 
aggressor hesitate. He warned that a self-respecting 
country could not be fat and flabby. Furthermore, he was 
convinced that a nation’s "men who are not ready to fight 
for the right are not fit to live in a free democracy. 1,22
The former President took every opportunity during 
this period to strike a chord for "Americanism," and there­
by lashed out at those he termed "hyphenates. "23 He re­
sisted all efforts, even by those groups who were favor­
able to the Allies, to have him lend support to any 
hyphenated-American organization.2^ Colonel Roosevelt 
likewise gave his fellow countrymen, and the Germans, no 
rest on the submarine issue. Especially after the Imperial
announcement of unrestricted sub warfare (outside specified
23shipping lanes), his vexation was without limits, and he 
demanded a vigorous national policy to cope with the situ­
ation.^^
22 19l5?af77iJ® ThlS Gountry»" Qutlook« CX (August ip,
23 By "hyphenates", Roosevelt was referring only to 
those persons who were acting in behalf°of the in­
terests of their mother country, not to the loyal 
foreign born. The actions of the hyphenates were definitely contrary to Roosevelt's policy of 
straight U.S." Mowry, Progressive Movement. 316.
Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 786.
23 Announced on February ip, 1913.
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26 Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 78 1.
Hoxjever irritated he might have been with the Ger­
mans, Roosevelt took what he considered to be a fair and 
objective position in their regard. He limited his criti­
cism of them largely to two points: the killing of Ameri­
cans on the high seas, and the subjugation of Belgium. 
Neither of these, he asserted, involved any "question of 
fact. " 27
Prom these two points, Theodore Roosevelt's personal 
policy toward America and the war thus evolved. He appealed 
for justice to the small Belgian nation, and he demanded 
retaliation for the injury done to Americans by submarine 
sinkings. As a third element, the Colonel privately and 
personally sought to advise the Allied leaders to the ex­
tent of making their propaganda in the United States more P 3
effective. These three things were pursued in order to 
steer Americans into the course of the Allies, which the 
ex-President believed to be the course of r i g h t . S o  
highly dedicated did he become to the cause of the Allies 
that he interpreted any help for the Germans as immoral, 
while any aid given to Britain and France was a "highly 
moral" act.^°
Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 786.
28 So dedicated was Roosevelt to the Allied cause that 
he went so far as to privately urge the British 
Government to recall the Ambassador to Washington 
because his interpretations of England's position to 
tne American people were seen by the Colonel as being 
far too impartial. Mowry, Progressive Movement. 3 1 6.
29 Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 790.
3° Mowry, Progressive Movement. 3 1 6.
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While keeping alert to the machinations of the wolves 
outside his door, President Wilson simultaneously had to 
wrestle with troubles within his own household. Secretary 
oi State Bryan chose to resign,after a disagreement X'fith 
the President over the second Lusitania note. By many ob­
servers, this action actually strengthened the domestic 
and international position of the Administration. The Out­
look editorialized that the departure of Bryan averted the 
greatest of dangers to America— being false to our charac­
ter, our traditions, and our ideals by putting peace above 
law, freedom, and righteousness. Describing Bryan*s pres­
ence in the Cabinet as having been a "severe handicap," 
the Outlook interpreted Wilson’s acceptance of the Secre­
tary's resignation as a rejection of the idea of "peace at 
any price. Tne President and his administration were now 
free to represent the true character of the country. ^ 2 
Tnus, by the evacuation of Secretary Bryan from the fore­
front of the political scene, President Wilson was rele­
gated to the dubious position of Colonel Roosevelt's top 
whipping-boy.
Another casualty of the fracas over the Administra­
tion's policies was Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison. 
Having indicated himself to be an ardent preparationist 
upon taking office in 1913, Garrison sought the counsel
June 8, 1915.
22 "The American Crisis," Outlook. CX (June 1 6.
3h.l» *
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of General Leonard Wood and henceforth agitated for army 
reorganization and enlargement. 33 At the time when Presi­
dent Wilson made public his program on military prepared­
ness, a disagreement arose between the Chief Executive and 
his Secretary over some of its features, especially the 
propagandizing of the proposals.3^ This Wilson-Garrison 
affair naturally created its political facets. The Na­
tional Security League and such prominent Republican 
politicians as Lodge, Root, and Stimson had endorsed the 
reorganization plan Garrison submitted to the President. 
Representative James Hay, Chairman of the House Committee 
on Military Affairs, had been supporting a plan similar to 
the one enunciated by Wilson--which was considerably dif­
ferent from Garrison's. When the President chose not to 
support his Secretary's program and instead seemed in 
agreement with Hay, Garrison chose to resign from the 
Cabinet. The Security League and the members of the 
Roosevelt school of preparedness teemed with contempt for 
the President. Wister charged the Chief Executive with 
having revoked the promises he had made to Garrison to 
push preparedness. 36 A man who at an earlier time had 
33 This was described by Baker as a common excited 
attitude by new Secretaries of War. Baker. Wil­son, VI,2. ----
3^ Ibid.. 18.
r>£
February 1 0, 1916. Several reasons have been sug­
gested for Wilson's actions in this matter, one 
being that Hay more nearly represented existing 
public opinion. Another is that Wilson may have 
hoped to get greater Congressional support by endorsing a legislator's plan.
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Wister, Friendship. 355.
professed to be a pacifist was chosen to succeed Garrison. 
He, Newton D. Baker, had said he was opposed to the agita­
tion for preparedness— it being a movement based on hys­
teria and amounting to nothing more than a manufactured 
37war scare.
It appeared that the new Secretary of War could 
be nothing but anathema to the preparedness proponents.
Pears were somewhat allayed, however, when upon taking 
office Baker announced that his policy would be one of 
peace, preparedness, and silence. "-3® least the word 
"preparedness" appeared in his vocabulary. Editorializing, 
the New York Times regarded him as fitted for the job, 
especially in view of his "talent for detail," and it 
recognized that he had an established reputation for 
"hard and systematic work." The Times praised him for 
being a consistent supporter of the President, both in 
military and in foreign matters. ^
What was the nature of the Wilson policy as these 
developments within the Administration were occurring?
The President was consistently accused by Theodore Roose­
velt of being controlled by the pacifists. ^ 0 But his split 
with Bayan suggested this accusation was not totally valid. 
Wilson seemed to favor a very slow conversion to a pre­
paredness policy, probably hoping that by such action the
37 New York Times, editorial, March 7, 1916, 10:3.
3 8  I b i d .
39 Ibid.
^  "Chinafying This Country," Outlook, CX (August i+, 1915),
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sincerity of his neutrality would not be shattered.This 
gradual method of military and naval build-up likewise was 
favored by the President so as to assure himself of the 
people’s confidence and thereby gain greater support in 
CongressJ+2
There did appear to be order and system in Wilson’s 
slowly developing military preparation program, though it 
was not recognized by his enemies. The movement in the 
direction of preparedness by the Administration had actually 
begun in July, 1915* after the dispatch of the third Lusi­
tania note. At that time, the Chief Executive called upon 
his War and Navy Secretaries to draw up programs for the 
development and the equipment of the two armed services.'"^ 
But this action was not to be taken as evidence that the 
President had abandoned his previously established position 
of neutrality. Even after the Arabic was sunk on August 
19, 1915, with a loss of American lives (only three months
after the Lusitania disaster), Wilson still took the stand
that the people were counting on him to keep them out of 
war. Moreover, he considered it nothing less than a ca­
lamity for the United States to get drawn into the conflict 
and hence become deprived of our disinterested influence 
in the peace settlement.^-
White, Autobiography, 508.
^ 2 Baker, Wilson, VI, 18.
^3 ibid., 8.
^  Ibid., 373.
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Ray Stannard Baker, Wilson's personal biographer, 
states that by July, 1915# the President was convinced of 
the need for positive action— based on the accumulated 
evidence of German bad faith and misdeeds.^ He was be­
coming more and more irritated with the Kaiser's govern­
ment, and especially with the German Ambassador to Washing­
ton, Count Bernstorff. If President Wilson was dedicated 
to a more assertive policy, however, his critic Roosevelt 
was not aware of it, for in the aftermath of the Arabic 
tragedy the Colonel charged that the time for words had now 
passed. And even Wilson admitted that his biggest puzzle 
was to determine "when patience ceases to be a virtue."^ 
During the fall of 1915, the President apparently 
became more certain of his convictions. Completely dis­
trusting the Germans by now, he asserted that "no decent 
man, knowing the situation" could be anything but "heart 
and soul for the Allies." But he recognized that many 
Americans did not share his opinion, and he remarked that 
he was not justified in forcing his personal opinion upon 
them. Thus his purposes remained the same, though he 
interestingly maintained that "we are not trying to keep 
out of trouble; we are trying to preserve the foundations 
upon which peace can be restored."^7
The Administration's preparedness program, which 
was presented to Congress in December of 1915, was first
hS Baker, Wilson, VI, 8.
Ibid., 373.
1+7 Ibid., 375.
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made public by the President in early November at a New York 
City function. Characteristically enough, it brought criti­
cism from both the Roosevelt and the Bryan forces,^-0 as well 
as from numerous other sources,Roosevelt*s first reaction 
was reflected in his letter to John Carter Rose in which he 
proclaimed that 'Wilson is now following afar off in the 
paths of preparedness and of Americanization which I blazed
for him over a year ago "^° While this comment to Rose
carries connotations of praise for the Chief Executive, 
on the same day in a statement to the New York Times Roose­
velt labelled the proposed military preparation legislation 
as a "shadow program." One week later, a published inter­
view in the Chicago Daily News quoted the Colonel as saying 
bilson's "half preparedness" was as dangerous as the schemes 
of Bryan and Henry Ford. ^ 1 Then in January (1916), while 
writing his old colleague Senator Lodge, Roosevelt described
Baker, Wilson. VI, 18.
JiQ
These included the militarists in Congress who wanted 
a more vigorous program than Wilson requested, those 
who aavocated a fleet second to none, anti-prepara- 
i10niS^S exemPlifieci by Henry Ford and Congressmen who feared their fate in the coming elections, and 
the^important Chairman of the House Committee on 
Military Affairs, Congressman James Hay of Virginia*Ibid* t 25-26.
50 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 978. Letter to John Carter Rose, November 1 2, 191f?. '
51 The Times and News as reviewed by Baker, Wilson. VI. 18.
A corollary of Roosevelt*s support of preparedness was 
his^detestation of those who called themselves pacifists.
It is interesting to note that although he dealt with 
such adversaries very harshly, there was one who was 
®uojected to the Colonel's wrath--Henry Ford, whom 
Resident sought ever so diligently to win over to the idea of preparedness. Buchanan, "Roosevelt
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the Administration’s plan as "all nonsense,” it being a
program of one-twentieth measures.”'^ In a subsequent
letter to the Senator, Roosevelt made further evaluations
by charging that Wilson's navy program was all wrong and
his army reorganization proposal wrong. In further
discourse on his favorite subject, the former President 
commented:^
Of course, the fundamental fact is that 
the real foes of preparedness in this country 
are its make-believe friends who are for...a 
tenth measure of preparedness, of sham pre­paredness .hi}- Bryan is not the real foe....
It is Wilson who is the real danger. Uncle 
Sam is associated in the world with nations 
armed witn high-powered rifles. Bryan says 
the U. S. should have no rifles at all, while 
Wilson disagrees, saying the U. S. should be 
armed— with a muzzle-loading flintrock musket.
It was obvious thus that President Wilson's new 
slant on preparedness brought no abatement in his an­
tagonists' attacks upon him. Though the Chief Executive
and Neutrality,” 781}.. Curiously, these two prominent 
Americans, Roosevelt and Ford, battled each other 
indirectly through newspaper advertisements, which expounded the virtues of the cause for which each 
was fighting. In answer to a pacifistic appeal in 
the New York Times sponsored and signed by Ford, 
the_American Defense Society, with Roosevelt on its 
advisory board, called attention in a half-page ad 
to the need for military preparation, the values of 
preparedness, and the criminality of unpreparedness. 
^ew Aork 1 imes, advertisement, February 21^ , 1916, 7:1.
Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 1006. Roosevelt to Lodge. January 26, 1916. 6 *
53 Ijoid«, 1012* Roosevelt to Lodge, February [j_, 1916*
^  This was obviously a dig at many of his old Republi­
can and Progressive colleagues who were supporting Wilson's program. s
was moving in the general direction as advocated by Roose­
velt, this development found little favor with the latter. 
Roosevelt interpreted Wilson’s belated change of attitude 
toward preparedness had been and still remained himself, 
while in Wilson, the Colonel sax^  a depiction of pseudo- 
preparedness.^ The fact that the President tood a mid­
winter tour of the country to get the public oriented,on
his preparedness program before Congressional opposition 
56could solidify,"' did not convince critics of his dedica­
tion to such a program. This trip with its inevitable 
dramatization was scored as politics, it being viewed as
deceptive preparation for the forthcoming presidential 
election. ^
In uhe eyes of Roosevelt, the President was capa- 
ble— and undoubtedly guilty— of far more than deception, 
he blasted him for wishy-washy conduct and procrastination. 
"He has not got a conviction in the world,” Roosevelt wrote 
Governor Hiram Johnson of California. For the purposes 
of re-election, Wilson "does not mind turning back and forth 
on any subject,” asserted the Colonel. As many writers
55 Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 78i|_.
Upon his return, it is reported that there was no 
perceptible flow of Congressional opinion, despite 
worsening conditions in Europe. This, it is sug­
gested, reflected the people's disillusion and doubt. Baker, Wilson. VI, 3 9.
^  Ikk-0.
56 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1026. Roosevelt to John­son, April 3, 1916.
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on the subject emphasize, Wilson sought to follow rather 
than to guide public opinion. This, for the most part 
was undoubtedly true. Therefore, it is likely that the 
shiftings and sways in the presidential position, which 
were subsequent to fluctuations in the national sentiment, 
were interpreted by Roosevelt as showing lack of conviction 
on the part of Wilson. Whether this synthesis be true 
would be dependent upon the view taken of the presidential 
responsibilities (i.e. as to whether the President's duty 
is to follow public opinion or to help shape it).
Roosevelt, in pursuing his campaign for more ade­
quate preparation, found other adjectives with which to 
label the President. Describing the Chief Executive again 
as the real enemy of the country, Roosevelt characterized 
him as a "demagogue, adroit, tricky, false, without one 
spark of loftiness in him, without a touch of the heroic 
in his cold, selfish and timid soul."^
It is true that the Colonel's bitter charges against 
Wilson got only limited acceptance from the people. How­
ever, they eventually began to make their desired dent. 
Especially when Roosevelt accused Wilson of using weasel 
words did his denunciation fall on attentive ears. Such 
words were exemplified by those in the President's request 
for "universal voluntary training." On this point of Wilson's
f£dendshl£> 355. Roosevelt letter to Owen Wister, February 5» 1916.
Weasel words were defined by Roosevelt as words
it "SveteanJ??r>tS S?CkSd dry by the word next to It^j^appearing to have meaning in it. Wister,
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military preparedness program, Roosevelt was quite rabid.
For the Chief Executive to ask for "universal voluntary 
training" motivated "only" by the "compulsion of the spirit 
of Americanism" was described by the Colonel as being 
analagous to a truant law for school boys which required 
attendance for all who did not wish to stay away from 
school. But again, this was a point on which the Presi­
dent undoubtedly sought to adhere because he believed it 
to be the opinion of the people— a dedication to the long 
American tradition of voluntary military service. To those 
of the Roosevelt-Wood school, such a policy was not only 
defective, weak, and unreliable, but it was also dangerous. 62
All in all, if Theodore Roosevelt had many sup­
porters for his theories on preparedness, he found few 
sympathizers for his extreme views on President Wilson.
His existence at Sagamore Hill was punctuated by days of 
loneliness and low spirits. The paths which had been beaten 
to his door for almost a decade by eminent political leaders 
were about to become obliterated by overgrowth. However, 
for those who continued to look to Oyster Bay as the zion 
of patriotic and political enlightenment, the hospitality 
extended to them there was as generous as always, if not 
more so. Those who partook of the atmosphere of buffalo 
heads and stuffed monkeys were, in most cases, persons who 
echoed the old Rough Rider in Ijis views on national issues 
people who shared his prejudices and hatreds. More than 
ever, Roosevelt valued and nurtured his friendships.
61 Wister, Friendship. 351)..
62 Wood, Military History. 19.
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A letter the Colonel wrote to Owen Mister is repre­
sentative of many he posted to his trusted friends during 
this period when he realized his voice was like that of a 
hermit, sequestered and with only limited e f f e c t . " Y o u r  
attitude during the last few years, both to me personally 
and especially as regards the politics of this country, 
has been a very great comfort," Roosevelt said to Mister 
with gratification. "This is especially so in view of the 
complete breakdown of the men who ought to be our intel­
lectual leaders," he concluded.6^ On another occasion he 
wrote Mister lauding that friend's castigation of Wilson.
The people will in the end be glad," the Colonel scribbled 
praisefully, "that the foremost American man of letters 
speaks of the Buchanan of our day as it is right to speak."^5 
Such letters as these can perhaps be taken as exhibits to 
prove the sincere dedication which Roosevelt had for what 
seemed to be his losing cause. They indicate the state of 
despair which engulfed him. Certainly a man gifted with 
rash political opportunism, of which Roosevelt was accused,
would have sought a more pleasant, a more popular course 
of action.
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S SH.];e r i o d 4 rouSj1Y speaking, was between mid-19Ik and the early part of 1 9 1 7. +
^  embe?r28!ri916!hiP’ 3S9‘ RooseTelt t0 Wister, Sept- 
65 Ibid^, 355. Roosevelt to Wister, April 11, 1916
The mid-war presidential election was near at hand 
before the Republicans found it within themselves to seri­
ously criticize the President. For almost two years, Theo­
dore Roosevelt was the single voice of stature to find 
fault with the manner in which Wilson was pursuing the 
problems of preparedness and international relations. The 
ex-President had been sorely chagrined by the "me-tooism" 
which had been innate in the attitudes and positions of 
many of his former political associates in the Republican 
and Progressive ranks. The Republicans felt that to op­
pose the President's neutralist position would bring to 
them the label of "War Party", while the Progressives 
feared that any action toward a more active military pro­
gram would sap governmental and public interest from their 
liberal domestic plans.
To Senator Lodge, Roosevelt wrote disparagingly 
of the G.O.P. attempt to "replace Wilson with a Republi­
can by capturing the German and other major voting 
blocs through the adoption of the "me too" policy tox^ ard 
Wilson's preparedness program. "Such tactics may be 
politically sound," he told Lodge, but he felt convinced 
that they are bad tactics from the standpoint of the 
country." under these conditions, the Colonel felt com­
pelled to say that he was indifferent as to whether Wilson 
was replaced or not. Under such conditions, he would 
emphatically not support the Republicans, preferring to
’’merely vote in the air." Republican tactics such as these, 
he ventured to predict, would lead the Progressives into 
the Wilson camp. 66
Perhaps such remarks as these by Roosevelt had some 
effect upon the Republican leadership, for on February 15, 
1916, a powerful speech by Elihu Root brought the Wilson- 
Republican honeymoon into a definite decline. From the 
date of Root's strong words of condemnation for the Wilson 
Administration, the Republicans went over to the attack.
For the first time since the outbreak of the war, they 
criticized Wilson's handling of military preparation and 
international diplomacy.6?
Ray Stannard Baker suggests that Roosevelt's words 
and deeds of the early months of 1916 might have been 
motivated by political ambitions. This may very well have 
been true inasmuch as the Colonel's hat was said to have 
been placed in the presidential ring on March 9th. On 
that date, he is quoted as saying: "Nothing is to be hoped
from the present administration." He went on to point out
that he would however refuse to "enter into any fight" for
68 ° the nomination — implying that a change needed to be made
at the White House and that he would accept nomination for
the job provided he were the overwhelming choice of the
Republicans. Nevertheless, whatever his inner convictions
66
VI11’ 1005- Rooseveit to ^
67 Ibia.. ioo5n.
66 Baker, Wilson. VI, 233.
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may have been, it was evident from his words that Roosevelt 
believed himself to be not only the outstanding proponent 
of preparedness but also the potential leader of the na­
tion's opinion.^ "The slumbering patriotism of our people 
must be waked and translated into concrete and efficient 
action," asserted the patriot of all patriots, who charged 
that many of the country's troubles were the "direct re­
sult of our utter failure to prepare and of our Governmental 
policy of almost unbelievable timidity and vacillation."7° 
Roosevelt was convinced that Wilson wanted the peo­
ple to believe that the alternative policies on prepared­
ness were two--the Administration plan and Bryan's— which 
left a choice between doing a half-way job or doing noth­
ing at all. By following the first plan, Wilson would 
thus get credit from the public for taking positive action.
In the mind of Roosevelt, this was a typical Wilsonian 
maneuver to persuade the people that something real had 
been done when it actually hadn't. The Administration's 
military program was viewed as a "make-shift" affair and 
the President was tagged by this prolific phrase-maker as the 
"non-partisan hero", the champion of American self-defense,"71 
Aq As contrasted with the apparent Wilson policy of following, not leading, public opinion/
7® Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, lOlpl. Roosevelt to banker Guy Emerson, May 11, 1916.
71 Ibid« The term "champion of American self-defense" applied here to Wilson is interpreted as carrying 
an undesirable connotation, Roosevelt intending to accuse Wilson of weakness and the lack of courage 
to aggressively fight for what is morally right.
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and as a "damned Presbyterian hypocrite."72
While Theodore Roosevelt struck viciously at Wilson 
and his policies, there were others who were also objects 
of the Colonel’s vitriol. Such persons as the editors of 
the New Republic, the Springfield Republican, the Atlantic 
Monthly, and The Evening Post as well as President Eliot 
of Harvard were chastised for the responsibility they shared 
in giving President Wilson such a strong position with the 
people. He suggested that they were responsible for the 
fact that "respectable men are absolutely indifferent to 
Wilson's lying on every subject and contradicting himself 
on every i s s u e . "73 Owen Wister echoed these sentiments, 
after having gathered facts covering Wilson's conduct of 
foreign and domestic policy. The facts revealed a pattern, 
contended Wister, and "the pattern showed that the Presi­
dent's steps continually concelled each other.... "7^ -
There is no question that the fiery Roosevelt en­
joyed the exercise of his passions against those with whom 
he violently disagreed, especially over matters of govern­
ment and politics. He writhed at Wilson almost continu­
ously, and simultaneously he held in great contempt those 
who worshipfully followed this man, this "cold-blooded 
politician." Even for such former loyal supporters of
72 Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny (New York,
1953)} 2I4.30 Hereafter cited as Goldman, Rendezvous.
73 Wister, Friendship, 3&0.
Ibid., 36I.
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his as Jane Addams, who now whole-heartedly endorsed Wilson, 
Roosevelt coined malevolent phrases. She, in his terminolo­
gy, had become "poor bleeding Jane Addams" and a "Bull 
M o u s e " . T h a t  Wilson and all about him became an obses­
sion with Roosevelt, there can be no doubt. This pungent 
anecdote reflects the frustration and vexation which domi­
nated the Colonel: "I consider Wilson next to Christ,"
said one of the President's benevolent supporters. "So 
was Judas Iscariot," Roosevelt is said to have retorted.7 *^ 
The American people, remembering the Roosevelt 
lacerations of political enemies in the somewhat recent 
past, demonstrated a tempered reaction toward the Colonel's 
ravings. This was a comforting factor for President Wil­
son, for he knew that his critic was quite vulnerable to 
the charge of being an "habitual scold" and of advocating 
preparedness merely for political objectives. 77 While his 
teeth—clicking attacks were inclined to defeat themselves 
by their violence, it could not be said, however, that 
Roosevelt was ineffective.
Baker contended that Roosevelt's diatribes brought 
no anxiety to the President.7® Whether they did or not, 
the professorial President continued in his way of at­
tempting to win supporters and influence politicians with 
sound argument and reason. During the bitter struggle
7^ Goldman, Rendezvous. 2l\S.
76 Wister, Friendship. 36 2.
77 Sullivan, Over Here, 202.
78 Baker, Wilson. VI, 18.
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over preparedness, it is said that he never uttered or wrote
a single word of personal attack or personal criticism of
Roosevelt or of any of his other antagonists.^
The New York Times, favorably inclined toward the
Wilson Administration, admomsliGd th© formsr Pr©sid©nt for
his, rantings against a well-meaning Chief Executive:®0
Scanning the gall and vinegar of his adjec­
tives, hearing that curious staccato of impetuous 
speech, the indulgent critic can only take refuge 
in the theory of the Everlasting Juvenile, the boy who has never grown up, as Dr. Eliot said 
of him. As Mrs. Berry in "The Ordeal of Richard 
Feverel" remarked delightedly of Dick's baby:
Ain't he got passion? Ain't he a splendid roarer?"
While Baker minimized the Wilson concern over Roose­
velt's attacks, Buchanan pointed out that the Colonel's 
opinions were significant, that he came to have tremendous 
influence with his fellow countrymen. While he held abso­
lutely no weight with the Administration, the Roosevelt 
opinions and suggestions expressed to Allied capitals are 
said to have had a positive, though indirect, influence 
upon American public opinion— through Allied propaganda. 81
Since the early portions of the European war, Theo­
dore Roosevelt had been convinced that the United States 
had a de facto involvement in the conflict, though not a 
physical one. That we were morally bound to the Allied 
side and yet did nothing materially to aid those who were
79 Baker, Wilson. VI, 25.
8 0 As quoted by Baker from the Times of December 7.1915. Ibid.. 18.   '
O -i
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Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 775.
seen as fighting our cause was a fact that caused this high­
ly patriotic American to act as he did. He recognized his 
position as a highly controversial national figure and he 
was fully aware of the criticism of him. This awareness 
was revealed in a letter he wrote to John St. Loe Strachey. 
His country finally approaching the brink of involvement, 
Roosevelt interestingly gave this old friend a personal 
evaluation of his extensive efforts to have this country 
fight for international morality.
"There has been one very curious feature in my ex­
periences of the last two years," the former President re­
marked to Strachey. "I was attacking my own fellow country­
men, and pointing out their errors and shortcomings unspar­
ingly, and I neither expected nor received sweeping support 
here at home; and although I think I can say that my fight 
with the black flag hoisted, did literally hammer convic­
tion into the minds of a good many millions of people; and 
toward the end I secured a very considerable following for 
the causes I was championing." Roosevelt went on to attack 
the British press for supporting Wilson as against one 
(himself) who worked for all the British stood for, remind­
ing that it was he himself who was the one "fighting the 
battle of the Allies" while Wilson "seemed to have fooled 
the [British] people about as successfully as he has fooled 
them on this side of the water...." To Strachey, the Colonel 
noted the fact that various Englishmen, as well as Americans,
llj.2
had tagged his publication Fear God and Take Your Own Part®2 
as an electioneering pamphlet, and he observed that actions 
by many British elements had hurt the Allied position in 
this country, surmising it to be true that "the English can 
be trusted to stand by only the people who are against them." 
Roosevelt, in his concluding remarks to this friend, empha­
sized that "what I have done has been done solely from the 
standpoint of the honor and interest of my own country, and 
what I believe to be the duty of that country in the face 
of mankind.
Events that unfolded during the next few months 
were to bring the United States into the war— a war Theo­
dore Roosevelt would have had his country enter at least 
two years earlier.
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Q p Theodore Roosevelt, Fear God and Take Your Own Part 
(New York, 1916). This book was based on and con­
sisted largely of articles he had written for the 
Metropolitan magazine during the previous lip months.
Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 1092. Roosevelt to John St. Loe Strachey, July 22, 1916.
CHAPTER VI
THE ROOSEVELT DIVISION
As early as the autumn of 1911+, the ex-President was 
developing ideas for the establishment of a "Roosevelt Divi­
sion," in the event that the United States should become 
engaged in the war which had recently engulfed Europe.
Within the ensuing months, his dream began to assume a more 
realistic nature when he started drawing up lists of those 
whom he would like to have included in his division. Among 
those listed were young army officers who had come to his 
attention, older officers who were friends from Spanish- 
American War days, and young civilians who were eager to 
serve as privates under the colorful Rough Rider.^ The 
Colonel consulted with his admirers and cohorts in the 
planning and organization of the volunteer division. In 
various parts of the country, these aides spread news of 
the venture and sought to recruit the very best possible 
personnel for the proposed organization. The response 
was overwhelming. Tens of thousands of adventurous youths 
pleaded for a chance to enlist under the Colonel. At the 
peak, two thousand applications per day were being received, 
and in the end he was ready to submit the names of 25>0 ,00 0
pmen as recruits for his division.
When the United States eventually did become engaged 
in the European War, Roosevelt was prepared to raise not one
2 Ibid., ij.96.
 ^Sullivan, Over Here, I|_93*
division but perhaps as many as four.3 He, like most every­
one else, realized that the country would not immediately be 
able to send a large army to the battlefront, but he saw 
the utility of a symbol-force.^ Roosevelt knew that he could 
have his volunteers trained and in the trenches months be­
fore the draft army could be ready, in fact, he expected that 
his unit would be combat-ready by the date that the Secre­
tary of War had set for the beginning of the assembling of 
the draft army (September, 1917) The ’’Roosevelt Division”
had become a reality. All it lacked was the authority to 
6exist. While the ex-President never seemed absolutely 
confident that he would be given permission to mobilize 
his organization, he worked energetically toward that end.
The fact that he had hurled quantities of severe charges 
at the Array's Commander-in-Chief did not seem to deter nor 
discourage him in his optimism and zeal. Likewise, it did 
not seem to occur to Roosevelt that it might not be practi­
cable for a President to send an ex-President, especially 
of another party, to France. 7
On February 2, 1917> the day that diplomatic rela­
tions were severed with Germany, Roosevelt wrote a letter
3 Hermann Hagedorn, The Roosevelt Family of Sagamore 
Hill (New York, 195>)+), 363* This work is hereafter 
cited as Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill.
^ Paxson, Pre-War Years, 1+13.
^ Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, 366.
 ^Sullivan, Over Here, 1+93*
7 Ibid.
to Secretary of War Baker. "I have already on file In your 
Department," he pointed out, "my application to be permitted 
to raise a Division of Infantry. If you believe there will 
be war and a call for volunteers, I respectfully and earnestly 
request that you notify me at once. I have prepared the
8skeleton outline of what I have desired the Division to be."
To this communication, Roosevelt received a cool 
reply. "No situation has arisen," stated Baker; "your let­
ter will be filed for consideration should occasion arise."
As if to Ignore the wet blanket technique employed by Baker, 
Roosevelt wrote him again without delay: "In the event of
being allowed to raise a division, I should, of course, 
strain every nerve to have it ready for efficient action at 
the earliest moment." This time, the Secretary was more 
specific as he wrote: "In reply to your patriotic sug­
gestion, I have to state the limitations of the War Depart­
ment. No action in the direction suggested by you can be 
taken without the express sanction of Congress."9
Though this last Baker letter was far from encourag­
ing, it nevertheless did contain an element which promised 
some hope, i.e. in regard to the sanction of Congress. With 
that body then adjourned, however, there was nothing that 
could be done at the time, y The Colonel contained himself 
for a month. Then he wired Baker that if the War Department
6 Sullivan, Over Here, i+9i+.
9 Ibid., i+93-
11+6
would merely furnish him arms and supplies, he himself would 
raise the rest of the money until some action was taken by 
Congress.1® In the meantime, he would be able to give his 
division six weeks' preliminary training at Port Sill, 
Oklahoma. 11 This suggestion by Roosevelt would seem to 
negate any suggestion that he was not dead serious about 
his plan. Thought it was not widely known, he also told 
the French Ambassador Jusserand that he would lead an 
American division to Prance if the French would pay for it. 12
To this latest Roosevelt proposal, there again came 
a disappointing reply. Baker contended that he lacked 
authority to grant the Colonel's wishes. Moreover, the 
Secretary stated that ’’general officers for all volunteer 
forces are to be drawn from the Regular Army.” This was 
a direct slap at the old Rough Rider who had anticipated 
going to France as a brigadier general, and it did not go 
without an appropriate Roosevelt answer. ”1 wish respect­
fully to point out,” he reminded Baker, "that I am a retired 
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and eligible 
to any position of command over American troops to which I 
may be appointed....” The Secretary replied: "The patri­
otic spirit of your suggestion is cordially appreciated.”1  ^
Seeing that correspondence was getting him nowhere, 
the ex-President chose a new channel of action. He went to
This telegram was dated March 19, 1917.
11 Sullivan, Over Here, I4.95.
12 Source Unavailable
13 Sullivan, Over Here, i|.9E>.
Uj.7
Washington for a visit at the home of his daughter, Mrs. 
Nicholas Longworth. While there, the Secretary of War 
called on Roosevelt and they were afforded an opportunity 
for private conversation. Still the Colonel got no satis­
faction from his demands that the volunteer division be 
activated. There was yet one alternative— an appeal to 
the President. ” 1 am going to tell Wilson," he confided 
to a friend, "that if he will give me this division, I will 
give him my promise never to oppose him politically in any 
way whatsoever." "I will promise Wilson that if he will 
send me to France, I will not come home alive." This latter 
statement apparently made reference to Wilson's presumed 
political jealousy of Roosevelt.1^
On April 2, 1917» President Wilson addressed a joint 
session of Congress and requested that body to declare war 
against Germany. The Colonel on that day was on his way from 
Florida to New York, and he chose this opportunity to kill 
two birds with one stone. While passing through Washington, 
he called at the White House to congratulate the President 
on his Congressional message and to discuss plans for the 
volunteer division. The two did not meet, however, because 
Wilson was holding a cabinet meeting, but that evening, 
Roosevelt issued a public statement regarding his reaction 
to the President's message. In its conclusion, the Colonel 
expressed the very earnest hope that he would be allowed "to 
raise a division for immediate service at the front.
14 Sullivan, Over Here, 496.
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As if to prepare the President for his second visit
to the White House four days later, Roosevelt, on April 5th,
said in a published statement: "The American people believe
that we owe it to ourselves and to the national honor to
send a fighting force of at least an army corps under the
American flag to the front at the earliest moment.... I
have asked permission to raise a division which would be
1 6in this army and under its commander."
On April 9th Roosevelt made a trip to Washington 
specifically to see the President. His secondary objective 
was to confer with his friends in Congress in support of 
the President's draft bill. The meeting at the White House 
was described as characterized by conversation on the level 
of superficial affability. 17 The President seemed pleased 
that his adversary was supporting his draft bill, seeking 
action "supplementary to it, and not contradictory to it." 
And, on this occasion, Wilson chose to defend his past con­
duct. He said that he had felt for a long time the things 
he said in his speech to Congress, but that the American 
people were not awake to the need— hence he had to bide 
his time. When Wilson suggested that many people had mis­
understood him, Roosevelt, in substance, said: "Mr. Presi­
dent, what I have said and thought, and what others have 
said and thought, is all dust in a windy street, if now we 
can make your message good. Of course, it amounts to 
nothing, if we cannot make it good.... How, all that I
Bishop, Roosevelt, Ij.23,
17 Sullivan, Over Here, I4.96.
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ask is that I be allowed to do all that is in me to help 
make good this speech of yours--to help get the nation to 
act, so as to justify and live up to the speech, and the 
declaration of war that followed."'*'®
Roosevelt found that Wilson had not understood his 
request concerning the division, and the former reportedly 
described the plan at length to the Chief Executive. 19 It 
had not been apparent to the President that the division 
was to be raised exclusively among men who would not be 
taken under the conscription system. 20 Having thus cleared 
up this point and eliminated the conflict between the volun­
teer and conscriptive systems, the Colonel seemed to enter­
tain some optimism regarding his chances.
Following his White House visit, Roosevelt told 
reporters and others that the President had received him 
with the utmost courtesy and consideration, 21 that he had 
had a "plain talk" with the President, 22 and that they had 
parted with friendly salutations. But the Colonel could 
not fail to show his usual chagrin at Wilson. "He promised 
me nothing definitely" he admitted. "If I talked to another 
man as he talked to me, it would mean that that man was going 
to get permission to fight. But I was talking to Mr. Wilson. 
His words may mean much, they may mean little. " 28
1 ft Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, 36 3.
^9 Sullivan, Over Here, Ij.96.
<79 Bishop, Roosevelt. )|?i|.
21 Ibid.
22 Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, 3 6 3.
23 Sullivan, Over Here, I4.96.
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There is little record in this connection of Presi­
dent Wilson's reaction to his conversation with the Colonel. 
Following Roosevelt's departure from the White House, Wilson 
is reported to have said to his secretary, Joseph Tumulty: 
"Roosevelt is a big boy. There is a sweetness about him 
that.is very compelling. I can easily understand why his 
follox-rers are so fond of him. According to Tumulty, 
Wilson was sentimentally inclined to make an exception for 
Roosevelt's division, even though Administration policy was 
against such organizations. But because the President de­
ferred to the wishes of his Secretary of War, the Colonel's 
requested favor was disallowed.
By his succeeding actions, Roosevelt indicated that 
he had little faith that his ambitions would be fulfilled.
He did not hesitate to speak and write frankly of his 
opinions. He bombarded Secretary Baker with the written
word, sending him one letter that covered eighteen type- 
26written pages. Writing to a friend, Roosevelt charged 
that the Administration was "playing the dirtiest and smal­
lest politics." "I don't think," he admitted, "they have 
the slightest intention of letting me go."2  ^ On May 11,
Baker sent to the Colonel the final refusal. But the old 
Rough Rider had one more card to play.
2^ Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker (2 vols., New York, 
1931), I, 199. This work is hereafter cited as 
Palmer, Baker.
Ibid., 203.
PA
Sullivan, Over Here, 1^.96.
27 Ibid., Ip97.
Roosevelt decided to appeal to the legislative 
branch, going over the heads of the executive. Seeming to 
comply with Baker's suggestion that he lacked authority to 
grant Roosevelt's request, an appeal was placed before his 
friends on Capitol Hill. Through them, Roosevelt asked 
Congress to enact an amendment to the pending draft legis­
lation authorizing the President, at his discretion, to 
raise four divisions of volunteers. In the course of the 
debate in the Senate over this amendment, Roosevelt was 
bitterly attacked as a "self-seeker" and "political op­
portunist". He was as bitterly defended. Senator Hiram 
Johnson asserted to his colleagues: "Today, you have adopted
his preparedness plan! Today, his undiluted Americanism 
that he preached to many, but to which few listened, has 
become the slogan of the nation. My God! when was it that 
a nation denied to its sons the right to fight in its 
behalf? " 28
The matter of the "Roosevelt Division" became a 
nation-wide issue. There were demands, "Send Roosevelt 
to France!" (presumed to have originated with his friends 
and supporters). From the other side of the Atlantic came 
impassioned appeals, "Send us Roosevelt!" From the Colonel 
himself, "I ask only that I be given a chance to render ser­
vice which I know I can render, and nine out of ten of those
who oppose me do so because they believe I will render It 
09too well." 7 An eminent American architect then in Paris
O A Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, 363*
29 Ibid., 361)..
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cabled the New York Times: "The presence of an ex-President
of the United States will send a thrill through the fighting
line of the allies. He is known here as a leader of men,
30as was Kitchener, and it is he whom Prance awaits.'* Henry
Watterson, a Democratic stalwart and fighting editor of the
Louisville Courier-Journal wrote: "The appearance of an
ex-President of the United States leading American soldiers
to the battle front would electrify the world." And Van
Valkenberg in the Philadelphia North American suggested
his readers imagine what the magic name of Roosevelt would
31mean to hard-pressed Britain and bleeding France.
"The President need not fear me politically," com­
mented Roosevelt. "If I am allowed to go I would not last.
I am too old.... But I could arouse the belief that America 
was coming; I could show the Allies what was on the way."
The Colonel knew, as did the nation, that, to a greater de­
gree than any other living man, he had the capacity to in­
spire youth. He was eager to put this capacity to work,
and he expressed the hope that he might live to "face the
32foe" in the trenches.
After two weeks of debate and delay, the Senate 
overwhelmingly passed the Draft Act, providing for the 
optional use of volunteer divisions.Hope came to
3® Bishop, Roosevelt, lp2lp.
31 Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, 3&k-»
32 Ibid.
33 Sullivan, Over Here, I(.97.
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Roosevelt, and he immediately wired the President for per­
mission to raise two divisions, or, if the President de­
sired, four. But this optimism vanished on May 18, 1917» 
when the President issued a statement to the press in words 
which seemed chosen to "reduce the patriot to the romantic 
adventurer: »3lj.
It would be very agreeable to me to pay 
Mr. Roosevelt this compliment, and the Allies 
the compliment of sending to their aid one of 
our most distinguished public men, an ex- 
President who has rendered many conspicuous 
public services and proved his gallantry in 
many striking ways. Politically, too, it 
would no doubt have a very fine effect and 
make a profound impression. But this is not 
the time or the occasion for compliment or 
for any action not calculated to contribute 
to the immediate success of the war. The 
business now in hand in undramatic, practical.^ 
and of scientific definiteness and precision.
This was one of the very few times when Woodrow Wilson took 
direct notice publicly of Theodore Roosevelt.^ The last 
two sentences of his statement sounded very unWilson-like, 
and showed a far greater concern for practical and accel- 
lerated action than either the President's former or sub­
sequent policies indicated.
With the week following, Colonel Roosevelt, in a 
statement which not only rang with patriotism but reverber­
ated with indignation, disbanded his paper division and
3b Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, 365. 
3% Bishop, Roosevelt, ij.25.
3^ Sullivan, Over Here, lj.98.
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absolved his volunteers from further connection with the 
17movement: ^ '
As good American citizens we loyally obey 
the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
American Army and Navy. The men who have volun­
teered will now consider themselves absolved 
from all further connection with this move­
ment..,. Our sole aim is to help in every 
way in the successful prosecution of the 
war and we most heartily feel that no in­
dividual* s personal interest should for one 
moment be considered save as it serves the 
general public interest. We rejoice that 
a division composed of our fine regular 
soldiers and marines under so gallant and 
efficient a leader as General Pershing is 
to be sent abroad. We have a right to a 
certain satisfaction in connection therewith.
I wish respectfully to point out certain 
errors into which the President has been led in his announcement....
In the latter portion of his statement, the Colonel denied 
that his was to be an independent command (as Wilson one 
time had charged), that there was any political or personal 
gratification intended by those who worked for the division; 
and denied that anything dramatic existed about the proposed 
actxon except "as all proposals indicating eagerness or 
willingness to sacrifice life for an ideal are dramatic. " 38
That the Colonel should have placed the name of 
General John J. Pershing in his statement cannot be con­
sidered as accidental. Because of past relationships, he 
had a special interest in the Missouri General, and in 
view of the circumstances involved, any praise and publi­
city which Pershing got would tend to cast a favorable light
37 Bishop, Roosevelt. Ij.25-26.
3 8  I b l d . «  ^ 2 6 .
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upon ex-President Roosevelt as well as upon the General. 
During Roosevelt's tenure in the White House, he had pro­
moted Pershing to brigadier general, over the heads of many 
senior officers. Had it not been for this action, "Black­
jack” Pershing could not have risen higher in rank, by 
linear promotion, than a major by 1916. Hence, Pershing 
would never have been in a position to be chosed to lead 
the Expedition in France except by this favor from Roose­
velt.-^
Pringle among others suggested that Roosevelt's 
presence in France would have placed Pershing in an im­
possible position, that the Colonel would have been a 
constant source of friction. These thoughts were presented 
in the light of past observations of the Colonel. Pringle 
asserts that Roosevelt could not have been subordinate, try 
as he might. In his job as Assistant Navy Secretary and 
in the Spanish-American War, he proved that subordination 
just was not in his nature.^
It has been questioned as to what General Pershing's 
view was regarding such organizations as the "Roosevelt 
Division". Did he agree with the suggestion concerning
39 Pershing, well aware of his indebtedness to Roosevelt, 
made the following farewell request of Secretary 
Baker: "If I cable requesting that the two Roosevelt
boys [(Archie and T.R., Jr. Q  be sent to France, will 
you grant the request?" The answer was in the af­
firmative, and such a cable was forthcoming. Palmer, 
Baker, 205.
ij.0 Pringle, Roosevelt, 598.
possible friction with Roosevelt? In his memoirs, the 
Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Force 
made no mention of any potential friction with the Colonel. 
He did say, however, that granting the request for one 
division would have "opened the door for many similar re­
quests." Furthermore, he stated that in a war such as was 
raging, it was "necessary that officers, especially those 
in high command, be thoroughly trained and disciplined."^-1 
Obviously, Roosevelt lacked these two qualifications.
There were many logical reasons why it was not 
feasible to permit the organization of such a force as 
Roosevelt desired. Frederick Palmer, writing the account 
of Newton D. Baker's experiences, with Baker's assistance, 
reasoned that if the Colonel were given permission to go 
to Europe with a military unit, then why could not others 
expect a similar concession, e.g. movie stars, champion 
golfers, leaders of fraternal organizations and their 
subordinates, and hardware association leaders and their 
salesmen.^-2 Furthermore, it was possible that men of 
political ambition would go to Europe as unit commanders, 
develop a colorful war record for themselves, and then re­
turn home to reap their rewards. The effectiveness of 
such leaders, Palmer suggested, would be limited, inasmuch 
as they could not be sufficiently strict with their men
*4-1 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World 'War 
(New York, 1931), 22.
^  Palmer, Baker, 20ij..
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and at the same time maintain their desired popularity. ^3 
From Palmer's accounts of affairs concerning the "Roosevelt 
Division", it is clear that Baker thought the Colonel en­
visioned himself as a leader of a "corps d'elite in a brief 
little war in a romantic setting,"^ and who dreamed of 
being "Alone in France" as he had been "Alone in Cuba.
What Woodrow Wilson would not see was the emotional 
value of the old Rough Rider's offer. Americans, partisan, 
bipartisan, and non-partisan, saw it. The French saw it.
Two days after the President's final action was announced, 
Georges Clemenceau, veteran statesman and leader of the 
Opposition in France, addressed the Chief Executive through 
the press in an appeal to reconsider his decision. "At 
the present moment," asserted Clemenceau, "there is in France 
one name which sums up the beauty of American intervention 
— Roosevelt. You are too much of a philosopher to ignore 
that the influence on the people of great leaders of men
often exceeds their personal merits. The name Roosevelt
"  ■■    -  - /  ........... ...   „ ....
has this legendary force in this country at this time. Our 
poilus ask, ’Where is Roosevelt? 1 The cause of humanity, 
which is also your cause, will owe to them something ap­
proaching a miracle. Since it is in your power to give 
them [the French soldiers] before the supreme decision the 
promise of reward, believe me— send them Roosevelt. I 
tell you because I know it will gladden their hearts."^-6
J+3 Palmer, Baker, 195.
^  Ibid., 197.
Ibid., 198.
^  Bishop, Roosevelt. lj.28.
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In making comment on the appeal from Clemenceau, 
Roosevelt said: "I am very grateful for the kind ex­
pressions in the letter, and, of course, it is a matter 
of the greatest sorrow and regret to me that I am not to 
have this opportunity to serve. "^ *7
There was certainly no doubt as to the Roosevelt 
prestige abroad. As early as April, 1917> both Marshal 
Joseph Joffre and Arthur Balfour, the heads of the French 
and British missions in the United States, had urged the 
American government to send a fighting force to the western 
front at once. The French, in as strong a case as diplomacy 
and discretion would permit, made an effort to insure that 
Roosevelt would command this requested f o r c e . I n  con­
junction with this matter, it was reported that the State 
Department censored much of Marshal Joffre’s first major
address in the United States, because of too strong a
k9reference to the volunteer division idea. In May, 1917, 
Colonel Roosevelt received a letter from the prominent 
Captain de Rochambeau, of the Fifth Regiment of French 
Infantry at the front. The Captain expressed his gratifi­
cation over the Congressional approval for the "Roosevelt
-^7 Bishop, Roosevelt, i+28.
Palmer asserts that the British, through a conversa­
tion between Secretary Baker and a General of the 
British military mission, revealed their opposition 
to the sending of volunteer divisions. Palmer,
Baker, 202.
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Division” and signified the hope that he would he one of 
the first to salute the Rough Rider with the title of "My 
G-eneral” on the battlefields of Prance. In his reply, 
Roosevelt did not hesitate to vent some of his feelings.
”1 bitterly regret,” he said, "that my Government has re­
fused to allow me to raise troops and take them to France.
The reasons were not connected with patriotism, or with
military efficiency, and so there is no use of my trying to
dr>get the decision altered.”
To others, Roosevelt was quoted as saying: ”1 wanted
to go to the war, and the people wanted me to go. I keep 
my good health by having a very bad temper, kept under good 
control.” ”0f course, I was disappointed...but I have not 
the slightest feeling against fate. ”^ 1
In a letter later that summer to his son Ted, who 
was again in training at Plattsburg, Colonel Roosevelt is 
quoted as saying: ”0f course, the President, in turning
down my Division, was actuated by the basest and most con­
temptible political reasons.... But I need not grumble 
about fate; I had my day, and it was a good day. ”^2
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CHAPTER VII
AMERICA AND ROOSEVELT IN THE WAR
Throughout most of the year 1916, the outcome of 
the war was a matter of grave doubt. These were truly dark 
days for the Allies. In the Siege of Verdun that year, 
over ij.00,000 Frenchmen were killed, most of them blown to 
"nameless shreds of flesh, splashed over many miles."'*'
The extremely serious nature of conditions in Europe 
came to have its reflections in America. Although the presi­
dential election absorbed the public attention during most 
of the last half of the year, American opinions toward war­
time problems took definite shape, once the political fracas 
had folded. After November, Theodore Roosevelt, who until 
then had only emphasized national preparedness and righting 
the wrong done to Belgium, novr advocated most emphatically
pthe single policy of immediate and total war with Germany,“ 
Never before in history was opinion in the country so favor­
able and so in support of compulsory military training as 
in the winter of 19l6-1917«^ Furthermore, there was wide­
spread dissatisfaction with the existing military system, 
a matter which gained the serious attention of Congress.^- 
The President and his administration seemed to be
Wister, Friendship, 352.
2 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 370.
3 Perry, Plattsburg, 155*
^ Ibid., 156.
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one of the few segments of American thought, outside of the 
pacifists, which did not demonstrate a sense of urgency- 
over the turn of events in Europe. The Administration 
seemed to sacrifice every other consideration to the policy 
of securing peace by negotiation through the good offices 
of the President of the United States. Wilson was devoted 
to the idea of America playing the dual role of model and 
agent of peace, hence he was conservatively disposed toward 
the recommendations for a rejuvenation of the military.^
LOn this matter, the Secretary of War remained non-committal.
On January 22, 1917» the Chief Executive delivered
an address to Congress describing his ideas of this country’s
responsibility in obtaining peace— "a peace made secure by
the organized major force of mankind" 7 and based upon the
principles of a "Monroe Doctrine" extended to the whole 
8world. This was the "peace without victory" speech. The 
ideals outlined in it were acclaimed by the major portion 
of the American press and by liberal forces throughout the
9world. But it was not well received by the Republicans in
Congress or by Theodore Roosevelt. The ex-President
^ Part of the dissatisfaction over the existing military 
setup was the lack of any form of compulsory training.
^ Perry, Plattsburg, 1^6.
7 Baker, Wilson, VI, Ij-28.
8 Ibid., Lj.29.
9 Ibid., 1+29-30.
Interpreted Wilson's words as an unwillingness to declare 
war under any circumstances, and he was prompted to describe
his adversary as "yellow" in the presence of danger and as
one who would "accept any insult or injury from the hands
of a fighting man."1®
Throughout the ensuing two years, Roosevelt struck 
relentessly at Wilson's peace without victory idea. In one 
of his last statements on this subject before his death, 
he proved himself a prophet, as he had done numerous times 
through his long career. In June 1918, speaking in opposi­
tion to Wilson's apparent desire for a negotiated peace 
and in favor of a complete "knockout", Roosevelt declared 
that "unless we knock out Germany we will have to fight 
again, probably within the lifetime of those now young. " 11
A most significant turn of events was very soon 
to follow the "peace without victory" appeal and to cast 
the United States in a new light in world events. Some six 
days before the President made his Congressional address and 
unknown to him, the Kaiser had decided to place "absolutely 
no" reliance on Wilson's peace efforts. Upon receiving the 
President's speech, the German attitude remained the same, 
finding nothing in it which could be considered as a "step 
in the direction of a peace acceptable to us. " 12 In view 
of these official positions, the German Government on Janu­
ary 3 1, 1917, announced the resumption of full submarine
10 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1156-57* Roosevelt to 
Senator Lodge, February 20, 1917*
11 Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, I4.O3.
12 Baker, Wilson, VI, Ip33,
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warfare. This shock engulfed the humanitarian reaction 
to tne recent Presidential peace plans and sent a wave of 
indignation through the country. Effective February 1st, 
the Germans were to forcibly prevent all navigation in the 
war zone.
The commercial and legal grievances held against 
the Allies by Americans were eclipsed by the violence of 
outraged public pride. Paxson describes Wilson as having 
been dragged down from the level of logic to that of action.^ 
The Sussex Pledge, which had resulted from the President's 
threat to break relations unless satisfaction was received 
on the submarine issue, had now been broken. This time 
there were no alternatives. The President severed United 
States relations with Germany on February 3rd, and from 
this time forth it was no longer a question of preparedness 
but of preparation for an immediately impending emergency.
Popular enthusiasm for the cause of the Allies was 
rapidly growing in the United States. News of the Zimmer­
man note and of the Russian revolution was having its posi­
tive effects upon public opinion. America was no longer 
neutral, either in spirit or in action. All eyes were now 
turned to the forthcoming first session of the new 65th
-*-3 This was a retraction of the German position taken in 
the last of the Sussex notes (May 1|, 1916) which in 
itself was a yielding to the Wilson ultimatum of Aprillo, 1916. Thus Germany had agreed not to sink mer­
chant ships without warning and without savins the lives thereon.
Paxson, Pre-War Years. 396.
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Congress and to the army program which the President was 
slated to recommend to that body on its opening day,
April 2.
The two intervening months between the diplomatic 
break and the declaration of war with Germany found ex- 
President Roosevelt in a difficult position. He sincerely 
hoped that the United States entry would become a reality, 
but he was sorely chagrined at the Administration*s failure 
to prepare for it. Because he had had dreams of leading a 
division in Europe, he knew that he would have to be cau­
tious in his criticism of the division-granting authority. 
However, in private correspondence with such friends as 
Henry Cabot Lodge and Hiram Johnson he could not refrain 
from speaking his mind. To the former he wrote that "noth­
ing is being done for preparedness." Fearing that this could 
mean a Wilson disinterest in entering the war, the old Colonel 
asserted that "if he Wilson does not go to war with Ger­
many I shall skin him alive* n1^ T o  Johnson he pointed out 
that "almost two weeks have passed since the break with 
Germany, and Leonard Wood tells me that there has not been 
one particle of effective preparation. " 16
15 Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 1157 and 1162. Letters to 
Senator Lodge dated February 20, 1917, and March 1 3, 1 9 1 7.
16 1157. Letter to Governor Johnson dated February 
H i  T* General Wood was soon to be "shanghaied" to the newly created and remote Southeastern Department of
Charleston, S. C., after having made a number of addresses in support of universal military training
* n t  o?9S e nIast.C°”nander °f the Depart-
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Roosevelt's criticisms were not reserved entirely 
for the President and his Administration. He was growing 
more and more bitter toward the Progressive LaPollette, 
especially in view of the Senator's pacifist opposition to 
what little preparedness effort the President was making. 
LaFollette, as the leader of the "little group of willful 
men, representing no opinion but their own, " 17 was accused 
by the Colonel of being an "unhung traitor" who ought to 
be hung if the war should come. 18 Moreover, Roosevelt said 
he was "utterly sick of the gush about 'supporting the 
President'" and suggested that those people who continually 
shrieked such a phrase were only less guilty than Wilson 
for existing conditions.1^
With the passing of each week after the diplomatic 
break, Roosevelt appears to have become more restless, fear­
ing that this country might not become an official and active 
participant in the war. He vented such emotions before the 
Union League Club of New York on March 20th. There, he re­
minded his listeners that Germany's action of seven weeks 
20past "was itself a declaration of war and should have 
been treated as such." During the intervening time, he
17 This tag was placed on the small group of Progressive 
and Republican senators who vigorously opposed even 
such a minor step toward preparedness as the armed neutrality bill.
1 8
Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 11^7. Letter to Cabot Lodge, February 20, 1917.
Ihid., 1162. Letters to Lodge March 13 and 18, 1 9 1 7.
20 Reference is made to the revocation of the Sussex Pledge.
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asserted, Germany "has steadily waged war upon us, and he 
suggested that if Lexington and Bunker Hill were sufficient 
cause for all out war, then surely the German actions over 
the previous two years were adequate reason to fight inas­
much as more American lives had been lost at the hands of 
the Germans than were taken by the British in these two 
colonial battles. The "proper" action which was taken 
against Germany on February 3rd "amounted to nothing," 
Roosevelt alleged. "It was an empty gesture, unless it 
was followed by vigorous and efficient action. Yet...we 
have done nothing. We have not even prepared." "There is 
no question about ’going to war,’" he declared. "Germany 
is already at war with us.... Let us face the accomplished 
fact, admit that Germany is at war with us, and in our turn 
wage war on Germany with all our energy and courage, and 
regain the right to look the whole world in the eyes with­
out flinching. " 21
By late March, 1917, involvement for the United 
States was generally regarded as inevitable inasmuch as 
every compromise short of war had been tried and had failed. 
When Congress met on April 2, President Wilson announced 
the failure of the policy of "Armed Neutrality" and subse­
quently urged a declaration of war. 22
21 Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, ll63n.
22 The Congressional Joint Resolution and the Presidential 
Proclamation declaring a state of war with Germany were signed and published on April 6, 1 9 1 7.
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The Chief Executive, in his Congressional message, 
sought an increase in the size of the army. Such additions 
were to "be chosen upon the principle of universal lia­
bility of service." The Presidential desires expressed in 
this statement were reflected in the Selective Service Act 
of May 18, 1917, which rejected the highly-promoted idea 
of universal military training, but which provided the Presi­
dent with authorization to increase "temporarily," by one 
million, the size of the military forces.
Wilson’s message to Congress was received by Colonel 
Roosevelt with mixed emotions. Generally he was favorable 
to it. He was in disagreement with the Administration how­
ever over specific details (i.e. Roosevelt strongly favored 
universal military training). Roosevelt is quoted as say­
ing "his [wilson's]] message bears out all I have said for 
the past two and a half years, and condemns all he has 
said and done..." in the same p e r i o d . Though the Presi­
dent was accused of having "epitomized" his own thoughts, 
Roosevelt may have felt flattered over this turn of events. 
Regardless of his reactions, on the day following Wilson’s 
address to Congress, the ex-President called at the White 
House while he was passing through Washington. Though not 
able to see the President, he issued the following state­
ment : ^
27 Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, 36 2.
2 l j .  o r . ,Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the ProgressiveEra. 282. “-------
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The President's message is a great state 
paper which will rank in history with the 
great state papers of which Americans in 
future years will be proud. It now rests with 
the people of the country to see that we put 
in practice the policy that the President has 
outlined and that we strike as hard, as soon, 
and as efficiently as possible in aggressive 
was against the Government of Germany.
We must send troops to the firing line 
as rapidly as possible. Defensive war is 
hopeless. We must by vigorous offensive war­
fare win the right to have our voice count
for civilization and justice when the time 
for peace comes.
I, of course, very earnestly hope that I may be allowed to raise a division for 
immediate service at the front.
The last paragraph of this statement constituted
what was possibly Roosevelt's most revealing words. It
disclosed more than a capriciousness in the "sweetness 
and light" of this overly generous statement to his old 
enemy. The ulterior motive undoubtedly was to "butter 
up” the President in order to lure him into granting Roose­
velt's most cherished desire— leadership of a division.
Be this as it may, there was a conspicuous lull in the ex- 
President 's condemnation of the Chief Executive and his 
Administration throughout the ensuing three or four months. 
This could not be considered a coincidence, for during much 
of that time the decision regarding a "Roosevelt Division” 
was hanging in the balance. He seemed to defend his silence 
in a letter on June 22, 1917> to his "exiled" friend, Gener­
al Wood. "I have not criticized the President since April 
2nd," he admitted, "but neither do I lie about him I I 
intend to tell the truth and point out the criminal folly
of our having failed to prepare, and to speak plainly of 
the dangers ahead.
Theodore Roosevelt played a conspicuous part in 
national affairs during the first weeks and months of 
American participation in the war. Not only did his 
division-raising efforts attract national attention, but 
he was a prominent influence in Washington legislative 
circles. On the occasion of his visit to the White House, 
President Wilson asked Roosevelt's support for his proposed 
legislation for "temporary" compulsory military training. 
This favor was easy to grant, inasmuch as he had been a 
long-time advocate of compulsory service. On Capitol Hill, 
his strength was felt especially as the Selective Service 
Act went through the legislative channels. And here again, 
Roosevelt unquestionably was hoping his cooperation would 
bring the desired reward. This motive was recognized by 
his antagonists in the Congress, and there was a major 
hassle over the proposed provision to the Act which would 
permit the President to create volunteer divisions.
The effect of the pioneering work done by Roosevelt 
and Wood, as well as by the Plattsburg Movement, in regard 
to preparedness and American international responsibility 
became quite evident upon our entry into the war. Their 
efforts had borne fruit. The extent to x*hich the general
Q/
Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 1203.
This was only a few days subsequent to Roosevelt's 
unsuccessful initial attempt to have a private conversation with Wilson.
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public seemed ready to accept the sacrifices of world con­
flict came as a surprise to the President and to other top 
government officials. A major portion of the population 
xxere favorable to the idea of compulsory service, contrary 
to high official opinion that the people would insist on 
the old American tradition of voluntary enlistment. So 
mistaken was Wilson regarding public opinion on this matter 
that he did not even dare to send up the customary "trial
pQballoon” on the subject prior to his Congressional message.
New York Tribune recognized the impact on pub­
lic thinking which Roosevelt's and General Wood's vociferous 
advocation of preparedness had had. "National conscription 
was the one thing for which the country was not unprepared,” 
it editorialized. "Congress didn't know this" and "neither 
did the Administration." "Up to the day when the draft of 
a selective service bill was sent to Congress," reminded 
the Tribune, "the War Department had not been able to bring 
itself even to whisper the word conscription." Not only 
were the people ready for conscription, asserted this 
journal, but "even a year ago the country would have wel­
comed a broad and logical conscription law...." "The com­
mon sense of the nation had dismissed as fatuous all the
hesitations at Washington about basing our military effort
29on universal service." The Selective Service Act was
28 Peppy^ Plattsburg, 171.
^  New York Tribune, July 1, 1917* as reported by and 
quoted from Perry, Plattsburg, 172.
thus quickly passed.3° Perhaps the old Rough Rider, be­
cause of this invaluable service to his country, should be 
exonerated of such charges of noisy demagoguery as were 
levelled by the New York Times, H. L. Mencken, and others.
Having been denied the privilege of serving his 
flag on foreign battlefields, Roosevelt set out to aid 
his country in whatever manner he could. He was not called 
upon to do anything great or glorious, to be sure. How­
ever, he seemed pleased and happy to contribute to the 
"cause" even in minor ways. Whether it was in some local 
capacity at Oyster Bay or a task with national character, 
the sage of Sagamore Hill gave each project his heart and 
his soul. When the first detachment of American troops 
was ready to sail for France in June, 1917, the American 
Bible Society, which supplied the men with pocket Testa­
ments, asked Colonel Roosevelt to write a message for 
their covers. In eager compliance with this request, he
•31wrote:
The teachings of the New Testament are 
foreshadowed in Macah's verse: 'What more
doth the Lord require of thee than to do 
justice, and to love mercy, and to walk 
humbly with thy God.'
Do justice; and therefore fight 
valiantly against the armies of Germany 
and Turkey, for these nations in this 
crisis stand for the reign of Moloch and 
Beelzebub on this earth.
Love mercy; treat prisoners well; 
succor the wounded; treat every woman as
3° May 18, 1917.
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if she were your sister; care for the little 
children, and be tender with the old and the 
helpless.
Walk humbly; you will do so if you study 
the life and teachings of the Savior.
May the God of Justice and Mercy have 
you in His keeping.
These were the words of a man who had given four 
sons to the armed services,32 who loyally stood by them 
spiritually and through continuous correspondence, and who 
lost one of those sons in the war. These were the words 
of a man who was criticized over and over again as a blood­
thirsty anarchist and a lover of war. Surely these phrases 
written for the Bible Society indicate something of the 
inner nature of the man, a nature which did not alx^ ays have 
outward manifestations. Though his was a controversial 
personality and admittedly contradictory at times, his 
character had a thesis. A very valid compendium of the 
Roosevelt character was written by the journalist Julia 
Street, who described him as "a Christian gentleman, his 
Christianity being muscular. " 33
32 Mrs. Roosevelt seems to have taken the same philosophical 
approach toward military service as did her husband. 
During 1915, the popular song "I Didn't Raise My Boy 
To Be A Soldier" is said to have provoked her on one 
occasion to echo: "I didn't raise my boy to be the
only soldier." Julia Street, "The Most interesting 
American," Collier's, LVI (October 23, 1915), 2lj..
33 Ibid., 6.
The first months of the war were agonizing ones for 
the Administration. There was much lack of coordination of 
effort and hence no end of confusion. For a period of six 
months, most of the mobilization steps taken by the govern­
ment were temporary measures adopted pending Congressional 
action* 3^ - American preparation for participation in the 
war was made more difficult by the lack of agreement as to 
the form which that participation should take. It was later 
revealed that the British emphasized the duty of the United 
States to build new tonnage and to produce food, while on 
the other hand, the French imperatively demanded that Ameri­
can troops be sent to Europe as soon as possible. On the 
basis of the English strategy that ships would win the war, 
provided sufficient production could be reached, it was 
originally intended that no U. S. troops would be sent 
abroad until March, 1918. ^  Apparently the appealing force 
of such urgent statements as Marshal Joffre's "Let the Ameri­
can soldier come now I" were too strong, for early contin­
gents of American troops reached Europe the preceding sum­
mer. 88
Paxson, "War Government," 59.
Ibid., This information was given in testimony by 
General Sharpe in 1918 before a Congressional com­
mittee investigating the War Department.
36 ,"Our Boys to France to Avert Disaster," Literary 
Digest, LIV (May 12, 1917)* 1393. Appearing on the 
front page of this issue, this article outlined the 
urgency that America contribute men and material to the war at the earliest possible moment.
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The problems of getting the nation geared to war 
could not, of course, fail to have its political implica­
tions and overtones. Leaders throughout the country were 
becoming concerned over the apparent inability of the 
Administration to get all aspects of national life geared 
to a war footing. Partisan politicians kept closely tuned 
to the developing situations which were of interest to 
them. War Secretary Baker pointed out to a conference of 
trade publication editors in May, 1917, that modern war 
was more than a Samson and David affair. Instead of bat­
tling with spears, slings, swords, and shields, the world 
was now in a struggle between smokestacks and engines. 
Baker emphasized the spreading realization that war was 
more than drafting, arming, training, and transporting 
soldiers. ^  The Secretary seemed to admit the inability 
of one single governmental department— his own— to cope 
with all aspects of war preparation. In ensuing months, 
however, he failed to convince many leaders that he was 
capably accomplishing even those things which could right­
fully be expected of the War Department.
The New York Times of January llj., 1918, editori­
alized concerning the questionable administrative capacity 
of the Wilson Administration. In commenting on Secretary 
Baker’s appearance before the Senate Committee on Military 
Affairs, the Times criticized the air of assurance exuded 
by the Secretary and stated that he had not convinced the
37 Sullivan, Over Here, 372.
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members of that committee that his complacent satisfaction 
with the present conditions and War Department business was 
warranted by the facts. The Times, usually quite favorable 
to the Administration in defending it against the attacks 
of Roosevelt and others, was now reiterating almost ver- 
batum what Roosevelt had charged all along. ’There are re­
ports," stated this great newspaper, "of a feeling of gloom 
and apprehension at the capital, of a feeling that the busi­
ness of preparing for war is not under competent management 
and direction; and there is a fear that calamities and na­
tional humiliation will be the penalty of the administrative 
incapacity to make good and effective use of the sums Con­
gress and the people have provided.... The atmosphere of 
self-satisfaction with which authority in Washington sur­
rounds itself does not extend over the whole country.... 
There will be an awakening at the capital when they begin 
to ask ’Why, in all these months and with all this money, 
have you not made us ready for war?1’’ The Times climaxed 
its editorial by questioning why a single individual with 
great authority had not been appointed to direct and drive 
the business of war mobilization.®®
This suggestion by so reputable a newspaper natu­
rally could not go unheeded. It may very well have been 
the motivating force behind some subsequent serious thought 
on both sides of the preparedness fence. It was only a 
period of some two months until the President followed this
T*16 New York Times, January II4., 1918.
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advice, and within a span of a few days, the Roosevelt ele­
ment had made a proposal, the embryo of which seems to have 
existed in this Times editorial.
If Roosevelt's vociferousness in sounding the alarm 
of inadequate leadership in Washington was discounted as 
political play, credence was given to the rumblings of 
uneasiness by one who was above suspicion of having personal 
motives for his criticism. This was no less a person than 
the highly respected chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Military Affairs, Senator George E. Chamberlain, Democrat 
of Oregon. The Senator, who spoke with great weight and 
authority, made the assertion that he was speaking as an 
American and not as a Democrat in charging that the mili­
tary establishment of America "has broken down" and almost
ceased its functioning.39
The uneasiness which existed at the turn of the 
year, 1917-1918, culminated in the appointment of Bernard 
M. Baruch the following March as the head of the War 
Industries Board. It was determined that the WlB should 
be a unified command under which all the work of mobili­
zation already accomplished by the Council of National 
Defense and other non-War Department agencies should be 
coordinated.^ "Czar" Baruch's capable hands became quite
39 Sullivan, Over Here, 37b» The Senator made this state­
ment after the hearing before which Secretary Baker 
testified.
^  Paxson, Pre-War Years, 253«
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evident in the mobilization effort. Thus the legitimate 
fears of the people were eased and tensions subsided. How­
ever, this was not accomplished until after one of America1s 
little political dramas had been enacted.
Late in January, after Senator Chamberlain had made 
his startling statement, Theodore Roosevelt held in Wash­
ington what Sullivan describes as a "court of indignation" 
at the home of his daughter, Mrs. Nicholas Longworth. Among 
those present at this event was a "council of protest," 
which was concerned with the wartime administrative inef­
ficiency in the Federal Government. It is suspected that 
most of those in this body were either old cronies of the 
Colonel or persons having a very similar attitude as his 
toward the Wilson Administration. It was this "council", 
under the guidance of the former President, which made an 
unprecedented recommendation as a remedy for the ailments 
so obvious in Washington. They suggested, if not demanded, 
that a coalition cabinet be created— a cabinet in which 
would be assembled the best brains of the country for the 
management of the war. ^ 1 A unified management of the 
country, in every detail but political, would thus be pro­
vided. This idea, however, was promptly squelched by 
President Wilson, who then asked for, and received, almost 
unlimited power to organize and direct all national re­
sources. Congress could hardly balk at the President's 
request for such authority in view of their own demands
^  Sullivan, Over Here, 375*
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for greater efficiency and more positive leadership. The 
authorization bill having been passed, Baruch was given 
the job of coordinating and commanding the country’s re­
sources— a job "to operate the whole United States as a 
single factory dominated by one management.
America in 1917 was in a war "up to her knees.”
It was a war very different from any other in which she had 
been involved. Journalists found many adjectives with which 
to describe it and many labels and titles to attach to it. 
Some writers of the day chose to call the American segment 
of this great struggle "Roosevelt’s War,” for it was a con­
flict which he sincerely believed in and in which he had 
sought to have his country participate. It was said to be 
"peculiarly his” though he was not a part of it physically. 
To be sure, "a war without Roosevelt did violence to an 
American legend.” Wilson, the historian, did not seem able 
to appreciate this f a c t . Colonel Roosevelt was left 
chagrined and frustrated because someone else was directing 
a war that "by all rules of reasoning should have been his 
to run.
Relatively speaking, Roosevelt's treatment of the 
President during the first few months of American partici­
pation was good (regardless of his motives). This, even
^  Sullivan, Over Here, 375>.
■^3 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 371 •
^  Ibid., 372.
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the Colonel's critics would have been forced to admit. But 
as time wore on and he saw his physical self and his mobili­
zation ideas ignored more and more by the Administration, 
he not only returned to his old characteristic of roaring 
bitter criticism at the President, but he developed what 
Mowry terms an unfairness as great as any man consumed with 
anger can have.^ The terminology the old Rough Rider used 
on Wilson became less and less complimentary. His deroga­
tions came to be applied even to old political colleagues 
who found it their duty to aid the Wilson Administration.
The President was categorized as an "exceedingly base" 
individual with a soul "rotten through and through," while 
such former Roosevelt supporters as Bainbridge Colby and 
Felix Frankfurter, who were now associated with the Adminis­
tration, were termed "ridiculous creatures."^ The Colonel 
accused Wilson of having won the 1916 election under false 
pretenses, ^ 7 and he struck again and again at the President's 
"peace without victory" appeal by asserting that "above all, 
we must insist that there shall be no inconclusive peace, 
no peace that is not based upon complete and over-whelming 
victory." As for the country's slowness in getting a proper 
war spirit aroused, Roosevelt pointed out that the responsi­
bility lay with our governmental leaders, who for two and
h 5^ Mowry, Progressive Movement. 3 7 1.
^  Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 1222. Roosevelt to Lodge,August 15, 19TT.
Here Roosevelt apparently was alluding to the Demo­
cratic campaign statements that "he kept us out of 
war" and that the Republicans, if elected, would 
plunge us into the conflict.
a half years preceding our entry "dulled the moral con­
science of the people" by arguing against American parti­
cipation. "It takes time," he emphasized, "to get people 
who have been misled back on the right course— the very 
course which they have...been told was the wrong course,^® 
Theodore Roosevelt in his declining days nurtured 
with a passion the association of those who held similar 
views as his own. He appeared to be willing to cooperate 
with almost anyone who would oppose Wilson and his ideas.
It is little wonder that this rapidly aging leader de­
veloped such a vindictive attitude toward the President, 
having listened regularly to Henry Cabot Lodge’s "song of 
hate" and Leonard Wood’s tales of woe over the mismanage­
ment of the army. Even such Republican Stalwarts and ex­
enemies of Roosevelt as Albert B. Pall and Joseph B. Poraker, 
who had many unhappy remarks to make about the Administra­
tion, became new-found friends of the ex-President. Not 
one of these men or any other person with whom he was in 
constant contact, it is said, could contribute an objective 
point of view toward the Administration.^ Consequently, 
with the passing of time, he became narrower in his views, 
and such views came to have less sway upon those who strived 
for objectivity. A letter written to Lodge on November 27, 
1918, is perhaps one of the better examples demonstrating
JO
Letters, VIII, 12S0, Roosevelt to Ernest 
ember 7* Republican Congressman from Minnesota, Hov-
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his unbounded bias. Indicating a concern over the failure 
to publish the battlefront casualty lists, he charged it 
to be the Administration's "deliberate purpose" not to do 
so "because it is assumed that two-thirds of them [the 
casualties^ are Republicans."^®
Despite the unfortunate turn in Roosevelt's public 
attitude, ^ 1 it must be noted, however, that the last period 
of his life was not spent entirely in a state of bitterness. 
Because the 1918 Congressional elections were to be so 
crucial, he found himself resuming old pre-1 9 1 2 friendships 
in order to present a united front for the good of the 
Republican cause. Even Taft, who it is said was not of 
the nature to carry a grudge forever, was again, in 1918, 
writing "My dear Theodore." The force of the "hate Wilson" 
idea had provided a sufficient common ground to draw Roose­
velt, Taft, and Root back together.^
The ex-President's one great ambition in 1918 was 
to bring defeat to V/oodrow Wilson by electing a Republican 
Congress. Without doubt, he agreed with Taft's thesis that 
G.O.P. control of Congress would "supply the deficiencies 
of...the Administration in carrying out a proper world
50 Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, Uj.06.
There seems to be no evidence to indicate that this 
demeanor carried over into the Colonel's private family life. In fact, all indications are that 
he became mellower in his relationships with loved ones.
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policy*” For the desired end— a united and victorious
Republican Party and a Democratic defeat in November— Roose- 
53velt worked;but the wartime damper on politics and the 
ethics involved therewith naturally limited the extent of 
his political activity. There were other factors as well 
which prevented his campaigning in the traditional Roose­
velt fashion. Early in that election year, he had been 
hospitalized by a severe attack of malignant Cuban fever 
and had for a time been on the verge of death. Then dur­
ing the summer, a leg abcess and erysipelas in one foot 
painfully plagued him and severely limited his physical 
activity.^ The fall of the year found him struggling 
with lumbago, gout, and sciatic rheumatism.^ He was no 
longer his old robust and bouncy self, though he retained 
until the end his nervous and restless energy.^ These 
factors had a curious effect upon Roosevelt’s political 
life. This was demonstrated when he emerged from the 
hospital. Though he was well aware that his name was
being associated with the 1920 Republican nomination, he•*
returned to his home and steadfastly refused to discuss 
Mowry, Progressive Movement, 373*
5k Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, 1^ 03*
^  I b i d . , ij.22.
^  These omnipresent characteristics are exemplified 
in Hagedorn1s account of a typical winter evening 
at Sagamore Hill for Theodore and Mrs. Roosevelt. 
Invariably the Colonel would poke impatiently at 
the burning logs in the fireplace, an act which 
would prompt the former First Lady to say: ”1
do think, Theodore, the fire would burn better if 
you didn’t fuss with it so much.” Hagedorn,Sagamore Hill, 392.
the matter of 1920. The reason he wished to get well, he 
asserted, was in order that he might resume his work "of 
endeavoring to get my country to exert her great, but lazy 
and unprepared strength as speedily and effectively as 
possible. "57 This is just what he did. But so sharp be­
came his criticisms of the Administration because of its 
lackluster nature and its failure to show a "real appreci­
ation" of the situation that a bill was introduced in the 
United States Senate, with Roosevelt as its primary object, 
calling for the imprisonment or fine of anyone guilty of 
"contemptuous or slurring language against the President."^® 
In response to such actions, Roosevelt, in his 
teeth-clicking way, shot back that he was an American citi­
zen, a free man, and loyal to governmental leaders only 
"to the degree in which they loyally and efficiently serve 
the United States." He expressed anxiousness at the op­
portunity to test the constitutionality of any laws limit­
ing freedom of speech. He defended his critical position 
by pointing out that "no human being has questioned suc­
cessfully the truth of anything I have said in criticism 
of the Administration." If, however, the President and 
his administration were held to be above criticism, he de­
clared, then we would have in this country "the Hohenzollern 
doctrine of lese majeste.
^  Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, 39ij-«
Ibid., 399. In the same vein, the Delaware House of Representatives came within one vote of passing a 
resolution calling for the attorney general of that 
state to proceed against Roosevelt for severly criti­
cizing the conduct of the Wilson Administration*
Ibid., 399.
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For a year prior to April, 1918, President Wilson 
had displayed a somewhat muddled mind regarding the morality 
of American participation in the war. Preparation had not 
gone well, and it seemed as if the Administration considered 
it to be somewhat meritorious to have been unprepared for 
war. However, on the first anniversary of American entrance 
into the war, the President made a speech which was music 
to the ears of his adversaries. Finally recognizing that 
only unlimited force could "make right the law of the world," 
Wilson made statements which were reported by one competent 
journal as vindicating the principles which Theodore Roose­
velt had been "so zealously upholding," principles which 
had now become national policy. A New York newspaper com­
mented: "Now, thank God, we are in the war."^®
Throughout 1918, Roosevelt’s public utterances 
were, for the most part, concerned with matters of national 
mobilization. His machinations behind the scenes, in pri­
vate correspondence and conversation, however, were largely 
political in nature. Publicly, he blazed at Wilson and 
Secretary Baker for their "folly and evil-doing" in the 
war effort; privately he worked to mollify the ex-Progres­
sives who were protesting the reactionary tone of many of 
the state Republican platforms. The former President so 
hoped for a Republican victory in November that he was 
willing to accept reactionary, moderate, and progressive
Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, l4.OO-i4.Ol.
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Alcandidates and platforms with equity and equanimity. Their 
bent on economic policies mattered little to him; anything 
would be better than Wilson and the Democrats. In his eyes, 
the fall elections were to be measured strictly along Demo­
crat-Republican party lines. Therefore, the old reformer 
could not find it in himself under the existing conditions 
of 1918 to preach the traditional radical doctrines of the 
progressives, and hence take a chance on splitting the party. 
But there seemed to be another reason for his taking this 
position. It is believed that it reflected a revolutionary 
trend in his thinking, a trend which indicated a new fear 
of Bolshevism. He who had had his qualms about the American 
capitalistic system now wrote his friend William Allen White 
that Bolshevism "was a more serious menace to world demo­
cracy than any species of capitalism. "82
Throughout the summer and fall of 1918, Roosevelt 
made numerous speeches. During the summer, he had spoken 
in Omaha, St. Louis, and Chicago; in the fall, he addressed 
audiences from the East Coast to Montana. These latter ap­
pearances were in support of the Fourth Liberty Loan, while 
his previous ones were under the auspices of the National 
Security League and other patriotic organizations. To be 
sure, this itenarary was one which would have challenged 
the most physically able of orators; however, for Roosevelt
81 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 37^*
82 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1315>* Roosevelt to William 
Allen White, May 2, 1918.
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it was a compromise with his conventionally more active 
existence. It was a schedule which found him under per­
petual medical care and often required last-minute ascents 
from bed confinement in order not to disappoint audiences. 
Though the enthusiasm with which the crowds received him 
gave the Colonel's speeches renewed energy and their old- 
time vigor, each experience seemed to take more and more 
life from him. Finally, he was forced to undergo hospitali­
zation a second time that year, spending the period from 
November 11th to December 2ij.th in New York City's Roosevelt 
Hospital.
It is interesting to note that throughout the pre­
election period Roosevelt made very few "political” speeches 
— that is, speeches which could be labelled as strictly 
partisan from a party standpoint. However, because of the 
difference between his own views and Wilson's on the prose­
cution of the war and the conclusion of peace, the Colonel's 
patriotic speeches definitely carried political overtones.
It must be pointed out, however, that his statements in 
actual support of the Republicans were generally expressed 
in private communication and were, without a shadow of 
doubt, the result of his sincere conviction that a G.O.P. 
victory would be in the best interests of the country.
This does not mean to say that he did not express respect 
for those Democratic members of Congress who had served 
their country well. He merely believed that as a whole 
it was the Republican and not the Democratic members who 
"have done most for the efficient furtherance of the war
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and have gone farthest in insistence that it should be put 
through until we win the peace of complete victory.n The 
ex-President was convinced that a Republican victory would 
be an indication to Americans and to their allies, as well 
as to Germany, that the United States was more resolute 
than ever in fighting the war to a peace of overwhelming 
victory and unconditional surrender.^
The Republicans had slowly come to realize that 
Theodore Roosevelt had been and was the beacon of opposi­
tion to the Wilson Administration, that he was their guid­
ing light and their savior. The Party in New York State 
desperately needed an uplift and a victory, and thus they 
turned to the Colonel. He was asked, if not begged, to be 
a candidate for governor of that state. Even his old 
political enemies gave him their blessing. Roosevelt 
fully realized the significance of the New York governor­
ship for anyone with Presidential aspirations; and he 
recognized with sardonic amusement that he, who had been 
in the "political scrapbasket" four years before and who 
now "was actually calling the tune both in the White House 
and on Capitol Hill," was being placed on a very high 
pedestal. But he declined the invitation.^- He said that, 
as an American citizen, he had "no interest whatever in
^3 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 137^ 4-* This view was ex­
pressed by Roosevelt in a letter of endorsement to 
Selden Palmer Spencer, Republican candidate for the 
United States Senate from Missouri, October If?, 1918.
%  Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, I|.06.
189
politics” at that time other than from the standpoint of
"straight Americanism” and of "winning the war."^ Having
refused this nomination, he wrote to his son Ted: "My
whole heart is wrapped up in this war and in what is to
come after; my whole pride and interest is in you boys
and your wives; and I just could not wrench my mind off
66to a wholly different track." Roosevelt’s one and only 
concern was about the fate of his country and those who 
were working and fighting for its glorious perpetuation.
It seemed impossible for him to divert his thought and 
attentions to such parochial matters as state problems 
and politics. His patriotic interests in this country 
and in the war, for which he and his four sons were an 
allied fighting team, had even brought Roosevelt to en­
dorse the President’s request for an adjournment of poli­
tics for the duration.^7
Roosevelt recognized the widespread and growing 
movement for his presidential candidacy in 1920. It had 
snowballed during the 1918 "off-year" election campaigns. 
Pressure had built up for him to state his position. 
Finally, he made the statement that he would run, if----.
Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1377* Roosevelt to John Henry Bartlett, prominent New Hampshire Republi­can, October 18, 1918.
LL
00 Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill. lp.8.
^7 This endorsement was withdrawn when, to Roosevelt's 
"great regret," it became evident to him that the 
"Administration and Democratic Party leaders treated 
this announcement merely as an effort to get Republi­
cans to play Democratic politics." Roosevelt, Let- 
ters, VIII, 1377. Roosevelt to John Henry Bartlett, October 18, 1918.
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"If the people want me, but only if they want me," were 
his qualifying remarks. He asserted he would not "lift 
a finger" for the nomination nor make any contest for it.
The nomination "will have to come to me," he explained, for 
"it would be worthless on any other basis.
Most Republicans of every stripe admitted that Roose­
velt could have the 1920 nomination without strings and on 
his own terms. Raymond Robins is reported as having re­
marked to the Colonel’s old New York political enemy Wil­
liam Barnes: "I suspect we are going to nominate TR in
1920 by acclamation." "Acclamation, hell!" Barnes is said 
to have retorted. "We’re going to nominate him by as­
sault, Pate deprived history of such an interesting 
spectacle.
Roosevelt's last big battle with Wilson was pre­
cipitated on October 26, 1918, It was on that date that 
the President contradicted the stand he had taken in favor 
of a moratorium on wartime political activity, and pro­
ceeded to ask the voters for a Democratic Congress,^®
"The leaders of the [Republican] minority in the present
/ O Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, 1+06.
69 Ibid., 1+06.
It is noted that Herbert Hoover, of recent European 
food relief fame, endorsed the Wilson appeal for a 
Democratic Congress. Likewise, he ardently sup­
ported Wilson's League of Nations when it came up 
for debate. Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1396n.
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Congress," Wilson pointed out in his pre-election appeal 
to the electorate, "have unquestionably been pro-war, but 
they have been anti-Administration." "The return of a 
Republican majority in either house of Congress," he in­
sisted, "would be interpreted on the other side of the 
water as a repudiation of my leadership.
Roosevelt, the unquestioned leader and voice of 
the Republican Party, was not slow in responding to the 
Wilson statement. In the general sense of the phrase, 
the former President had adjourned his political activity, 
in accordance with the President's request. It is not 
surprising therefore that he was extremely galled at the 
Chief Executive's action. In what has been described as 
Roosevelt’s last great speech, the famed Rough Rider, in 
a two-hour discourse before a packed Carnegie Hall con­
vocation of New York Republicans on October 28, dealt with 
the matter in a detail of logic. Lincoln, he pointed out 
to his audience, had made no "party test" in the wartime 
election of l86ij.. Instead, the Great Emancipator had "ap­
pealed to all loyal men of all parties," asking "that the 
test of fitness for Congress be, not adherence to his 
personal administration, but unconditional support of the
^  Bishop, Roosevelt, lj.67* It is a credit to Roosevelt’s 
political acumen that, though he had contemplated a 
similar appeal for votes, he suppressed the plan when 
he realized it would leave the way open for a Demo­
cratic attack. Frederic L. Paxson, review of Talks 
With Theodore Roosevelt by John J. Leary, Jr., Ameri­
can Historical Review,XXVI (October, 1920), iq.9-1^ 0.
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war,” Wilson, on the other hand, the Colonel further 
enunciated, "does not ask for loyalty to the Nation,” but 
rather "asks only for support of h i m s e l f * T h u s ,  Demo­
crats, be they even anti-war, were being supported for 
Congressional seats by the wartime President. And, Roose­
velt did not hesitate to remind his countrymen that "this 
is the people’s government, this is the people’s war, and 
the peace that follows will be the people's peace."73 
This denunciation of Wilson was the keynote of 
Roosevelt’s New York address, and it received nationwide 
circulation and' attention. Bishop, among others, suggests 
that this cogent rebuttal to the President's argument was 
a "powerful factor" in bringing majorities to the Republi­
cans in both houses of Congress in the November election.7^- 
Until the day of voting, Roosevelt did not let the 
public or his friends forget the Chief Executive’s action, 
a move which was a signal to the Colonel and his Republican 
colleagues that there was open season in politics once a- 
gain. He is reported to have made this interesting obser­
vation in regard to this new development: "He [Wilson]
has...I am thankful to say, come out into the open and 
made a frank party appeal for the Democratic Party against 
the Republicansj and this at least makes the fight more
7^ Bishop, Roosevelt. I4.6 7.
73 Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, lj.22.
7^- Bishop, Roosevelt, Ij.68.
comfortable.""^ He stressed to the public many times that 
Wilson was asking for the election of anti-war, and there­
fore anti-American, senators and representatives. Further­
more, he was aiding Congressmen who had been against the 
Administration when it was pro-war, and who had supported 
it by obstructing legislative efforts to uncover or put a
stop to its inefficiency, waste, delay, extravagance, and
\
corruption— all of which was damaging and had "damaged the 
cause of America.
To a prominent industrial leader, Henry H. Timken, 
Roosevelt wrote this message concerning Wilson’s partisan 
appeal: "I make my [November election campaign] appeal
as an American, for President Wilson has made his appeal 
for a Democratic Congress in the narrowest spirit of 
partisanship. He asks that the Republicans even although 
pro-war, be defeated and he makes no distinction between 
pro-war and anti-war Democrats, but asks for the election 
of all alike.... The President’s appeal is a cruel insult 
to every Republican father and mother whose sons have 
entered the Army or the Navy, and I believe it would be 
equally resented by the Democrats whose gallant sons are 
in the Army or the Navy, side by side with the gallant 
sons of their Republican neighbors.... It seemed in­
credible to Roosevelt that a President of the United States
^  Bishop, Roosevelt, 1^.68.
Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 138k. Roosevelt to Al­
bert B. Fall, October 30, 1918.
Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1388. Roosevelt to Timken, 
November 2, 1918.
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in time of war would, through partisanship, choose to be 
the leader of his party rather than of all the people.
On October 31st, on the eve of the all-important 
elections, Roosevelt and Taft joined in a widely circulated 
statement which strongly urged the election of a Republican 
Congress, This move was a reaction to the known uneasi­
ness felt by a major segment of the population over Wilson1s 
peace theories. The Roosevelt-Taft appeal assured that a 
Republican Congress would stand for the unconditional sur­
render of Germany, the participation of the Senate in the 
making of the peace, and an accounting of Democratic 
stewardship over wartime expenditures.
Believing it to be the general judgment of ’’good 
Americans” that complete loyalty to the country was syn­
onymous with complete loyalty to the war, the Colonel*s 
steady flow of pre-election correspondence suggested that 
President Wilson was being unpatriotic and selfish in de­
manding that loyalty to him should take precedence over 
loyalty to the war. "The Administration has taken no act 
to hurry up the war, save on account of pressure from Con­
gress," he avowed; "the people cannot be certain what Presi­
dent Wilson, and still less what the Democratic majority in 
the two Houses really intend.” The problem had a solution.
7® Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 1388n. In his correspondence 
with Senator Lodge, Roosevelt had this to say concern­
ing Wilson*s plans for a negotiated peace: "Let us
dictate peace by the hammering guns and not chat about 
peace to the accompaniment of the clicking of type­
writers." Ibid.. 1380. Roosevelt to Lodge, October 
2k, 1918.
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"The one way to guarantee the efficient waging of this war
to the end,” declared the Colonel, "is to secure the election
h79of a Republican Congress.
A Republican Congress was secured, and the old patriot 
revelled in his glory. The victory, especially in the Senate, 
fed the Roosevelt soul. Overlooking the fact that the vic­
torious Republicans carried a strongly conservative cast,
he found great happiness in the fact that Wilson's days 
finwere numbered. Reflecting back upon the President's
election appeal, Roosevelt wrote his British friend, Arthur
Hamilton Lee, that this act by Wilson "gave me my chance,
and in the last week of the campaign we did the seemingly
impossible— carried the House by a substantial and the
Senate by a bare majority." He dramatized the election
results as a strong rebuke of the President, inasmuch as
the latter had asserted that the election, so far as he
was concerned, was a test of only one thing— his adminis-
0Xtration's policies.
In an article which he wrote for The Kansas City 
Star, November 18th, Colonel Roosevelt described the election 
of a Republican Congress as "first and foremost a victory
for straight Americanism. To the Republican Party it re-
fi Ppresents not so much a victory as an opportunity." This
Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1379-1397. Roosevelt to 
John Henry Bartlett, October 18, 1918.
fin Mowry, Progressive Movement,
8 -^ Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1397* Roosevelt to Lee,
November 197 1918.
82 Ibid., 1392n.
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last statement indicates that Roosevelt did not choose 
to gloat over "his" and the Republicans' recent success; 
moreover, it would seem that his words injected a tone 
of caution and seriousness into the situation. This feel­
ing was definitely reflected in his expressions to Lodge, 
expressions which warned the Republicans as to what they 
should and should not do with their "opportunity." "We 
must take the lid off and investigate, and must show no 
mercy to the President," he told the Senator, "[but] the 
situation is so good that you must not make any mistake 
by overplaying your hand and causing a reaction of sympathy 
toward the President."®-^
The aging Roosevelt felt that he had been vindicated 
of the barrage of charges which had been hurled at him over 
the few previous years. Realizing that there had been a 
time when his was truly a voice in an unfriendly wilderness, 
he confided to his long-time friend Rudyard Kipling that 
he "took a certain sardonic amusement in the fact that 
whereas four years ago, to put it mildly, my attitude was 
not popular [even among most Republicans^, I was now the 
one man whom they insisted upon following and whose state­
ments were taken as the platform."®^-
Theodore Roosevelt was once again, without question, 
the leader of the Republican Party. He had defeated his 
old enemies within that organization, and they were now
Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, li|13. Roosevelt to Lodge,
December 6, 191b.
^  Ibid.. llj.05. Roosevelt to Kipling, November 23, 1918.
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riding his coattails. He had not only won a tremendous 
victory within his old party but he had also won a victory 
over the Democrats. It was most emphatically a dual vic­
tory. But most significant to him was the new Republican 
majority in the Senate— even if it was sustained by only 
two seats. For quite some time before the fall elections, 
it was evident that the war was in its closing phases. Its 
end would necessitate the drawing up of a peace contract, 
and Roosevelt did not like what he knew of Wilson’s peace 
concepts. To him, a Wilsonian peace would surely be a 
catastrophe. He saw that the 1920 presidential election 
would be too late to bring this matter to the people’s 
attention, and to make it a public issue. Hence, in the 
1918 Congressional elections had lain Roosevelt's only hope 
of being able to prove public disapproval of what was known 
of Wilson's peace plans, and to gain sufficient Senate votes 
to block his program.
To be sure, Roosevelt was more than chagrined at 
the manner in which the President was seeking an armistice. 
There was little, however, that he, his colleagues, or the 
electorate could do about this phase of the peace. That 
matter being solely in the hands of the Chief Executive 
and his subordinates. It was his firm conviction that, if 
the war were to fulfill the purpose for which we entered it, 
it should end in Berlin and not sooner. His bitter opposi­
tion to an armistice can thus be imagined. And it cannot 
be too surprising that he, Lodge, and other Republican 
leaders saw in the President's peace negotiations certain
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political facets and motives. Lodge especially had his
misgivings. To him, Wilson's negotiated peace efforts
were translated as an attempt to get votes for a third
89term in 1920 from the German-American groups. ^ Roose­
velt interpreted the President's efforts in a somewhat 
different light. Though a negotiated peace with Germany,
he was convinced that Wilson hoped to bring that country
into the League and thereby gain support for himself in 
his candidacy to become that organization's first presi­
dent. Furthermore, it was Colonel House's intention, he 
asserted, "to secure an economic alliance between Germany 
and the United States as against England;" because it was 
believed in Administration circles that "we must not have
Germany too much weakened, because Germany was a check on
England, as otherwise we should be at England's mercy.
The November Republican victory was an extremely 
important turning point in the life and career of Woodrow 
Wilson. William Allen White suggests that here at the 
zenity of Wilson's power, the Devil grinned, the man slipped 
by writing a letter asking his country for a partisan Demo­
cratic Congress, and "America turned savagely upon its hero 
who had shown a human w e a k n e s s . H i s  relatively brief 
but highly successful political path was soon to be smothered 
under a heavy overcast of mental anguish, supreme
Mowry, Progressive Movement, 375*
° Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 139i+* Roosevelt to George Haven Putnam, President of the American Rights League, November 15, 1918.
William Allen White, Woodrow Wilson, 386-36 7.
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disappointment, disillusionment, and bitterness, which 
culminated in his physical destruction— a condition which 
was sustained until his end. Theodore Roosevelt, on the 
other hand, was enjoying for the first time in a decade 
the taste of real political success. The clouds of gloom 
were partially gone. The extreme sadness which pervaded 
the halls of Sagamore Hill, however, emanating from his 
son Quentin1s death, prevented Colonel Roosevelt from 
looking to the future with enthusiasm and ambition.
CHAPTER VIII
FINISHED AND UNFINISHED BUSINESS
With the advent of Armistice Day, 1918, Theodore 
Roosevelt, for the second time within a year, was forced 
to undergo hospitalization. The strenuous life was col­
lecting its toll} and though he sometimes spoke and wrote 
with eager anticipation of the future, many of his last 
letters revealed a tone which indicated that his chapter 
in history was coming to a close. Through the last three 
months of the election campaign, he had made two speaking 
tours. This physical exertion plus the mental anguish from 
the loss of his son Quentin had been and were continuing to 
sap his vitality. Despite his confinement, however, the 
Colonel continued to work against the Wilson League of Na­
tions and for the type of international organization in 
which he believed.
Throughout his career, Roosevelt had shown an under­
standing of America's growing interests and increasing 
importance in world affairs. As early as 1910, he had 
spoken in behalf of a form of international organization 
of states. Especially during the years 1911j- and 1915* he 
repeatedly endorsed the idea. 1 His correspondence with his 
friend Van Valkenburg, moreover, indicated him to be an 
ardent advocate of a league. But at this time, as he argued 
in the later years, he contended that the country's primary
1 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 376.
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responsibility was to arm itself in the interests of its own 
self-defense* It would then be in a position to work mean­
ingfully within an international organization for the purpose 
of maintaining world peace* How could we aid in imposing 
our will on anyone else, he reasoned, when we are not in a 
position to do so militarily. 2 It was obvious throughout 
his entire discussion and debate of this issue that he be­
lieved the success of a league in enforcing peace in the 
world could be achieved only by working from a position of 
military strength. He put absolutely no faith in anything 
less forceful. To him, Wilson's theories on the League 
were "much” less forceful and fell in the "domain of empty 
and windy eloquence." He warned of the fate that would be­
fall the President when the point was reached that he had 
to "make definite the things for which he stands."3
Though Roosevelt made many unhappy remarks about 
the President's plans for a league, it cannot be said that 
he was a critic without ideas of his own. Instead of a 
league of "nations", he believed that there should be a 
league of the "Allies". Under such an arrangement, there 
would be a much greater chance for the survival and success 
of the organization, because of the integration which these 
countries had already achieved in bringing about the over­
throw of the "hideous despotism" of the Central Powers.
2 Wister, Friendship. 3 3 6.
3 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, llj.1 8, Roosevelt to Henry
J. Haskell of The Kansas City Star. December 28, 1918.
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And no nation, he said, that had been acting as a criminal 
should be admitted to the league "until after a sufficient 
number of years to satisfy us."^- He further believed that 
each member nation should have reserved to itself the right 
to decide which international questions were "non justi­
fiable. Being the nationalist that he was, it was clear 
that he would fight any encroachment on the sovereignty of 
his country.  ^ Roosevelt contended that our participation 
in an international peace organization would necessarily 
be a move over and above preparation for our own national 
defense; under no circumstance could it be a substitute 
for defense. To him this was an extremely important point, 
and he emphasized this when he wrote to James Bryce: "I
am not willing to play the part which even Aesop held up 
to derision when he wrote of how the wolves and the sheep 
agreed to disarm, and how the sheep as a guarantee of good 
faith sent away the watchdogs, and were then forthwith 
eaten by the wolves.” "Uncle Sam must, in the last ana­
lysis," insisted the former President, "rely on himself
^ Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, 1393* Roosevelt to W. W.
Davies of Australia, November lij., 1918.
^ Bishop, Roosevelt, ij-70.
 ^Mowry, Progressive Movement, 377* To Albert J.
Beveridge on October 31, 1918, Roosevelt wrote:
"I am for saying with a bland smile whatever Na­
tionalism demands. I will then adopt with that 
extra consideration any wise and feasible plan for 
limiting the possible area and likelihood of future 
wars." Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, 1385.
 ^Ihid.. llj.00. Roosevelt to James Bryce, November 19,1918.
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for his safety, and not on scraps of paper signed by 
others."®
Roosevelt was quick to admit that he did not put 
much faith in the Wilson League of Nations, or in "any 
corresponding universal cure-all."^ Any promise that a 
league would definitely do away with war, he reminded,
"is either sheer nonsense or rank hypocrisy. While 
he felt that the League might "do a little good," he rea­
soned that "the more pompous it is and the more it pre­
tends to do, the less it will really accomplish." Draw­
ing upon his excellent knowledge of history, Roosevelt said 
that the talk about the League had a "grimly humorous sug­
gestion of the talk about the Holy Alliance" and its purpose 
of maintaining perpetual peace. "The Czar Alexander, by 
the way," chided Roosevelt, "was the President Wilson of 
this particular movement a century ago."^
That Roosevelt was playing partisan politics with 
the League issue is a contention that has often been made 
since the Armistice. Regardless of the validity of such 
an assertion, the former President was adamant in his be­
liefs regarding the nature of any organization which might 
be formed; and he expressed these views regardless of their
® Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, lj.20.
 ^Roosevelt, Letters, VIII. ll+llj.. Roosevelt to H. R.Haggard, December 6, 1918.
Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill, 1^.20.
Roosevelt, Letters. VIII, II4.I3. Roosevelt to P.C.Knox, December 6, 1918.
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conflict with others, Democrat or Republican. One instance 
is his rather caustic counter assertion to his good Republi­
can friend Leonard Wood's declaration that there is "nothing 
more dangerous than the world court and the League of Nations 
idea.” "I am for such a league as I have outlined," Roose­
velt asserted, "a league which, however , has nothing in 
common with the policies of Messrs. Wilson and Taft. " 12
Perhaps the most comprehensive collection of the 
Roosevelt views on the League of Nations appears in an 
article which he wrote three days before his death for The 
Kansas City Star. The Star, because of the immense moment 
of the issues before the Peace Conference at that time, had 
requested Roosevelt to give his countrymen the benefit of 
his discussions of the possibilities of a league of nations 
as a preventative of war. Although he consented to do this, 
he told the newspaper that he expected to follow the league 
editorial with one "on what I regard as infinitely more 
important, namely, our business to prepare for our own 
self-defense." This latter article, was never written; 
however, his league article appeared on the front page of 
the Star on January 1 3, 1919, one week following his death.
In editorial comment preceding the former President's words, 
the newspaper reminded its readers that the expressions fol­
lowing represented Roosevelt's "matured judgment based on 
protracted discussion and correspondence. It is of peculiar 
importance as the last message of a man who above every
12 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 376.
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other American of his generation combined high patriotism, 
practical sense, and a positive genius for international 
relations.” Because of the significance to this study of 
this last Roosevelt editorial effort, its text is here 
quoted: ^
It is of course a serious misfortune that 
our people are not getting a clear idea of what 
is happening on the other side. For the moment, 
the point as to which we are foggy is the League 
of Nations. We all of course earnestly desire 
such a league, only we wish to be sure that it 
will help and not hinder the cause of world 
peace and justice.... In any such movement 
if too much is attempted the result is either 
failure or worse than failure.
The trouble with Mr. Wilson’s utterances 
so far as they are reported...is that they 
are still absolutely in the stage of rhetoric 
precisely like the fourteen points. Some of 
the fourteen points will probably have to be 
construed as having a mischievous signifi­
cance, a smaller number might be construed as 
being harmless, and one or two even as bene­
ficial, but nobody knows what Mr. Wilson really 
means by them, and so all talk of adopting them 
as basis for a peace or a league is nonsense....
So Mr. Wilson's recent utterances give us abso­
lutely no clew as to whether he really intends 
that at this moment we shall admit Germany,
Russia, with which, incidentally, we are still 
waging war, Turkey, China and Mexico into the 
league on a full equality with ourselves. Mr.
Taft has recently defined the purposes of the 
league and the limitations under which it 
would act, in a way that enables most of us to 
say we very heartily agree in principle with
13 The Star1s columns state that this article was dictated 
to his secretary at Sagamore Hill on Friday, January 3rd, 
and it was expected that she would take the typed copy 
to him for correction, the following Monday. At i|.:l5 a.m. 
on that Monday morning, January 6th, Theodore Roosevelt 
died. There was an ensuing delay of several days be­
fore this editorial reached the Star for its publica­
tion. The Kansas City Star, January 13, 1919, 1.
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his theory and can, without doubt, come to an 
agreement on specific details.
Would it not be well to begin with the 
league which we actually have in existence, 
the League of the Allies who have fought 
through this great war? Let us at the peace 
table see that real justice is done as among 
these allies, and that while the sternest 
reparation is demanded from our foes for such 
horrors as those committed in Belgium, North­
ern France, Armenia, and the sinking of the 
Lusitania, nothing should be done in the 
spirit of mere vengeance. Then let us agree 
to extend the privileges of the League as 
their conduct warrants it to other nations, 
doubtless discriminating between those who 
would have a guiding part in the League and 
the weak nations who would be entitled to 
the privileges of membership, but who would 
not be entitled to a guiding voice in the 
councils. Let each nation reserve to itself 
and for its own decision, and let it clearly set forth questions which are non-justicable. 
Let nothing be done that will interfere with 
our preparing for our own defense by intro­
ducing a system of universal obligatory 
military training modeled on the Swiss plan.
Finally, make it perfectly clear that we 
do not intend to take a position of an inter­
national Meddlesome Matty. The American people 
do not wish to go into an overseas war unless 
for a very great cause and where the issue is 
absolutely plain.... The American people do 
not intend to give up the Monroe Doctrine.
Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce some 
kind of a police system in the weak and dis­
orderly countries at their thresholds. But 
let the United States treat Mexico as our 
Balkan peninsula and refuse to allow Euro­
pean or Asiatic powers to interfer on this 
continent in any way that implies permanent 
or semi-permanent possession. Every one of 
our allies will with delight grant this re­
quest if President Wilson chooses to make it 
and it will be a great misfortune if it is 
not made.
I believe that such an effort made moder­
ately and sanely, but sincerely and with utter 
scorn for words that are not made good by 
deeds, will be productive of real and lasting 
international good.
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Because of Roosevelt's death at a time when the 
great debate over American participation in the League of 
Nations was only beginning, it became a practice of both 
sides of the argument to quote Roosevelt in the substan­
tiation of their positions. It is true that he favored 
an international organization for the promotion of peace.
But while he supported the idea of "a” league, he could 
not endorse "the” League, Wilson's League. His position 
might be termed a compromise between the extremes. Per­
haps the most-asked question is what actions the Colonel 
would have taken had he lived through the period of debate. 
Mowry and Pringle agree that Roosevelt would have joined 
Lodge and the "battalion of death" in killing the League, 
which was designed and presented so uncompromisingly by 
Wilson. Had the former President returned to the White 
House after 1920, Mowry speculates he would have remained 
an ardent nationalist, but something might have been sal­
vaged from the peace— which was not a peace at all. Roose­
velt, who had always favored some measure of international 
cooperation, would not, however, as President of the United 
States, have led his country into joining the League of 
Nations without drastic reservations. But, suggests Mowry, 
the American nation, regardless of its organizational affili­
ation and under the leadership of one who understood his 
country's growing interest in the world family of nations, 
would have fulfilled its newly-adopted obligations to world 
society.1^
Mowry, Progressive Movement, 377.
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It is significant to note that in his declining days, 
Roosevelt was mentioned as a possible member of the Presi­
dent’s peace party to Versailles, but neither his physical 
condition nor his temperament would have permitted such a 
role. J As fate dictated, his presence in such a group 
would have been of little consequence, for his end came 
soon after the U. S. delegation arrived in France. The 
momentous decisions were yet to be made at the time of 
his death.
Roosevelt did not live to fight in the great na­
tional battle over the League of Nations, and he did not 
live to throw his hat into the 1920 presidential ring.
In some manner or another he would have been a most active 
participant in both struggles. If he expressed unconcern 
over the 1920 race because of family conditions, the urge 
to become immersed in politics seemed always to be irre- 
sistable to him, even in his dying days. In reply to 
questions concerning his intentions for 1920, the former
On December i|.th, 1918, President Wilson sailed for 
France with his delegation consisting of Secretary 
Lansing, Colonel House, General Tasker H. Bliss, 
Henry White, and various experts and secretaries. 
The selection of White, the only Republican in 
the group, was criticized by his fellow party mem­
bers because his Republicanism was not active 
enough to please .them. Roosevelt, it is said, was 
preferred by his party’s leadership; but this un­
doubtedly was never considered as a serious sug­
gestion— there being no evidence that any amount 
of harmony could result from his participation 
in the proceedings. John Spencer Bassett, Our 
War With Germany (New York, 1919), 336-37*
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President, late in 1918, said: "I am indifferent to the
subject; since Quentin’s death the world seems to have shut 
down upon me. If my other boys do not come back, what would 
the Presidency mean to me...? But if I do consent it will 
be because as President I could accomplish some things that 
I should like to see accomplished before I die.... And, 
by George, if they take me, they will take me without a 
single modification of the things I have always stood 
for. " 16
To William Allen White, who visited him in his 
hospital room and discussed the forthcoming presidential 
election, the Colonel remarked: "Well, probably I shall
have to get in this thing by June [1919^ ]."^  ^ Hence to 
the very last, the spirit of the Rough Rider existed; he 
battled with himself and with his seeming undying desire 
to return to the White House.
Mowry states that only a week before his death 
Roosevelt told his friends that the Republican Convention 
would nominate him in 1920; and, there is little doubt 
in Mowry’s mind that he would have given his eyeteeth to 
have been elected President once again. This would have 
been the perfect culmination of a historic life. His 
election in 1920 would have been "ample balm" for 1912
and 1916, and would have been a popular vindication of
1 fthis struggle with Wilson.
16 Sullivan, Over Here, 502.
1  ^White, Autobiography, 5ij-8.
16 Mowry, Progressive Movement, 375-376.
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There was significance in the timing of Roosevelt's 
death. Mowry sees in his passing the end of a twenty-year- 
old political movement. With him went the last hope of any* I
effective progressive<action in the Republican Party for 
at least two decades.1  ^ For as the Bull Moose was making 
his exit from the political stage, Calvin Coolidge made 
his entry from the right wing. William Allen White is 
certain that had Roosevelt lived he would have been nominated 
and elected. Furthermore, White suggests that the future 
economic developemnt of the United States might have been 
something entirely different from what it was. nThe 
country would have had, in workable terms, from a Republi­
can administration, much of the social program that came 
a dozen years later under the second Roosevelt. It would 
have been adopted in normal times. We should have had the 
little end of the wedge. It would not have disturbed
economic and industrial traffic, and a great cataclysm
20might have been avoided.”
Theodore Roosevelt had played the role as Wilson's 
antagonist to the hilt for almost five years. At every 
turn he was the experienced and masterful politician; he 
was also the patriot supreme— one who loved his country 
dearly and deeply regretted that the one life which he had 
could not be given for it. The appropriately mixed portions 
of patriotism and politics were undoubtedly the forces which 
caused him to be labelled as the greatest American of his time.
Mowry, Progressive Movement, 377.
20 White, Autobiography, Sb 9.
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Roosevelt was a great leader— it was his natural 
bent to lead. And he did not shrink at the thought of 
defeat, if defeat meant standing up for what he considered 
morally and intellectually right. He was not an egotist 
such as he was accused of being by his enemies; moreover, 
he did not always wither at the thought of admitting mis­
takes, as has also often been contended. True, he did 
have an abundance of ego, but observations seem to indi­
cate a willingness on his part to confess errors approxi­
mately to the extent that is humanly characteristic. In 
addition to his little-known mental depressions, perhaps 
the following extracts from his correspondence with a 
total stranger reveal to some degree that he was a man 
who practiced at least some introspection--a soul-searching 
which probably came especially as a result of the antago­
nistic reactions to his criticisms of Wilson. ”1 have 
frequently erred in judgment and have said so," he pointed 
out. But he countered: "Unlike Mr. Wilson, I have never
erred in intellectual honesty and moral straightforward­
ness.... I never erred but once and that was on the 
occasion in question, when for the first sixty days after 
the outbreak of the World War I heartily supported him.
This was a mistake, but it was a generous mistake from
PIproper motives. I have never erred whei| I opposed him."
It is true that Theodore Roosevelt had boundless 
confidence in himself, and that this virtue often was
Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, lij.21. Roosevelt to Carroll 
E. Armstrong, hardwareman of Clinton, Iowa, January 
3, 1919.
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translated by others as supreme conceit cannot be too sur­
prising. Had it not been for this characteristic, however, 
so many historians would not have found his personality 
to be the object of their affections. Roosevelt*s self- 
confidence led him to speak his opinions quite frankly.
This, coupled with the fact that he was a leader who was 
ahead of his time on many issues, led to the label "ex­
tremeness" being placed on numerous of his statements. 
Recognizing this tag, Roosevelt asserted that his "ex-
„22tremeness one year is another person’s moderation later,
23and history has borne him out.
He would not deny any portion of his ravings at Wil­
son. He was in the difficult position of being an ex- 
President, and as a highly patriotic individual he felt 
that there was a definite service which he could perform 
for his country. That duty as he came to interpret it 
through his actions was in the nature of being the people’s 
watchdog against a President and an administration which 
might not always act in their best interests. flMy duty,”
22 Bishop, Roosevelt. I4.6 6. Prom his speech in support 
of the New York Republican ticket, October 28, 1918.
23 Roosevelt seemed to enjoy his talents as a phrase- 
maker, and he knowingly injected humor into his 
biting criticisms through the use of these original 
creations. Many times, of course, though using a 
phrase merely for the purpose of making a point,
he was subject to the criticism of being extreme in 
his words. One of the best examples of this perhaps 
appeared when he was bemoaning the fact that the 
U.S. was not doing its duty in the world. This 
country, he asserted, was running neck and neck 
with the Chinese as "the greatest of yellow nations." 
Mowry, Progressive Movement, 386.
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he is quoted as having stated, "is to oppose him [Wilson] 
wliop© h© go©s wrong* • •and, in* & P68.sona.bl© nuinbop of ©s.s©s*
I make him go fairly right. With proper justification,
however, many persons who attempted to be objective in 
evaluating the role of Theodore Roosevelt would agree with 
Pringle that his services toward his country and toward 
preparedness were marred by his bitter attitude toward 
President Wilson. His spoken and written charges against 
his Democratic adversary were lacking in tolerance and
2 5trust, and were permeated with undue hatred.
Roosevelt felt that his task as the exponent of
preparedness had as its corollary the role of propagandist
— at home and abroad. He was rather proud of his efforts
in this regard. Because he believed that his stand was
that of true Americanism, he did not deviate from his
goal of attempting to win the American people to his views.
Nor did he hesitate to advise his foreign friends in the
26Allied countries how to win American support. Early in
27the war, the former President somewhat secretly became 
dedicated to the Allied (especially the British) cause, and 
at the same time came to be an unofficial, if not unsolicited
^  Hagedorn, Sagamore Hill. I{.21.
pd Pringle, Roosevelt, 585.
26 Buchanan, "Roosevelt and Neutrality," 782.
2? In private conversation and correspondence Roosevelt 
displayed an extreme friendship for Britain; however, 
publicly he remained impartial. So successful was 
he at this deliberate "cover-up" that he was criti­
cized by the editor of the London Spectator for his 
lack of warmth toward England. Ibid., 790.
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advisor to his highly placed British friends regarding 
matters involving America. Prom all evidence, his advice 
did not go unheeded. There came to be a close correlation 
between Roosevelt’s suggestions to the British and their 
subsequent actions in behalf of winning American favor.
He thus frequently is seen as having displayed his art of
28propaganda to the "less artful” British.
Among the many charges that were hurled at the 
former President was that of being a war monger and a 
’’bloodthirsty anarchist”. In a personal interview, he 
emphatically denied that he could be so accused. As 
President of the United States for seven and a half years, 
he pointed out, our forces never fired a single shot at 
a foreign foe, despite various complications and his in— 
sistence on protecting American citizens throughout the 
world. Admitting that war is a very terrible thing which 
should be avoided by every decent means, he emphasized 
that he did not "regard it as the worst conceivable thing 
in the world." "I think some things are even more to be 
avoided than war," he asserted. Furthermore, being a
28 two examples of this apparent influence are here given:
(1) Roosevelt in late 191!}- called on the British to 
publish an official report on Germany’s atrocities.
Some six months later, after the sinking of the 
Lusitania, the Bryce Report on atrocities was re—
.leased; C2) to the British, Roosevelt attributed a 
rise in American opinion favorable to Germany to 
their helpful treatment of our war correspondents, 
while Britain and Prance on the other hand^were 
treating them badly. Five months after this re­
minder, official British^policy toward American 
correspondents was modified. Ibid., lo'J,
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family man with four sons, he felt that any parent should 
know "whether I want to see my four boys go off to fight.
His clamorous activities in promoting preparedness 
and the persistency with which he attacked its opponents 
naturally brought to him the charge that he was using this 
issue for opportunistic purposes. Roosevelt's advocacy of 
national preparedness, however, could not be so construed 
honestly. "Everyone who will take the trouble to find out 
may ascertain," he was quick to point out, " [that] I have 
been shouting preparedness at the top of my lungs for 
thirty-five years."30 Collier* s Magazine editorially sub­
stantiated his statements in regard to this point by list­
ing almost a dozen quotes from his utterances of twelve to 
twenty years previous which showed that his thinking on 
preparedness had been consistent through the years.31 
Indeed it can be said that Theodore Roosevelt 
lived a Spartan life. His entire existence was one of 
rigid discipline, both physical and mental. He fought 
for his goals in the same manner that he lived his every­
day life— with vigorousness and with abiding and undiverted 
attention. He preached loud and long for the ideas to which 
he was dedicated, using to the limit the forces of his pen, 
his unclear voice, and his storehouse of histrionics. In
Julia Street, "The Most Interesting American," Collier's. 
LVI (October 23, 1915)» 25. This article was based on 
a personal interview which the author had with ex- President Roosevelt.
3° Ibid., 6.
31 Collier's. "Roosevelt As A Prophet," ed., LVI 
(October 23, 1915), 6.
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his later years as he championed the cause of preparedness, 
he was often accused of overstating his attitude. "I do 
not believe I do overstate...,” he told one criticj ”of 
course, I have got to be emphatic to attract attention.”32 
Thus, though his character consisted of a conglomeration 
and an amalgamation of facets, regardless of their peculi­
arity or orthodoxy he was fully aware of their existence 
and he made full use of every one. Contrary to the usual 
characteristics of the extremely busy and highly bombastic 
person, Roosevelt was a thinker. His mind was quick and 
flexible. He enjoyed the challenges which came from think­
ing and concentration on subjects in many fields; and the 
views he expressed not only merited the most serious con­
sideration, but in many cases proved to be words of a seer.
It seems unfortunate that the talents of two such 
outstanding liberals and two such magnificent leaders as 
Roosevelt and Wilson could not have been blended in some 
manner so as to have caused a unity of purpose and effort. 
Instead, their labors and their emotions too often worked 
diametrically to one another’s, resulting in a most furious 
struggle between themselves and between the forces which 
they represented. Perhaps the temper of the times was best 
characterized in later years by Colonel Roosevelt’s daughter,
32 Roosevelt, Letters, VIII, lOOlj.. Roosevelt to Willard 
D. Straight, January 13, 1916.
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Mrs. Nicholas Longworth, who is quoted as having said:
"How we did cherish and nourish our hatreds in those days!
The story of Theodore Roosevelt was that of a man 
whose patriotism and love of politics created a spirit 
within which motivated him into a life of perpetual 
restlessness. Certainly nothing could do the character 
of Theodore Roosevelt less justice than a plaster bust.
33
33 Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great 
Betrayal (New York, 191+^ T> -^0•
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